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1.	 Introduction	
	
1.1	 In	a	nutshell	
This	 dissertation	 elaborates	 on	 a	modern,	 analytic	 version	 of	 the	 ontology	 of	
idealism,	according	to	which	(a)	phenomenal	consciousness,	as	an	ontological	
category,	 is	 fundamental;	 and	 (b)	 everything	 else	 in	nature	 can	ultimately	 be	
reduced	 to,	 or	 grounded	 in,	 patterns	 of	 excitation	 of	 phenomenal	
consciousness.	 It	 posits	 a	 reduction	 base	 consisting	 of	 a	 single	 element:	
spatially	 unbound,	 universal	 phenomenal	 consciousness.	 Its	 key	 challenge	 is	
then	to	explain	how	the	seemingly	distinct	phenomenal	inner	lives	of	different	
subjects	of	experience	can	arise	within	this	fundamentally	unitary	phenomenal	
field.	 This	 is	 sometimes	 called	 the	 “decomposition	 problem”	 in	 the	 literature	
(Chalmers	2016a)	and	it	is	the	core	problem	this	dissertation	attempts	to	tackle.	
Along	the	way,	a	variety	of	other	challenges	are	addressed,	such	as:	how	we	can	
reconcile	 idealism	with	the	 fact	 that	we	all	 inhabit	a	common	external	world;	
why	this	world	unfolds	independently	of	our	personal	volition	or	imagination;	
why	 there	 are	 such	 tight	 correlations	 between	 measured	 patterns	 of	 brain	
activity	and	reports	of	experience;	etc.	
Idealism	has	had	 its	heyday	 in	Western	philosophy	 in	 the	 18th	 (Berkeley)	 and	
early	 19th	 (Hegel)	 centuries.	 Though	 it	 has	 enjoyed	 popularity	 amongst	
continental	 philosophers,	 analytic	 philosophers	 have,	 by	 and	 large,	 failed	 to	
take	 idealism	 seriously,	 perhaps	 because	 of	 its	 association	 with	 religious	
traditions	in	both	East	and	West.	With	this	dissertation,	I	hope	to	help	change	
this	by	offering	a	strictly	analytic,	conceptually	clear	articulation	of	idealism.	I	
also	hope	 to	 offer	 empirical	 neuroscientific	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 idealism	
may	be	better	suited	to	make	sense	of	the	data	than	mainstream	physicalism	or	
constitutive	panpsychism.	
The	core	of	this	dissertation	consists	of	five	papers—each	a	piece	of	the	larger	
jigsaw	puzzle	assembled	in	this	volume—published	in	academic	journals.	They	
are	reproduced	here	without	any	change	of	substance.	The	order	in	which	they	
are	 presented	 is	 meant	 to	 help	 more	 effectively	 convey	 the	 overarching	
argument	of	which	each	individual	paper	is	a	part.	In	this	Introduction,	I	shall	
summarize	this	overarching	argument	so	to	help	readers	place	each	paper	in	its	
broader	 context,	 as	 they	 make	 their	 way	 through	 the	 dissertation.	 In	 other	
words,	here	I	shall	attempt	to	sketch	the	final,	completed	picture	of	the	jigsaw	
puzzle	before	each	piece	is	explored	in	more	detail.	
For	 this	 reason,	 however,	 readers	 should	 not	 expect	 the	 highly	 summarized	
argument	 presented	 in	 this	 Introduction	 to	 be	 strictly	 rigorous	 or	 complete.	
The	 goal	 is	 to	 first	 convey	 the	 general	 idea	 behind	 this	 dissertation,	 before	
elaborating	 on	 it	 with	 the	 rigor	 of	 the	 subsequent	 chapters.	 The	 appropriate	
literature	 reviews,	 as	 well	 as	 discussions	 on	 how	 the	 work	 presented	 here	 is	
situated	in	the	context	of	prior	efforts,	are	also	comprised	in	the	papers	ahead	
(chapter	2	to	6),	not	in	this	Introduction.	
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1.2	 The	big	picture	
It	has	now	become	trite	to	point	out	that	mainstream	physicalism	fails—unless	
one	subscribes	to	its	eliminative	formulation,	a	view	whose	absurdity	I	shall	not	
bother	 to	 argue	 for	 here1—to	 account	 for	 the	 sole	 given	 fact	 of	 reality:	 the	
existence	 of	 experience	 (e.g.	 Chalmers	 2003).	 Physicalism	 is	 also	 arguably	
irreconcilable—insofar	 as	 it	 presupposes	 physical	 realism—with	 results	
emerging	 from	 physics	 laboratories	 around	 the	 world	 (e.g.	 Kim	 et	 al.	 2000,	
Gröblacher	et	al.	2007,	Romero	et	al.	2010,	Lapkiewicz	et	al.	2011,	Ma	et	al.	2013,	
Manning	et	al.	2015,	Hensen	et	al.	2015,	etc.),	as	elaborated	upon	in	Section	A.3	
of	Appendix	A.2	So	both	 in	terms	of	 its	explanatory	power	and	 its	consistency	
with	empirical	observations,	our	mainstream	ontology	is	found	wanting.	
I	mention	this	merely	to	highlight	the	need	for	an	alternative	ontology,	such	as	
that	offered	in	this	dissertation.	Other	than	a	brief	review	of	the	‘hard	problem	
of	consciousness’	in	Chapter	3,	I	shall	not	focus	on	discussing	the	untenability	
of	mainstream	physicalism.	This	 has	 already	been	done	 in	 the	 literature	 (e.g.	
Levine	1983,	Chalmers	1996,	Rosenberg	2004:	13-30,	Strawson	et	al.	2006:	2-30,	
etc.).	What	 I	 shall	 attempt	 in	 the	 next	 chapter	 is	 something	more	 ambitious	
and—hopefully—more	 constructive:	 to	 point	 out	 the	 failures	 and	 internal	
contradictions	 of	 the	 very	 thought	 processes	 that	 underlie	 mainstream	
physicalism	 and	 related	 ontologies.	 Only	 by	 understanding	 these	 implicit,	
unexamined	 failures	 and	 contradictions	 can	 we	 hope	 to	 reform	 our	 thinking	
and	eventually	solve	(or	circumvent)	the	associated	dilemmas	and	paradoxes.	
In	this	context,	Chapter	2	discusses	what	is	perhaps	the	root	of	key	unresolved	
problems	 in	 contemporary	 analytic	 philosophy:	 the	 tendency	 to	 try	 to	 make	
sense	 of	 nature	 by	 replacing	 concrete	 observations	 with	 theoretical	
abstractions.	 Such	 attempts	 often	 consist	 of	 mere	 word	 games,	 played	 in	
thought	with	a	rich	and	shifting	phantasmagoria	of	concepts.	The	process	tends	
to	unfold	 so	 implicitly	 that	many	don’t	 seem	 to	 even	notice	how	many	 steps	
of—epistemically	 unreliable—conceptual	 abstraction	 their	 reasoning	 entails.	
Chapter	 2	 attempts	 to	make	 these	word	games	 explicit.	 It	 also	 suggests	more	
epistemically	 reliable	 lines	 of	 reasoning	 that	 avoid	 unnecessary	 conceptual	
abstractions.	
By	pursuing	these	more	reliable	lines	of	reasoning,	Chapter	3—the	core	of	this	
dissertation—elaborates	on	an	analytic	 formulation	of	 idealism.	 It	argues	 that	
the	best	categorical	explanation	 for	 the	 facts	of	nature	entails	 that	 these	 facts	
																																								 								
1	Interested	readers	can	peruse,	 instead,	an	excellent	recent	essay	by	Galen	Strawson,	
who	 has	 put	 it	 best:	 https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-
deniers/.	
2 	For	 a	 less	 technical	 approach,	 see	 two	 of	 my	 essays	 on	 Scientific	 American’s	
Observations	 blog:	 https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/should-
quantum-anomalies-make-us-rethink-reality/	 and	
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/coming-to-grips-with-the-
implications-of-quantum-mechanics/.	
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are	 essentially	 phenomenal.	 All	 of	 existence	 consists,	 it	 is	 claimed,	 solely	 of	
ideas—thoughts,	 emotions,	 perceptions,	 intuitions,	 imagination,	 etc.—even	
though	not	one’s	personal	ideas	alone.	
The	 ontology	 articulated	 in	Chapter	 3	 can	be	 summarized	 thus:	 there	 is	 only	
universal	phenomenal	consciousness.	We,	as	well	as	all	other	living	organisms,	
are	 dissociated	 alters	 of	 this	 universal	 consciousness,	 analogously	 to	 how	 a	
person	 with	 Dissociative	 Identity	 Disorder	 (DID)	 manifests	 multiple	 disjoint	
centers	of	subjectivity	also	called	‘alters.’	We,	and	all	other	living	organisms,	are	
surrounded	 by	 the	 transpersonal	 phenomenal	 activity	 of	 universal	
consciousness,	 which	 unfolds	 beyond	 the	 dissociative	 boundary	 of	 our	
respective	 alter.	 The	 inanimate	world3	we	 perceive	 around	us	 is	 the	 ‘extrinsic	
appearance’—i.e.	the	phenomenal	image	imprinted	from	across	our	dissociative	
boundary—of	 this	 activity.	The	 living	organisms	we	 share	 the	world	with	 are	
the	extrinsic	appearances	of	other	alters.	
Instead	 of	 the	 mainstream	 physicalist	 postulate	 of	 an	 ontological	 category	
fundamentally	outside	 and	 independent	of	mind,4	Chapter	 3	offers	 a	different	
categorical	 interpretation	of	what	we	call	 ‘matter.’	 Indeed,	according	 to	 it	 the	
living	brain	 is	merely	 a	phenomenal	appearance	 of	 a	person’s	 conscious	 inner	
life—her	thoughts,	feelings,	fantasies,	beliefs,	etc.—as	presented	on	the	screen	
of	perception	of	e.g.	another	person.	And	since	the	brain	is	made	of	matter,	this	
is	what	the	matter	in	a	living	brain	 is.	Chapter	3	then	goes	further	and,	in	the	
spirit	 of	 parsimony	 that	 underlies	 this	 entire	 dissertation,	 argues	 that	 this	 is	
also	 what	 all	matter	 is:	 the	 phenomenal	 appearance	 of	 equally	 phenomenal	
activity	unfolding	across	a	dissociative	boundary.	The	matter	 constituting	 the	
inanimate	universe	 is,	 thus,	what	 transpersonal	experiences	unfolding	outside	
the	alters	 look	 like	 from	 the	point	of	 view	of	 an	alter,	 just	 as	a	 living	brain	 is	
what	 personal	 experiences	 look	 like.	 By	 construing	 all	 matter	 to	 be	 a	
phenomenal	 appearance	 of	 equally	 phenomenal	 activity,	 analytic	 idealism	
requires	 nothing	 more	 than	 phenomenality	 to	 offer	 a	 coherent	 categorical	
interpretation	of	nature.	
Many	criticisms	can	be—and	have	been—made	against	such	a	consciousness-
only	ontology.	 Indeed,	because	of	 the	 formidable	 cultural	momentum	behind	
the	notion	of	an	objective	physical	world	distinct	from	mind,	one	can	promptly	
leverage	a	ready-made,	culturally	sanctioned	list	of	objections	against	idealism.	
Chapter	 4	 lists	 many	 of	 these	 objections	 and	 tackles	 them	 one	 by	 one.	 It	
attempts	to	show	that	they	are	often	based	on	logical	fallacies	such	as	question-
begging,	 unexamined	 assumptions,	 misunderstandings	 of	 the	 implications	 of	
analytic	idealism,	etc.	
																																								 								
3	Throughout	 this	dissertation,	 I	 use	 the	word	 ‘inanimate’	 in	 the	 sense	of	non-living;	
i.e.	as	that	which	is	not	biology.	
4	Throughout	 this	 dissertation—except	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 where	 they	 are	 defined	 in	 a	
different	way—I	use	 the	words	 ‘mind’	 and	 ‘mentation’	 as	 synonyms	of	phenomenal	
consciousness	and	phenomenal	activity,	respectively.	
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One	 objection	 is	 exceptional	 because	 it	 poses	 some	 legitimate	 difficulties:	 a	
necessary	 implication	 of	 the	 ontology	 proposed	 in	 Chapter	 3	 is	 that	 an	
organism’s	metabolism—all	of	it—is	the	extrinsic	appearance	of	the	organism’s	
conscious	 inner	 life.	 This	 is	 reasonable	 enough	 for	 certain	 patterns	 of	 brain	
activity	known	to	correlate	with	experiences	accessible	 through	 introspection,	
but	 what	 about	 metabolism	 beyond	 the	 brain,	 such	 as	 e.g.	 liver	 and	 kidney	
function?	And	what	about	the	metabolic	activity	taking	place	in,	say,	a	person’s	
left	big	toe?	If	the	ontology	proposed	in	Chapter	3	is	correct,	then	liver,	kidney	
and	even	toe	function	must	all	correspond	to	experiences	as	well.	Yet,	try	as	we	
might,	these	experiences	do	not	seem	to	be	accessible	through	introspection.	
Moreover,	even	if	we	were	to	look	at	the	brain	alone,	ignoring	the	metabolism	
in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 body,	 recent	 studies	 in	 psychology	 suggest	 the	 presence	 of	
seemingly	unconscious	mental	processes	in	the	brain	(e.g.	Hassin	2013).	This,	if	
true,	would	already	contradict	analytic	idealism.	
Chapter	 5	 bites	 these	 bullets	 and	 argues	 that,	 despite	 appearances	 to	 the	
contrary,	 there	 is	 no	 clear	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 any	mental	 process	 is	 truly	
unconscious.	 Instead,	 it	 attempts	 to	 show	 that	 there	 are,	 in	 fact,	 very	 good	
reasons	 to	 think	 that	 what	 we	 regard	 as	 unconscious	 mental	 processes	
correspond	 merely	 to	 an	 illusion	 of	 unconsciousness,	 which	 results	 from	
dissociative	states	or	lack	of	metacognition.	And	once	these	two	mechanisms—
dissociative	states	and	 lack	of	metacognition—are	 identified,	 they	can	explain	
why	experiences	corresponding	to	areas	of	the	living	body	beyond	the	nervous	
system	can’t	be	accessed	through	introspection.	
The	 last	piece	of	 the	puzzle	 is	 that	of	empirical	evidence.	Chapter	6	compiles	
and	 discusses	 a	 broad	 list	 of	 instances	 of	 brain	 function	 impairment	 that	 are	
accompanied	by	enrichment	 of	 conscious	 inner	 life	 and	an	expansion	 of	one’s	
sense	 of	 identity.	 The	 list	 includes	 cases	 as	 varied	 as	 asphyxiation,	 physical	
trauma	to	the	head,	the	consumption	of	psychoactive	substances	that	dampen	
brain	activity,	etc.	
Such	 correlations	 between	 impaired	 brain	 function	 and	 enriched	 conscious	
inner	life	are	at	least	counterintuitive	under	the	mainstream	physicalist	notion	
that	 conscious	 inner	 life	 is	 constituted	 or	 generated	 by	 brain	 activity.	 Under	
analytic	 idealism,	on	the	other	hand,	 they	are	 to	be	expected:	 if	normal	brain	
function	 is	 part	 of	 the	 extrinsic	 appearance	 of	 a	dissociated	 alter	 of	 universal	
consciousness,	 then	 some	 forms	 of	 reduction	 or	 impairment	 of	 normal	 brain	
function	should	be	the	extrinsic	appearance	of	a	reduction	or	impairment	of	the	
dissociation.	 And,	 of	 course,	 from	 a	 first-person	 perspective	 a	 reduction	 of	
dissociation	 must	 be	 experienced	 as	 an	 enrichment	 of	 conscious	 inner	 life:	
reintegrated	memories,	the	recovery	of	a	broader	sense	identity,	renewed	access	
to	 previously	 dissociated	 insights	 and	 emotions,	 reintegration	 of	 previously	
dissociated	 skills,	 etc.	Contrary	 to	physicalism,	 analytic	 idealism	can	 thus	not	
only	accommodate,	but	also	make	sense	of,	the	evidence	discussed	in	Chapter	
6.	
Naturally,	 the	 argument	 in	 Chapter	 6	 is	 not	 that	 all	 impairment	 of	 brain	
function	should	be	accompanied	by	enriched	inner	life.	Otherwise,	the	smartest	
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and	most	creative	people	would	be	those	with	the	most	damaged	brains.	This	is	
clearly	not	the	case.	But	neither	does	analytic	idealism	require	it	to	be	the	case.	
Allow	me	to	elaborate.	
As	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	a	living	organism	corresponds	to	a	dissociated	alter	
of	universal	consciousness.	As	such,	each	person	can	be	regarded	as	a	segment	
of	 universal	 consciousness—meant	 here	 generically,	 without	 implying	 that	
universal	consciousness	necessarily	has	spatiotemporal	extension—comprising	
its	 own	 dissociated	 phenomenal	 states.	 Segments	 comprising	 many	
phenomenal	 states	 can	 be	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘big	 alters,’	 whereas	 segments	
comprising	 few	 phenomenal	 states	 can	 be	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘small	 alters.’	 It	 is	
reasonable	to	say,	for	instance,	that	human	beings	correspond	to	bigger	alters	
than,	say,	insects.	
Notice	 that,	 in	 principle,	 both	 big	 and	 small	 alters	 can	 be	 equally	 well	
dissociated.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 relative	 amount	 of	 phenomenal	 states	
encompassed	by	an	alter	does	not	bear	relevance	to	how	well	dissociated	these	
phenomenal	 states	 are	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 universal	 consciousness.	 It	 is	 entirely	
coherent,	within	the	logic	of	analytic	idealism,	that	a	small	alter	could	be	more	
strongly	dissociated	from	universal	consciousness	than	a	big	alter,	or	the	other	
way	around.	
Now,	 since	 brain	 activity	 is	 part	 of	 the	 extrinsic	 appearance	 of	 an	 alter’s	
dissociated	 phenomenal	 states,	 it	 stands	 to	 reason	 that	 some—even	most—
types	of	brain	function	impairment	should	correspond	simply	to	a	reduction	of	
the	phenomenal	 states	of	 the	alter.	These	 types	of	brain	 function	 impairment	
will	not	disrupt	the	dissociation	itself,	but	only	stifle	whatever	is	circumscribed	
by	 the	 dissociative	 boundary.	 The	 alter	 will	 become	 smaller,	 cognitively	
compromised,	 but	 still	 equally	 well	 dissociated.	 This	 is	 why,	 under	 analytic	
idealism,	many	 or	 even	most	 types	 of	 brain	 function	 impairment	 should	 still	
come	accompanied	by	cognitive	deficit,	not	awareness	expansion.	
Only	some	specific	types	of	brain	function	impairment,	which	somehow	affect	
the	dissociative	mechanisms	themselves—as	opposed	to	the	phenomenal	states	
encompassed	by	 the	 alter—should	 correlate	with	 an	 enrichment	of	 conscious	
inner	 life.	 They	 make	 the	 dissociative	 boundary	 ‘porous,’	 so	 to	 speak.	 At	
present,	 however,	 it	 is	 not	 yet	 known	what	 precise	 aspects	 of	 brain	 function	
correspond	 to	 these	 dissociative	 mechanisms,	 even	 though	 some	 tantalizing	
indications	 are	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 6.	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 currently	
impossible	 to	predict	with	 accuracy	what	 types	 of	 brain	 function	 impairment	
should	lead	to	what	type	of	effect:	awareness	expansion	or	cognitive	deficit.	
What	 distinguishes	 the	 predictions	 of	 analytic	 idealism	 from	 those	 of	
mainstream	 physicalism	 is	 this:	 under	 analytic	 idealism,	 some	 types	 of	 brain	
function	impairment	should,	in	principle,	lead	to	enriched	conscious	inner	life.	
Under	mainstream	physicalism,	however,	this	is	much	more	difficult	to	argue,	
as	elaborated	upon	 in	Chapter	6.	More	 rigorously	put,	my	claim	 is	 this:	 there	
are	 some	 types	 of	 brain	 function	 impairment—which	 under	 mainstream	
physicalism	 should	 correlate	 with	 cognitive	 deficit	 and	 under	 analytic	 idealism	
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with	 enriched	 inner	 life—that	have	 been	 shown	 to	 be	 accompanied	by	 enriched	
inner	life.	
Notice	that,	because	of	the	inherent	limitations	of	gauging	consciousness	from	
a	second-	or	third-person	perspective,	the	playing	field	isn’t	level:	many	types	of	
brain	 function	 impairment	may	cause	both	an	enrichment	of	 conscious	 inner	
life	 and	 compromise	 the	 subjects’	 ability	 to	 report	 this	 enrichment.	 For	
instance,	 language	 or	motor	 centers,	memory	 pathways	 or	 a	 variety	 of	 other	
communication-critical	 functions	 in	 the	brain	may	be	compromised,	harming	
or	 eliminating	 the	 subjects’	 ability	 to	 speak	 or	write.	 For	 all	 we	 know,	many	
subjects	 could	 be	 lying	 in	 hospital	 with	 severe	 head	 trauma	 or	 other	 brain	
ailments,	having	unfathomable	inner	experiences,	and	yet	be	utterly	incapable	
of	 relating	 any	 of	 it	 to	 family	 or	 medical	 staff.	 If	 brain	 areas	 essential	 to	
metacognition	are	compromised,	subjects	may	not	even	be	able	to	report	their	
experiences	 to	 themselves,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 5.	 Consequently,	 the	
potential	 for	 evidence	 that	 corroborates	 analytic	 idealism	 is	 restricted	 by	
conflicting	 requirements:	 the	 corresponding	 brain	 function	 impairment	must	
be	 sufficient	 to	 affect	 dissociative	 mechanisms—not	 just	 dampen	 the	
phenomenal	 states	 encompassed	 by	 the	 alter—whilst	 preserving	 enough	
cognitive	 function	 so	 subjects	 can	 report	 their	 expanded	 awareness.	 These	
conflicting	 requirements	 aren’t	 trivial	 to	 meet	 concurrently.	 It	 is,	 thus,	 if	
anything,	surprising	that	so	many	case	reports	exist	in	the	literature	that	seem	
to	corroborate	analytic	idealism,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	6.	
Chapter	 7	 then	 discusses	 some	 important	 issues	 related	 to,	 but	 left	
insufficiently	addressed	by,	chapters	2	to	6.	It	also	points	to	potential	areas	of	
future	investigation.	
	
1.3	 The	appendices	
The	analytic	case	for	idealism	is	laid	out	in	chapters	2	to	6.	Nonetheless,	there	
are	 two	 topics	 that,	 despite	 not	 being	 part	 of	 the	 core	 argument	 of	 this	
dissertation,	 arise	 so	 forcefully	 from	 it	 that	 it	 would	 have	 been	 negligent	 to	
leave	 them	 unaddressed.	 I	 have	 thus	 added	 two	 papers—also	 originally	
published	in	academic	journals—that	tackle	these	topics	in	two	appendices,	A	
and	B,	respectively.	
Appendix	A	addresses	the	following	question:	If	analytic	idealism	is	true,	what	
are	its	implications?	In	other	words,	how	does	it	change	the	way	we	look	upon	
life	 and	 the	 world?	 Indeed,	 whereas	 mainstream	 physicalism	 denies	 the	
meaning	of	the	world	by	construing	it	to	be	a	mechanical	contraption	governed	
by	 blind	 laws	 and	 mere	 chance,	 analytic	 idealism	 regards	 the	 world	 as	 the	
extrinsic	 appearance	of	 intrinsic,	 universal	 phenomenal	 activity.	According	 to	
it,	nature	holds	hidden	but	 inherent	semantic	meaning:	 it	points	symbolically	
to	something	beyond	its	face-value	appearance.	This	 is	unpacked	in	Appendix	
A,	in	an	attempt	to	highlight	the	relevance	of	idealism	to	life.	
Because	 it	 was	 originally	 published	 as	 a	 self-contained	 paper,	 Appendix	 A—
more	specifically,	Section	A.3—includes	an	empirical	argument	to	substantiate	
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its	 starting	hypothesis	 that	 the	world	 is	 essentially	 phenomenal.	 It	 elaborates	
upon	the	experimental	evidence	for	what	is	technically	called	‘contextuality’	in	
physics:	 the	 notion	 that	 physical	 quantities	 are	 fundamentally	 dependent	 on	
observation	 and	 have	 no	 definite	 existence	 before	 being	 observed.	 The	 link	
between	contextuality	and	idealism	is	also	made	explicit	in	Appendix	A.	
Attentive	 readers	 will	 notice	 that,	 throughout	 Appendix	 A,	 I	 use	 the	 word	
‘meaning’	to	denote	‘sense’	(as	in	the	sense	of	a	word	or	phrase),	 ‘significance’	
(as	in	the	significance	of	a	historical	moment)	and	‘purpose’	(as	in	the	purpose	
of	 an	 action),	 freely	 conflating	 all	 three	 usages.	 This	 conflation	 is	 intentional	
and	implicitly	reflects	the	very	conclusion	of	the	appendix:	that	the	purpose	of	
life	is	to	unveil	the	sense	and	significance	of	the	world.	Thus	the	meaning	of	life	
in	 the	 world	 is	 simultaneously	 life’s	 purpose	 and	 the	 world’s	 sense	 and	
significance.	 Indeed,	 the	 very	 linguistic	 versatility	 of	 the	 word	 ‘meaning’	
amplifies	the	argument	in	Appendix	A:	‘purpose’	is	intrinsically	connected	with	
‘sense’	and	‘significance.’	Perhaps	language	captures	and	preserves—like	a	time	
capsule—ancient	intuitions	we	have	since	allowed	to	escape	us.	
The	second	question	that	naturally	arises	if	one	finds	the	argument	for	analytic	
idealism	compelling	is	this:	What	drove	the	formidable	momentum	behind	the	
mainstream	 adoption	 of	 physicalism	 over	 the	 past	 200	 years	 or	 so,	 if	 a	more	
plausible	and	viable	alternative—unaffected	by	fundamental	problems,	such	as	
the	‘hard	problem	of	consciousness’—has	existed	all	along?	
Appendix	B	argues	that	a	key	motivation	for	the	development	and	mainstream	
adoption	 of	 physicalism	 has	 been	psychological,	 as	 opposed	 to	 philosophical.	
This	may	come	as	a	surprising	assertion,	for	physicalism	is	often	regarded	as	a	
purely	 fact-based	 interpretation	of	 reality,	untarnished	by	subjective	biases	or	
covert	 wish-fulfillment	 maneuvers.	 Appendix	 B	 argues	 that	 this	 may	 not	 be	
true,	for	there	are	compelling	reasons	to	believe	that	the	physicalist	worldview	
protects	and	validates	the	ego,	even	in	view	of	formidable	threats	such	as	death.	
Perhaps	 even	 more	 surprisingly,	 behind	 physicalism’s	 apparent	 denial	 of	
meaning	 there	 operate—it	 is	 argued—psychological	mechanisms	 that	 seek	 to	
enhance	one’s	sense	of	meaning	in	life.	
For	these	reasons,	I	argue	that	it	is	not	surprising	that	physicalism,	despite	its	
inherent	 problems,	 has	 come	 to	 amass	 the	 formidable	 level	 of	 support	 it	 has	
today	 among	 the	 intellectual	 elites,	 particularly	 in	 academia.	 As	 is	 often	 the	
case	with	 views	 that	 come	 to	 define	 a	 culture,	 there	 is	more	 to	 physicalism’s	
success	than	its	philosophical	merits.	
	
1.4	 Preempting	misunderstandings	
While	 discussing	 the	 ideas	 presented	 in	 this	 dissertation	 with	 other	
philosophers,	it	has	become	clear	to	me	that	a	few	observations	should	be	made	
upfront,	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 the	 correct	 understanding—and,	 perhaps	more	
importantly,	 preempt	misunderstandings—of	 what	 is	 claimed	 in	 the	 papers	
ahead.	
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A	 claim	made	 already	 in	 the	 title	 of	 Chapter	 3	 is	 that,	 according	 to	 analytic	
idealism,	 the	 universe	 is	 in	 consciousness.	 This	 is	 liable	 to	misinterpretation:	
insofar	as	analytic	idealism	entails	that	consciousness	is	the	categorical	basis—
the	underlying	essence—of	all	 that	exists,	 shouldn’t	one	say,	 instead,	 that	 the	
universe	is	consciousness?	
This	would	 indeed	 be	 so	 if	 I	 took	 the	word	 ‘universe’	 to	 denote	 ‘all	 there	 is.’	
After	all,	if	the	universe	is	all	there	is	and	it	is	‘made	of’	consciousness,	then	to	
say	 that	 the	 universe	 is	 in	 consciousness	 would	 amount	 to	 saying	 that	
consciousness	is	in	consciousness.	
However,	 throughout	 this	 dissertation,	 I	 take	 the	 word	 ‘universe’	 to	 denote	
what	 we	 perceive	 and	 measure.	 In	 other	 words,	 I	 am	 using	 the	 operational	
definition	of	‘universe’	in	physics,	as	opposed	to	a	metaphysical	one.	The	claim	
is	 then	 that	 this	 perceived	 universe	 is	 in	 consciousness	 since,	 according	 to	
analytic	 idealism,	 it	 consists	 of	 particular	 patterns	 of	 excitation	 of	 universal	
consciousness.	The	universe	is	thus	in	consciousness	for	the	same	reason	that	
ripples	are	in	water.	
A	 second	 point	 prone	 to	 misunderstanding	 is	 the	 following:	 as	 discussed	 in	
Chapter	 3,	 an	 important	 contribution	 of	 this	 dissertation	 is	 the	 notion	 that	
dissociation—at	 a	 universal	 scale—is	 what	 creates	 the	 appearance	 of	
fragmentation	 of	 universal	 consciousness	 into	 multiple	 disjoint	 centers	 of	
experience,	 such	 as	 you	 and	me.	 Yet,	 at	 a	 human	 scale,	 dissociation	 is	 often	
thought	 of	 as	 presupposing	 intentionality,	 or	 ‘aboutness.’	 Allow	 me	 to	
elaborate.	
Many	 of	 our	 human	 phenomenal	 states	 entail	 intentionality:	 we	 think	 about	
buying	the	car	we	saw	at	the	dealership;	we	feel	bad	about	 the	news	we	heard	
on	the	radio;	etc.	These	thoughts	and	feelings	are	thus	about	things	or	events	in	
the	 ‘world	 out	 there’:	 they	 are	 anchored	 in	 some	 content	 of	 sense	 perception	
accessible	 through	 episodic	 memory	 (Chalmers	 1996:	 19).	 When	 dissociation	
happens	at	 the	human	 level,	 it	 is	often	episodic	memory	access	 that	becomes	
compromised	 as	 a	 reaction	 to	 trauma:	 traumatic	 memories	 are	 no	 longer	
accessible	through	the	chains	of	cognitive	association	that	characterize	regular	
psychic	life	(American	Psychiatric	Association	2013).	
The	 possible	 misunderstanding	 is	 then	 this:	 if	 dissociation	 presupposed	
intentionality,	then	the	argument	in	Chapter	3	would	fail	because	it	posits	that	
dissociation—at	a	universal	scale—is	what	enables	intentionality	to	begin	with,	
by	 creating	 a	 boundary	 between	 an	 alter	 and	 its	 surrounding	 environment.	
Without	this	boundary	there	would	be—it	is	argued—no	sense	perception,	no	
‘world	out	there’	about	which	we	could	think	or	feel.	
The	misunderstanding	lies	 in	assuming	that	dissociation	is	defined	 in	 terms	of	
intentional	content,	simply	because	it	often	happens,	in	humans,	in	connection	
with	intentional	content.	However,	dissociation	entails	merely	the	cessation	of	
an	 otherwise	 normal	 cognitive	 association	 between	 two	 phenomenal	 states—
say,	 a	 thought	 and	 a	 feeling—regardless	 of	 whether	 these	 states	 have	
intentional	content	or	not.	
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A	thought	experiment	 should	make	 this	 clear:	 it	 is	possible	 to	conceive	of	 an	
infant	kept	from	birth	in	an	ideal	sensory-depravation	chamber.	Such	an	infant	
would	 not	 only	 have	 abstract	 thoughts	 and	 feelings,	 but	 there	would	 also	 be	
natural	 cognitive	 associations	 across	 these	 thoughts	 and	 feelings.	 If	 some	 of	
these	cognitive	associations	were	 to	cease,	one	would	still	be	able	 to	speak	of	
dissociation,	 even	 though	 the	 infant	 would	 have	 never	 experienced	 sense	
perception.	In	other	words,	it	seems	perfectly	possible	that	phenomenal	states	
could	become	dissociated	from	each	other,	even	if	they	don’t	have	phenomenal	
content.	Therefore,	the	argument	in	Chapter	3	holds.	
The	final	point	of	possible	misunderstanding	has	to	do	with	the	argument	laid	
out	 in	Chapter	 2.	 There,	 I	 attempt	 to	 show	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 an	 ontological	
category	outside	and	 independent	of	phenomenal	consciousness	 is	not	only	a	
theoretical	abstraction—as	opposed	 to	an	empirical	observation—it	 is	also	an	
epistemically	 unreliable	 abstraction.	 Readers	 of	 that	 paper	 have,	 however,	
tended	to	assume	that	I	was	seeking	to	make	an	affirmative	metaphysical	point	
based	 on	 this	 epistemic	 basis	 (see	 the	 Open	 Peer	 Commentaries	 in	 Kastrup	
2018b).	This	is	incorrect.	
So	 let	 me	 be	 clear	 upfront:	 what	 Chapter	 2	 attempts	 is	 to	 highlight	 that	
different	 ontologies	 inherently	 carry	 different	 epistemic	 costs—i.e.	 degrees	 of	
epistemic	 confidence—even	 if	 these	 ontologies	 are	 both	 internally	 consistent	
and	consistent	with	empirical	observations.	And	whereas	this	is	admittedly	not	
a	metaphysical	argument,	it	undoubtedly	has	great	relevance	in	informing	one’s	
choice	 of	metaphysics,	 since	 all	 that	 is	 available	 for	making	 such	 a	 choice	 is	
one’s	knowledge.	The	degree	to	which	one’s	knowledge	is	reliable	should	be	a	
factor—perhaps	even	a	defining	factor—in	the	choice.	
Having	made	these	upfront	clarifications,	I	am	now	ready	to	begin	elaborating	
on	analytic	 idealism	by,	 first,	 laying	out	 its	 epistemic	basis	 and	motivation	 in	
the	next	chapter.	
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2.	 Conflating	Abstraction	with	Empirical	Observation:	
The	False	Mind-Matter	Dichotomy	
	
This	paper	first	appeared	in	Constructivist	Foundations,	ISSN	1782-348X,	Vol.	13,	
No.	3,	in	July	2018.	
	
2.1	 Abstract	
The	alleged	dichotomy	between	mind	and	matter	 is	pervasive.	Therefore,	 the	
attempt	 to	 explain	matter	 in	 terms	 of	 mind	 (idealism)	 is	 often	 considered	 a	
mirror	 image	 of	 that	 of	 explaining	 mind	 in	 terms	 of	 matter	 (mainstream	
physicalism),	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 being	 structurally	 equivalent	 despite	 being	
reversely	arranged.	I	argue	that	this	is	an	error	arising	from	language	artifacts,	
for	 dichotomies	must	 reside	 in	 the	 same	 level	 of	 abstraction.	 Because	matter	
outside	mind	is	not	an	empirical	observation	but	rather	an	explanatory	model,	
the	epistemic	symmetry	between	the	two	is	broken.	Consequently,	matter	and	
mind	cannot	reside	in	the	same	level	of	abstraction.	It	then	becomes	clear	that	
attempting	to	explain	mind	in	terms	of	matter	is	epistemically	more	costly	than	
attempting	 to	 explain	 matter	 in	 terms	 of	 mind.	 The	 paper	 highlights	 the	
primacy	 of	 perceptual	 constructs	 over	 explanatory	 abstraction	 on	 both	
epistemic	and	ontic	levels.	
	
2.2	 Introduction	
The	(unexamined)	assumption	that	mind	and	matter	are	jointly	exhaustive	and	
mutually	exclusive	concepts	 is	pervasive	today.	In	other	words,	many	scholars	
implicitly	 take	 every	 aspect	 of	 existence	 to	 be	 either	 mental	 (e.g.	 thoughts,	
emotions,	 hallucinations)	 or	 physical	 (e.g.	 tables	 and	 chairs),	 mentality	 and	
physicality	 being	 polar	 opposites	 in	 some	 sense.	 Originating	 with	 René	
Descartes	 and	 Immanuel	 Kant	 (Walls	 2003:	 130),	 this	 dichotomy	 has	 been	
firmly	 entrenched	 in	 Western	 thought	 since	 at	 least	 the	 early	 nineteenth	
century.	 Eminent	 scholarly	 publications	 of	 the	 time,	 such	 as	 The	 British	
Cyclopædia	 of	 Natural	 History,	 lay	 it	 out	 unambiguously:	 “as	 mind	 is	 the	
opposite	 of	 matter	 in	 definition,	 the	 perfection	 of	 its	 exercise	 must	 be	 the	
opposite	of	that	of	the	exercise	of	matter”	(Partington	1837:	161).	From	the	early	
twentieth	century	onwards,	more	nuanced	formulations	of	the	dichotomy	were	
proposed.	Alfred	North	Whitehead	 (1947),	 for	 instance,	 considered	mind	 and	
matter	 co-dependent	 opposites.	 Even	Henri	 Bergson,	 whose	 conception	 of	 an	
élan	vital	was	meant	to	dilute	the	Cartesian	split,	was	careful	not	to	completely	
eradicate	the	dichotomy	(Catani	2013:	94).	
Indeed,	 this	 trend	 towards	 more	 nuanced	 formulations	 endures	 to	 this	 day.	
Philosopher	David	Chalmers,	for	instance,	wrote	that	the	“failure	of	materialism	
leads	to	a	kind	of	dualism:	there	are	both	physical	and	nonphysical	[i.e.	mental]	
features	of	the	world”	(1996:	124).	He	speaks	of	property	dualism	(ibid.:	 125)	to	
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distinguish	 it	 from	 the	 discredited	 substance	 dualism	 of	 Descartes.	
Nonetheless,	the	essence	of	the	dichotomy	persists	intact.	Public	endorsements	
of	property	dualism	by	influential	science	spokespeople,	such	as	neuroscientists	
Christof	 Koch	 (2012a:	 152)	 and	 Sam	 Harris,1	lend	 academic	 legitimacy	 to	 it.	
Harris,	 for	 instance,	 claims	 that	 mind	 and	 matter	 each	 represent	 “half	 of	
reality,”	making	the	 implicit	assumption	that	 they	have	comparable	epistemic	
status	(that	is,	that	matter	is	as	confidently	knowable	as	mind).	So	pervasive	is	
this	assumption	that	it	has	become	integral	to	our	shared	cultural	intuitions.	
Whilst	a	fundamental	dichotomy	between	mind	and	matter	is	readily	accepted	
by	 large	 segments	 of	 the	 population—perhaps	 for	 psychological	 reasons	
(Heflick	 et	 al.	 2015)—in	 philosophical	 circles	 the	 corresponding	 dualism	 is	
properly	 regarded	 as	 unparsimonious.	 For	 this	 reason,	 philosophy	 has	
historically	 attempted	 to	 explain	 one	 member	 of	 the	 alleged	 dichotomy	 in	
terms	of	 the	other.	The	ontology	of	 idealism,	 for	 instance,	attempts	to	reduce	
“all	 sense	 data	 to	 mental	 contents”	 (Tarnas	 2010:	 335),	 whereas	 mainstream	
physicalism—perhaps	 better	 labelled	 as	 ‘materialism,’	 but	 which	 I	 shall	
continue	 to	 refer	 to	 as	 ‘mainstream	 physicalism’	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 consistency	
with	some	of	the	relevant	literature—attempts	to	reduce	all	mental	contents	to	
material	arrangements	(Stoljar	2016).	To	be	more	specific,	idealism	entails	that	
mind	 is	 nature’s	 fundamental	 ontological	 ground,	 everything	 else	 being	
reducible	 to,	 or	 grounded	 in,	 mind,	 whereas	 mainstream	 physicalism	 posits	
that	 nature’s	 fundamental	 ontological	 ground	 is	 matter	 outside	 and	
independent	 of	 mind,	 everything	 else	 being	 reducible	 to,	 or	 grounded	 in,	
matter.	
The	problem	is	that	the	ingrained	cultural	intuition	that	mind	and	matter	have	
comparable	 epistemic	 status	 tends	 to	 creep—unexamined—even	 into	
philosophical	 thought,	 leading	 to	 the	 tacit	 conclusion	 that	 idealism	 and	
mainstream	physicalism	are	mirror	images	of	each	other,	in	the	sense	of	being	
structurally	equivalent	despite	being	reversely	arranged.	In	the	present	essay,	I	
contend	 that	 this	 tacit	 conclusion	 is	 false	 because	 it	 overlooks	 important	
epistemic	considerations:	we	do	not—and	fundamentally	cannot—know	matter	
as	confidently	as	we	know	mind.	By	incorrectly	positing	that	idealism	incurs	an	
epistemic	cost	comparable	to	that	of	mainstream	physicalism	in	at	 least	some	
important	 sense,	 the	 tacit	 conclusion	 undervalues	 idealism	 and	 overvalues	
physicalism.	 This	 confusion	may	 be	 a	 key	 enabler	 of	 physicalism’s	 success	 in	
underpinning	 our	 present-day	 mainstream	 worldview.	 Once	 the	 tacit	
conclusion	 is	 properly	 examined	 and	 rectified,	 as	 attempted	 in	 this	 essay,	
idealism	 may	 emerge	 as	 a	 more	 plausible	 ontology	 than	 mainstream	
physicalism,	at	least	in	terms	of	its	epistemic	cost.	
Like	 Gilbert	 Ryle	 (2009),	 I	 argue	 that	 mind	 and	 matter	 do	 not	 form	 a	
dichotomy.	My	argument,	however,	does	not	depend—as	Ryle’s	controversially	
																																								 								
1	See	Harris’s	video	titled	“You	Are	More	Than	Your	Brain”	on	Big	Think,	4	September	
2016,	 available	 at	
https://www.facebook.com/BigThinkdotcom/videos/10153879575418527/.	
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does	 (Webster	 1995:	 483)—on	 equating	 mind	 with	 behaviours.	 Indeed,	 Ryle	
attempts	to	refute	the	alleged	dichotomy	by	effectively	relegating	mind	to	the	
status	 of	mere	 illusion	 (ibid:	 461).	My	 argument,	 instead,	 rests	 on	 the	 notion	
that	 mind	 and	 matter	 are	 not	 epistemically	 symmetrical—a	 concept	 I	 shall	
formally	define	 in	 section	2.5—as	members	of	a	dichotomy	must	be.	 I	do	not	
deny	 mind,	 because	 it	 is	 epistemically	 primary:	 all	 knowledge	 presupposes	
mind.	
That	 the	 notion	 of	 physically	 objective	 matter—that	 is,	 matter	 outside	 and	
independent	 of	 mind—is	 now	 largely	 taken	 for	 granted	 suggests	 cultural	
acclimatization	 to	 what	 is	 a	 mere	 hypothesis.	 After	 all,	 physically	 objective	
matter	 is	 not	 empirically	 observable,	 but	 a	 conceptual	 explanatory	 device	
abstracted	from	the	patterns	and	regularities	of	empirical	observations—that	is,	
an	 explanatory	 abstraction	 (Glasersfeld	 1987;	 more	 on	 this	 in	 section	 2.4).	
Indeed,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 growing	 tendency	 in	 science	 today	 to	 mistake	
explanatory	 abstraction	 for	what	 is	 available	 to	 us	 empirically.	 This	 has	 been	
extensively	 documented	 before,	 but	 mostly	 in	 regard	 to	 clearly	 speculative	
ideas	 such	 as	 superstring	 theory	 and	 multiverse	 cosmologies	 (Smolin	 2007).	
When	it	comes	to	the	everyday	notion	of	physically	objective	matter,	however,	
many	fail	to	see	the	same	conflation	at	work.	
To	illustrate	and	highlight	the	conflation	with	an	admittedly	extreme	example,	
the	 next	 section	 briefly	 reviews	 the	 ontology	 of	 pancomputationalism,	which	
posits	ungrounded	computation	as	the	primary	element	of	existence	(Piccinini	
2015).	 Indeed,	 the	 idea	 of	 replacing	 physicalism	 with	 ontic	
pancomputationalism	should	provide	a	visceral	demonstration	of	the	epistemic	
cost	 of	 substituting	 explanatory	 abstraction	 for	 empirical	 observation.	 In	 this	
context,	my	suggestion	is	that	an	analogous	epistemic	disparity	exists	between	
idealism	and	mainstream	physicalism.	In	other	words,	if	one	is	convinced	that	
ontic	pancomputationalism	is	absurd	in	comparison	to	physicalism,	then—and	
on	the	same	basis—one	has	reason	to	question	the	plausibility	of	mainstream	
physicalism	in	comparison	to	idealism.	
Section	 2.4	 then	 elaborates	 more	 systematically	 on	 the	 different	 planes	 of	
abstract	explanations	used	in	science	and	philosophy.	It	provides	the	basis	for	
the	refutation	of	the	alleged	dichotomy	between	mind	and	matter	later	carried	
out	 in	 section	2.5,	which	 forms	 the	core	of	 this	 essay.	Finally,	 the	Conclusion	
sums	it	all	up.	
Before	 we	 start,	 however,	 some	 terminology	 clarifications	 are	 needed.	
Throughout	 this	 essay,	 I	 use	 the	 word	 ‘mind’	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 phenomenal	
consciousness.	 Following	 Thomas	 Nagel’s	 (1974)	 original	 definition	 of	 the	
latter—which	has	since	been	further	popularized	by	Chalmers	(1996,	2003)—I	
stipulate	that,	if	there	is	anything	it	is	like	to	be	a	certain	entity,	then	the	entity	
is	minded.	As	such,	mind—as	the	word	is	used	here—is	epistemically	primary,	
an	assertion	 further	substantiated	 in	section	2.4.	 In	 this	sense,	mind	does	not	
necessarily	 entail	 higher-level	 functions	 such	 as	 metacognition—that	 is,	 the	
knowledge	of	one’s	knowledge	(Schooler	2002:	340)—or	even	a	conscious	sense	
of	 self	 as	 distinct	 from	 the	 world.	 It	 necessarily	 entails	 only	 the	 presence	 of	
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phenomenal	 properties,	 in	 that	 it	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 substrate	 or	 ground	 of	
experience.	 Moreover,	 insofar	 as	 what	 we	 call	 ‘concreteness’	 is	 itself	 a	
phenomenal	 property	 associated	 with	 the	 degree	 of	 clarity	 or	 vividness	 of	
experience,	mind	 is	 the	 sole	ground	of	 concreteness.	Anything	allegedly	non-
mental	cannot,	by	definition,	be	concrete,	but	is	abstract	instead,	in	the	sense	
of	lacking	phenomenal	properties.	
I	am	well	aware	that	the	word	 ‘mind’	 is	used	in	entirely	different	ways—often	
decoupled	 from	experience—in	other	 contexts,	 such	 as	 philosophy	of	 biology	
(Godfrey-Smith	 2014)	 and	 artificial	 intelligence	 (Franklin	 1997).	 Yet,	 I	 believe	
the	usage	I	am	defining	here	is	adequate	for	the	context	of	the	present	paper.	
And	given	this	usage,	experience	can	be	coherently	regarded	as	an	excitation	of	
mind,	whereas	mind	can	be	coherently	regarded	as	the	substrate	or	ground	of	
experience.	
	
2.3	 The	epistemic	cost	of	explanation	by	abstraction	
By	 postulating	 a	 material	 world	 outside	 mind	 and	 obeying	 laws	 of	 physics,	
physicalism	 can	 accommodate	 the	 patterns	 and	 regularities	 of	 perceptual	
experience.	But	it	fails	to	accommodate	experience	itself.	This	is	called	the	‘hard	
problem	of	consciousness’	and	there	 is	now	a	vast	 literature	on	 it	 (e.g.	Levine	
1983,	Rosenberg	2004:	 13-30	and	Strawson	et	 al.	2006:	2-30).	 In	a	nutshell,	 the	
qualities	 of	 experience	 are	 irreducible	 to	 the	 parameters	 of	 material	
arrangements—whatever	the	arrangement	is—in	the	sense	that	it	is	impossible,	
even	 in	principle,	 to	deduce	 those	qualities	 from	 these	parameters	 (Chalmers	
2003).	
As	 I	 elaborate	 in	 section	 2.5,	 the	 “hard	 problem”	 is	 not	 merely	 hard,	 but	
fundamentally	 insoluble,	arising	as	 it	does	from	the	very	failure	to	distinguish	
explanatory	abstraction	from	empirical	observation	discussed	in	this	paper.	As	
such,	 it	 implies	 that	 we	 cannot,	 even	 in	 principle,	 explain	 mind	 in	 terms	 of	
matter.	 But	 because	 the	 contemporary	 cultural	 ethos	 entails	 the	 notion	 that	
mind	 and	matter	 constitute	 a	 dichotomy,	 one	may	 feel	 tempted	 to	 conclude	
that	there	should	also	be	a	symmetrical	‘hard	problem	of	matter’—that	is,	that	
we	 should	not,	 even	 in	principle,	be	able	 to	explain	matter	 in	 terms	of	mind.	
The	 natural	 next	 step	 in	 this	 flawed	 line	 of	 reasoning	 is	 to	 look	 for	 more	
fundamental	 ontological	 ground	 preceding	 both	 mind	 and	 matter;	 a	 third	
substrate	to	which	matter	and	mind	could	both	be	reduced.	
A	 good	 example	 of	 this	 line	 of	 reasoning	 is	 brought	 by	 ontic	
pancomputationalism,	which	posits	that	ungrounded	information	processing	is	
what	makes	up	 the	universe	at	 its	most	 fundamental	 level	 (Fredkin	2003).	As	
such,	 ontic	 pancomputationalism	 entails	 that	 computation	 precedes	 matter	
ontologically.	But	 “if	 computations	are	not	configurations	of	physical	entities,	
the	most	 obvious	 alternative	 is	 that	 computations	 are	 abstract,	mathematical	
entities,	 like	 numbers	 and	 sets”	 (Piccinini	 2015).	 According	 to	 ontic	
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pancomputationalism,	 even	 mind	 itself—psyche,	 soul—is	 a	 derivative	
phenomenon	of	purely	abstract	information	processing.2	
To	 gain	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 epistemic	 cost	 of	 this	 line	 of	 reasoning,	 consider	 the	
position	of	physicist	Max	Tegmark	 (2014).	According	 to	him,	 “protons,	atoms,	
molecules,	 cells	 and	 stars”	 are	 all	 redundant	 “baggage”	 (ibid:	 255).	 Only	 the	
mathematical	parameters	used	to	describe	the	behaviour	of	matter	are	real.	In	
other	 words,	 Tegmark	 posits	 that	 the	 universe	 consists	 purely	 of	 numbers—
ungrounded	 information—but	 nothing	 to	 attach	 these	 numbers	 to.	 The	
universe	supposedly	is	a	“set	of	abstract	entities	with	relations	between	them,”	
which	 “can	 be	 described	 in	 a	 baggage-independent	 way”	 (ibid:	 267).	 He	
attributes	all	ontological	value	to	a	description	while—paradoxically—denying	
the	existence	of	the	very	thing	that	is	described	in	the	first	place.	
Clearly,	 ontic	 pancomputationalism	 represents	 total	 commitment	 to	 abstract	
mathematical	 concepts	 as	 the	 foundation	 of	 existence.	 According	 to	 it,	 there	
are	only	numbers	and	sets.	But	what	are	numbers	and	sets	without	the	mind	or	
matter	 where	 they	 could	 reside?	 It	 is	 one	 thing	 to	 state	 in	 language	 that	
numbers	 and	 sets	 can	 exist	without	mind	and	matter,	 but	 it	 is	 another	 thing	
entirely	 to	 explicitly	 and	 coherently	 conceive	 of	what—if	 anything—this	may	
mean.	By	way	of	analogy,	it	is	possible	to	write—as	Lewis	Carrol	did—that	the	
Cheshire	 Cat’s	 grin	 remains	 after	 the	 cat	 disappears,	 but	 it	 is	 another	 thing	
entirely	to	conceive	explicitly	and	coherently	of	what	this	means.	
Ontic	 pancomputationalism	 appeals	 to	 ungrounded	 information—pure	
numbers,	mathematical	descriptions—as	ontological	primitive,	 i.e.,	as	the	sole	
fundamental	aspect	of	existence.	But	what	exactly	is	information?	Our	intuitive	
understanding	of	the	concept	has	been	cogently	captured	and	made	explicit	by	
Claude	Shannon	(1948):	information	is	given	by	state	differences	discernible	in	
a	 system.	 As	 such,	 it	 is	 a	 property	of	 a	 system—associated	with	 the	 system’s	
possible	 configurations—not	 an	 entity	 or	 ontological	 class	 unto	 itself.	 Under	
mainstream	 physicalism—that	 is,	 materialism—the	 system	 whose	
configurations	 constitute	 information	 is	 a	 material	 arrangement,	 such	 as	 a	
computer.	 Under	 idealism,	 it	 is	 mind,	 for	 experience	 entails	 different	
phenomenal	 states	 that	 can	 be	 qualitatively	 discerned	 from	 one	 another.	
Hence,	information	requires	a	mental	or	material	substrate	in	order	to	be	even	
conceived	of	explicitly	and	coherently.	To	say	that	information	exists	in	and	of	
itself	is	akin	to	speaking	of	spin	without	the	top,	of	ripples	without	water,	of	a	
dance	without	the	dancer,	or	of	the	Cheshire	Cat’s	grin	without	the	cat.	It	is	a	
grammatically	valid	statement	devoid	of	any	semantic	value:	a	 language	game	
less	meaningful	 than	 fantasy,	 for	 internally	 consistent	 fantasy	 can	 at	 least	 be	
explicitly	and	coherently	conceived	of	and,	thereby,	known	as	such.	But	in	what	
way	can	we	know	information	uncouched	in	mind	or	matter?	
One	 assumes	 that	 serious	 proponents	 of	 ontic	 pancomputationalism	 are	well	
aware	of	this	 line	of	criticism.	How	do	they	then	reconcile	their	position	with	
																																								 								
2 	See	 Fredkin’s	 online	 draft	 paper	 titled	 “On	 the	 Soul,”	 available	 at:		
http://www.digitalphilosophy.org//wp-content/uploads/2015/07/on_the_soul.pdf.	
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it?	 A	 passage	 by	 Luciano	 Floridi—well-known	 advocate	 of	 information	 as	
ontological	 primitive—may	 provide	 a	 clue.	 In	 a	 section	 titled	 “The	 nature	 of	
information,”	he	states:		
Information	 is	 notoriously	 a	 polymorphic	 phenomenon	 and	 a	
polysemantic	 concept	 so,	 as	 an	 explicandum,	 it	 can	be	 associated	with	
several	explanations,	depending	on	the	level	of	abstraction	adopted	and	
the	 cluster	 of	 requirements	 and	 desiderata	 orientating	 a	 theory.	 …	
Information	 remains	 an	 elusive	 concept.	 (Floridi	 2008:	 117,	 emphasis	
added)	
Such	ambiguity	lends	ontic	pancomputationalism	a	kind	of	conceptual	fluidity	
that	 renders	 it	 impossible	 to	 pin	 down.	 After	 all,	 if	 the	 choice	 of	 ontological	
primitive	is	given	by	“an	elusive	concept,”	how	can	one	definitely	establish	that	
the	 choice	 is	wrong?	 In	 admitting	 the	 possibility	 that	 information	may	 be	 “a	
network	of	 logically	 interdependent	but	mutually	 irreducible	 concepts”	 (ibid.:	
120),	Floridi	seems	to	suggest,	even,	that	such	elusiveness	may	be	unresolvable.	
While	 vagueness	may	 be	 defensible	 in	 regard	 to	 natural	 entities	 conceivably	
beyond	the	human	ability	to	apprehend,	it	is	at	least	difficult	to	justify	when	it	
comes	to	a	human	concept	such	as	information.	We	invented	the	concept,	so	we	
either	specify	clearly	what	we	mean	by	it	or	our	conceptualization	remains	too	
ambiguous	 to	be	ontologically	meaningful.	 In	 the	 latter	 case,	 there	 is	 literally	
no	 sense	 in	 attributing	 ontological	 value	 to	 information	 and,	 hence,	 ontic	
pancomputationalism	is—once	again—strictly	meaningless.	
Although	 ontic	 pancomputationalism	 is	 an	 admittedly	 extreme	 example,	 an	
analogous	 attempt	 to	 reduce	 concreteness—that	 is,	 the	 felt	 presence	 of	
conscious	 perception	 (Merleau-Ponty	 1964)—to	mere	 explanatory	 abstraction	
lies	 behind	 both	 mainstream	 physicalism	 and	 the	 alleged	 mind-matter	
dichotomy,	as	I	shall	argue	in	the	next	section.	At	the	root	of	this	concerning	
state	 of	 affairs	 is	 a	 generalized	 failure	 to	 recognize	 that	 every	 step	 of	
explanatory	 abstraction	 away	 from	 the	 concreteness	 of	 conscious	 perception	
implies	 a	 reduction	 in	 epistemic	 confidence:	 we	 do	 not	 know	 that	 abstract	
conceptual	objects	exist	with	the	same	level	of	confidence	that	we	do	know	that	
our	 perceptions—whatever	 their	 source	 or	 underlying	 ontic	 nature	may	 be—
exist.	I	do	not	know	that	subatomic	particles	outside	and	independent	of	mind	
exist	with	the	same	level	of	confidence	that	I	do	know	that	the	chair	I	am	sitting	
on,	which	I	am	directly	acquainted	with	through	conscious	perception,	exists.	
Worse	still,	with	what	confidence	can	we	know	that	a	loosely	defined,	possibly	
incoherent	concept	 such	as	ungrounded	 information	 lies	at	 the	 foundation	of	
existence?	As	such,	steps	of	explanatory	abstraction	can	only	be	justified	if	the	
relevant	 empirical	 observations	 cannot	 be	 explained	 without	 them,	 lest	 we	
conflate	 science	and	philosophy	with	meaningless	 language	games.	This	 is	 an	
important	claim,	so	allow	me	to	dwell	on	it	a	little	longer	before	proceeding	to	
the	next	section.	
It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 perceptual	 illusions	 indicates	 that	
conscious	 perception	 entails	 less	 epistemic	 confidence	 than	 abstract	 formal	
systems.	For	instance,	in	the	well-known	“checker	shadow”	illusion	created	by	
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the	 Perceptual	 Science	 Group	 of	 the	 Massachusetts	 Institute	 of	 Technology,	
two	 identically	 coloured	 squares—A	 and	 B—of	 a	 checkerboard	 are	 initially	
perceived	to	be	of	opposite	colours	because	of	the	different	contexts	 in	which	
they	 are	 perceived	 (see	 Figure	 2.1).	 Should	 we	 then	 declare	 that	 conscious	
perception	 is	 fundamentally	 unreliable?	Well,	 notice	 that	 it	 is	 also	 conscious	
perception	that	eventually	dispels	 the	 illusion:	by	looking	at	one	of	the	squares	
as	it	is	moved	to	the	other’s	context,	one	sees	that	it	indeed	has	the	same	colour	
as	the	other	square.	So	even	in	the	case	of	perceptual	illusions,	it	is	still	direct,	
concrete	experience	 that	provides	us	with	 the	epistemic	confidence	necessary	
to	recognize	the	illusion	for	what	it	is.	
	
	
Figure	2.1:	The	“checker	shadow”	illusion.	Despite	appearances	to	the	contrary,	
squares	A	and	B	are	the	same	shade	of	grey.	
	
Further	 supporting	 the	 claim	 that	 abstracting	 away	 from	 direct	 experience	
implies	 a	 reduction	 in	 epistemic	 confidence	 is	 the	 anti-realist	 view	 in	
philosophy	 of	 science.	 According	 to	 it,	 abstract	 theoretical	 entities—such	 as	
subatomic	particles,	invisible	fields	and	any	other	postulated	entity	that	escapes	
our	ability	 to	directly	perceive—are	but	“convenient	 fictions,	designed	to	help	
predict	the	behaviour	of	things	in	the	observable	world”	(Okasha	2002:	61;	see	
also	van	Fraassen	1990).	 In	other	words,	 the	best	we	can	say	about	subatomic	
particles	and	other	abstract	entities	 is	 that	 the	observable	world	behaves	as	 if	
these	 abstract	 entities	 existed.	 This	 does	 not	 entail	 or	 imply	 that	 the	 entities	
exist	as	such,	which	we	cannot	be	certain	of	either	way	(van	Fraassen	1980).	In	
this	 sense,	 explanatory	 abstraction	 again	 implies	 reduction	 in	 epistemic	
confidence,	 insofar	 as	we	 do	not	 know	 that	 subatomic	 particles	 and	 invisible	
fields	exist	with	the	same	level	of	confidence	that	we	do	know	that	the	world	
we	consciously	perceive	exists.	
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2.4	 Levels	of	explanatory	abstraction	
Like	ontic	pancomputationalism,	mainstream	physicalism	is	no	stranger	to	the	
epistemic	 cost	 of	 explanatory	 abstraction:	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 material	 world	
outside	 and	 independent	 of	 mind	 is	 a	 theoretical	 inference	 arising	 from	
interpretation	of	sense	perceptions	within	a	framework	of	complex	thought,	not	
an	 empirical	 observation.	 After	 all,	 what	 we	 call	 the	 world	 is	 available	 to	 us	
solely	 as	 ‘images’—defined	 here	 broadly,	 so	 as	 to	 include	 any	 sensory	
modality—on	 the	 screen	 of	 perception,	which	 is	 itself	mental.	 Even	 physicist	
Andrei	 Linde,	 one	 of	 the	 founders	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 cosmic	 inflation,	
acknowledged	 this	 in	 a	 1998	 talk	 titled	 “Universe,	 Life,	 Consciousness,”	
delivered	 at	 the	 Center	 for	 Theology	 and	 the	 Natural	 Sciences	 (CTNS),	
Berkeley,	California:3	
Let	 us	 remember	 that	 our	 knowledge	 of	 the	 world	 begins	 not	 with	
matter	 but	 with	 perceptions.	 I	 know	 for	 sure	 that	my	 pain	 exists,	 my	
‘green’	exists,	and	my	 ‘sweet’	 exists	…	everything	else	 is	a	 theory.	Later	
we	 find	 out	 that	 our	 perceptions	 obey	 some	 laws,	 which	 can	 be	most	
conveniently	 formulated	 if	 we	 assume	 that	 there	 is	 some	 underlying	
reality	 beyond	 our	 perceptions.	 This	model	 of	material	 world	 obeying	
laws	 of	 physics	 is	 so	 successful	 that	 soon	we	 forget	 about	 our	 starting	
point	 and	 say	 that	matter	 is	 the	 only	 reality,	 and	perceptions	 are	 only	
helpful	for	its	description.	
Now,	we	know	 that	mind	 is	 capable	of	 autonomously	generating	 the	 imagery	
we	 associate	 with	 matter:	 dreams	 and	 hallucinations,	 for	 instance,	 are	 often	
qualitatively	 indistinguishable	 from	 the	 so-called	 ‘real	 world.’	 Therefore,	 the	
motivation	 for	 postulating	 an	 objective	 material	 world	 must	 go	 beyond	 the	
mere	existence	of	this	imagery.	And	indeed,	what	the	notion	of	objective	matter	
attempts	to	make	sense	of	are	certain	patterns	and	regularities	observable	in	the	
imagery,	such	as:		
• The	correlations	between	observed	brain	activity	and	reported	inner	life	
(see,	 e.g.	 Koch	 2004	 for	 a	 scientific	 take	 on	 the	 neural	 correlates	 of	
consciousness,	 but	 consider	 also	 the	 obvious	 effects	 of	 e.g.	 alcohol	
consumption	 and	 head	 trauma—both	 of	 which	 disrupt	 regular	 brain	
activity—on	inner	experience);	
• The	observation	that	we	all	seem	to	inhabit	the	same	world;	and	
• The	observation	that	the	dynamics	of	this	world	unfold	independently	of	
our	personal	volition.	
After	all,	if	mind	is	not	a	product	of	objective	arrangements	of	matter,	how	can	
there	be	 such	 tight	 correlations	between	brain	activity	 and	experience?	 If	 the	
world	is	not	made	of	matter	outside	our	individual	minds,	how	can	we	all	share	
the	same	world	beyond	ourselves?	If	the	world	is	not	independent	of	mind,	why	
can	we	not	change	the	laws	of	nature	simply	by	imagining	them	to	be	different?	
																																								 								
3At	 the	 time	 of	 this	 writing	 the	 transcript	 of	 this	 talk	 was	 available	 online	 at:	
http://web.stanford.edu/~alinde/SpirQuest.doc.	
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Clearly,	 thus,	 the	 non-mental	 world	 posited	 by	 physicalism	 is	 largely	 an	
attempt	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 these	 three	 basic	 observations.	 As	 such,	 it	 is	 an	
explanatory	 abstraction,	 not	 itself	 an	 observation.	 We	 conceptually	 imagine	
that	 there	 is	 a	 non-mental	 world	 underlying	 our	 perceptions—and	 in	 some	
sense	 isomorphic	 to	 these	 perceptions—because	 doing	 so	 helps	 explain	 the	
basic	 observations	 (see	Figure	 2.2).	Nonetheless,	whatever	 ontological	 class	 is	
pointed	 to	 by	 this	 conceptual	 abstraction	 remains	 perforce	 epistemically	
inaccessible,	a	recognition	already	present	in	Immanuel	Kant’s	Critique	of	Pure	
Reason.	
	
	
Figure	2.2:	Levels	of	explanatory	abstraction.	Grey	and	dotted	parts	represent	
steps	of	abstraction.	
	
Explanatory	abstraction	does	not	stop	at	this	first	level.	After	imagining	a	non-
mental	 world	 isomorphic	 to	 our	 perceptions,	 we	 are	 left	 with	 the	 task	 of	
explaining	how	and	why	this	world	behaves	the	way	it	does.	Why	do	objects	fall	
when	dropped?	Why	does	 a	 piece	 of	 amber	 attract	 chaff	when	 rubbed?	How	
can	 certain	 metals	 magnetically	 attract	 other	 metals?	 To	 answer	 these	
questions,	we	must	 attribute	 to	 the	material	world	 certain	 properties	 that	 go	
beyond	 perceptual	 isomorphism.	 We	 say,	 for	 instance,	 that	 matter	 has	 the	
properties	of	mass,	charge	and	spin.	These	properties	constitute	a	second-level	
of	explanatory	abstraction	beyond	direct	experience	(see	Figure	2.2	again).	
Naturally,	 there	 can	 be	 even	more	 levels	 of	 explanatory	 abstraction	 involved.	
Superstring	 theory,	 for	 instance,	 attempts	 to	 explain	 the	 properties	 of	matter	
through	 the	 particular	 modes	 of	 vibration	 of	 imagined	 hyper-dimensional	
strings	(Greene	2003).	But	the	two	levels	illustrated	in	Figure	2.2	are	sufficient	
for	the	discussion	that	follows.	
The	 defining	 characteristic	 of	 explanation	 by	 abstraction	 is	 a	 progressive	
movement	 away	 from	 Edmund	 Husserl’s	 (1970)	 “life-world,”	 from	 the	
concreteness	of	direct	experience.	First,	one	posits	a	world	devoid	of	qualities	
(Varela,	Thompson	and	Rosch	 1993)	and,	as	such,	devoid	of	concreteness	 too,	
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for	 concreteness	 is	 a	quality	of	 experience.	Then,	one	progressively	 loads	 this	
world	 with	 properties	 that	 entail	 no	 direct	 isomorphism	 to	 experience.	 For	
instance,	we	do	not	 see	 electric	 charge	 or	 spin;	we	only	 see	 the	behaviour	 of	
matter	that	these	abstract	properties	supposedly	explain,	such	as	attraction	and	
repulsion.	Similarly,	we	do	not	feel	mass;	we	only	feel	the	weight	and	inertia	of	
objects,	which	the	property	of	having	mass	supposedly	explains	(Okasha	2002:	
58-76).	
Because	concreteness	is	the	intuitive	foundation	of	what	we	consider	real,	each	
step	in	this	movement	away	from	concreteness	takes	us	farther	from	what	we	
intuitively	sense	to	be	real	(Merleau-Ponty	1964).	One	may	then	become	lost	in	
a	 forest	of	 intellectually	appealing	but	ultimately	arbitrary	conceptualizations.	
This,	again,	is	the	epistemic	cost	of	explanation	by	abstraction.	
	
2.5	 Dispelling	the	mind-matter	dichotomy	
By	 definition,	 the	 two	 members	 of	 a	 dichotomy	 are	 jointly	 exhaustive	 and	
mutually	 exclusive.	Ontologically,	 this	means	 that	 if	 one	member	 is	 the	 case,	
then	 the	other	 is	necessarily	not	 the	case,	and	vice-versa.	For	 instance,	 in	 the	
context	of	biological	organisms,	if	life	is	not	the	case,	then	death	is	necessarily	
the	 case.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 a	 job	 application,	 if	 success	 is	 the	 case	 (i.e.	 the	
applicant	gets	the	job),	then	failure	is	not	the	case.	And	so	on.	As	such,	a	single	
test	suffices	to	acquire	knowledge	about	the	ontological	status	of	both	members	
of	a	dichotomy.	If	I	can	perform	a	test	to	determine	if	a	person	is	alive,	then	I	
will	automatically	know	whether	the	person	is	dead,	without	having	to	test	for	
death	separately.	If	I	can	set	a	criterion	for	success,	then	that	same	criterion	will	
automatically	determine	whether	failure	is	the	case,	without	my	having	to	set	a	
separate	criterion	for	failure.	And	so	on.	I	shall	call	this	property	of	a	dichotomy	
epistemic	 symmetry.	 When	 two	 concepts	 are	 epistemically	 symmetrical,	
knowledge	of	one	implies	knowledge	of	the	other.	
Now	notice	that	epistemic	symmetry	can	only	hold	 for	concepts	 residing	 in	 the	
same	level	of	explanatory	abstraction.	If	they	do	not,	then	there	necessarily	is	at	
least	one	extra	inferential	step	necessary	to	know	whether	one	of	the	concepts	
obtains.	This	 breaks	 the	 symmetry,	 for	 then	we	 cannot	 acquire	 knowledge	of	
the	ontological	status	of	both	concepts	with	a	single	test.	
Here	is	an	example:	the	presence	of	a	negative	feeling	can	be	tested	for	directly	
through	introspection—thus	entailing	no	inferential	steps—whereas	testing	for	
the	presence	of	a	positive	electric	charge	requires	an	inference	by	observation	
of	 the	 associated	 behaviour	 of	 matter.	 Because	 of	 this	 need	 for	 an	 extra	
inferential	 step,	 knowing	 the	negative	 feeling	 cannot	 imply	 knowledge	 of	 the	
positive	electric	charge.	The	negative	feeling	and	the	positive	electric	charge	are	
not,	therefore,	epistemically	symmetrical	and	cannot	constitute	a	dichotomy.	
Conversely,	positive	and	negative	electric	charges	are	both	properties	of	matter,	
residing	in	the	second	level	of	explanatory	abstraction	illustrated	in	Figure	2.2.	
As	 such,	 they	 are	 epistemically	 symmetrical	 and	 can	 constitute	 a	 dichotomy.	
Indeed,	every	level	of	explanatory	abstraction	can	encompass	dichotomies.	For	
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instance,	 the	size	of	material	objects	 is	 isomorphic	to	perceptual	qualities:	we	
can	 subjectively	 test	whether	 an	 object	 is	 big	 or	 small	 in	 relation	 to	 another	
object.	 As	 such,	 bigness	 and	 smallness	 both	 reside	 in	 the	 first	 level	 of	
explanatory	abstraction	and	are	epistemically	symmetrical;	they	can	constitute	
a	dichotomy	(see	Figure	2.3).	
	
	
Figure	2.3:	Dichotomies	in	their	respective	levels	of	explanatory	abstraction.	
	
But—and	here	is	the	key	point—mind	and	matter	do	not	reside	in	the	same	level	
of	 explanatory	 abstraction.	 Mind—as	 defined	 in	 Section	 2.2—is	 the	 ground	
within	which,	 and	out	of	which,	 abstractions	are	made.	Matter,	 in	 turn,	 is	 an	
abstraction	of	mind	(see	Figure	2.2	again).	This	breaks	the	epistemic	symmetry	
between	 them:	we	do	not	know	matter	 in	 the	 same	way	 that	we	know	mind,	
for—as	cogently	argued	by	Linde	 in	 the	earlier	quote—matter	 is	 an	 inference	
and	 mind	 a	 given.	 Consequently,	 although	 mind	 can	 encompass	 polar	
opposites—such	 as	 the	 feelings	 of	 love	 and	 fear	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 situation	
where	 someone	 feels	 passionate	 about	 a	 particular	 aspect	 of	 someone	 else	
(assuming	that	other	passions,	 such	as	hate,	which	 is	arguably	a	 form	of	 fear,	
are	particular	instances	of	love	or	fear)—it	cannot	itself	be	the	polar	opposite	of	
matter	 or	matter’s	 properties.	 It	 follows	 that	 we	 have	 no	 reason	 to	 conclude	
that	reducing	matter	to	mind	is	as	challenging	as	reducing	mind	to	matter,	and	
there	 is	 thus	 no	 substantiation	 for	 a	 ‘hard	 problem	 of	 mind.’	 Stronger	 still,	
insofar	 as	 what	 we	 call	 ‘matter’	 can	 be	 parsimoniously	 construed	 as	
phenomenal	patterns	of	excitation	of	mind,	matter	is	on	an	epistemic	par	with	
mind	and	can,	in	principle,	be	reduced	to	the	latter,	for	both	already	reside	in	
the	same	ontological	domain.	This	move	takes	mind	itself	to	be	an	ontological	
primitive	 and	 eliminates	 any	 conceivable	 ‘hard	problem	of	mind,’	 since	mind	
now	does	not	need	to	be	reduced.	
The	notion	of	a	dichotomy	between	mind	and	matter	arises	from	language.	In	
order	to	speak	of	 the	substrate	of	experience	we	must	give	 it	a	name,	such	as	
‘mind’	or	 ‘consciousness,’	 thereby	 linguistically	objectifying	 the	 subject.	Then,	
we	 conflate	 language	 with	 what	 language	 attempts	 to	 describe,	 implicitly	
assuming	that	mind	is	an	object	just	as	matter	allegedly	is.	We	forget	that	there	
is	no	epistemic	symmetry	between	the	two.	
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Indeed,	 because	 the	 concept	 of	mind-independent	matter,	 as	 an	 explanatory	
abstraction,	 arises	 in	mind,	 as	 an	 ‘excitation’	 of	 mind,	 to	 say	 that	 mind	 and	
matter	 constitute	 a	 dichotomy	 is	 akin	 to	 saying	 that	 ripples	 and	 water	
constitute	a	dichotomy.4	Dichotomies	can	exist	only	between	different	kinds	of	
ripples—say,	those	that	flow	mostly	to	the	right	versus	those	that	flow	mostly	
to	 the	 left—not	between	ripples	and	 the	substrate	where	 they	 ripple.	Mind	 is	
the	substrate	of	the	explanatory	abstraction	we	call	matter,	so	when	we	speak	
of	a	mind-matter	dichotomy	we	fall	 into	a	fundamental	“category	mistake,”	as	
Ryle	(2009)	put	it.	However,	contrary	to	what	Ryle	suggests,	 it	 is	matter	that	is	
the	abstraction,	not	mind.	
The	 notion	 that	 idealism	 and	 mainstream	 physicalism	 are	 mirror	 images	 of	
each	 other	 arises	 from	 a	 failure	 to	 grasp	 this	 point.	 Lucid	 contemplation	 of	
these	 ontologies	 shows	 that	 idealism	 attempts	 to	 reduce	 an	 explanatory	
abstraction	(physically	objective	matter)	to	that	which	articulates	and	hosts	the	
abstraction	in	the	first	place	(mind).	This	is	prima	 facie	eminently	reasonable.	
Mainstream	 physicalism,	 in	 turn,	 attempts	 to	 reduce	 mind	 to	 mind’s	 own	
explanatory	 abstractions,	 an	 obvious	 paradox	 that	 constitutes	 the	 crux	 of	 the	
‘hard	problem.’	
There	 would	 be	 no	 ‘hard	 problem’	 if	 one	 did	 not	 conflate	 explanatory	
abstractions	 with	 concrete	 ontological	 primitives,	 if	 one	 did	 not	 attempt	 to	
paradoxically	 reduce	mind	 to	abstractions	of	mind.	The	 ‘hard	problem’	 is	not	
something	empirically	observed	but	the	salient	result	of	internal	contradictions	
in	a	logico-conceptual	schema;	contradictions	that	I	hope	to	have	helped	make	
explicit	with	the	present	paper.	
Naturally,	 circumventing	 the	 ‘hard	 problem’	 in	 the	 way	 suggested	 above	
ultimately	 forces	 us	 to	make	 do	with	mind	 alone	 as	 an	 ontological	 primitive	
and	 thereby	 entertain	 some	 form	 of	 idealism—more	 specifically,	 a	 form	 of	
idealism	wherein	mind	 is	 the	 experientially	 given	ground	of	 existence,	whose	
manifestations	 comprise	 the	 concrete	 phenomenality	 you	 and	 I	 undergo	 in	
everyday	 life.	 And	 whereas	 idealism	 in	 the	 West	 has	 had	 its	 heyday	 in	 the	
eighteenth	(e.g.	Berkeley)	and	early	nineteenth	(e.g.	Hegel)	centuries,	it	is	now	
enjoying	 renewed	 interest	 (Chalmers	 2018)	 for	 having	 been	 updated	 and	
revitalized	with	 compelling	 new	 formulations	 (e.g.	 Kastrup	 2017b	 and	 2017e,5	
Yetter-Chappell	 2018,	 as	well	 as	 Fields	 et	 al.	 2017,	 insofar	 as	 the	 latter	 can	be	
construed	 as	 a	 form	 of	 idealism).	 These	 are	 sometimes	 proposed	 under	 new	
names,	 such	as	 ‘cosmopsychism’	 (e.g.	Shani	2015,	Nagasawa	and	Wager	2016),	
which,	 as	 the	name	 suggests,	 posits	 that	 the	 cosmos	 as	 a	whole	 is	 essentially	
																																								 								
4	Allow	me	to	insist	on	an	observation	already	made	in	Section	1.4:	this	is	an	epistemic	
point.	Mind-independent	matter	can	only	be	known	as	a	concept	that	arises	in	mind,	
for	we	 have	 no	 direct	 access	 to	 the	 hypothesized	 ontological	 category	 the	 concept	
denotes.	 Therefore,	 insofar	 as	 we	 can	 know	 it,	 mind-independent	 matter	 is	 an	
excitation	of	mind	and,	 as	 such,	 cannot	 form	a	dichotomy	with	mind	 for	 the	 same	
reason	that	ripples	cannot	form	a	dichotomy	with	water.	
5	See	also	Chapter	3	of	this	dissertation.	
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phenomenal.	 Even	 ‘radical	 constructivism’	 can	 be	 construed	 as	 a	 form	 of	
idealism,	 insofar	 as	 its	 claims	 are	 not	 merely	 epistemic,	 but	 ontic:	 “Radical	
constructivism	…	develops	a	theory	of	knowledge	in	which	knowledge	does	not	
reflect	 an	 ‘objective’	 ontological	 reality,	 but	 exclusively	 an	 ordering	 and	
organization	 of	 a	 world	 constituted	 by	 our	 experience”	 (Glasersfeld	 1987:	 24,	
emphasis	 added).	 Finally,	 the	 strongest	 objections	 usually	 leveraged	 against	
idealism	have	recently	also	been	tackled	(Kastrup	2017c6).	
Having	 said	 all	 this,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that,	 in	 and	 of	 itself,	 the	 argument	
provided	 in	 this	 paper,	 despite	 being	 supportive	 of	 idealism,	 does	 not	
necessarily	imply	idealism.	I	have	focused	on	epistemic	cost	considerations	and	
did	not	 show	whether	 or	how	 idealism	can	 account	 for	 all	 relevant	 empirical	
observations	we	make	of	nature.	Indeed,	an	articulation	of	an	idealist	ontology	
is	not	within	the	scope	of	this	paper.	But	if	it	is	demonstrated—as	some	of	the	
papers	 cited	 above	 claim	 to	 do—that	 idealism	 can	 account	 for	 all	 empirical	
observations	 that	 mainstream	 physicalism	 allegedly	 accounts	 for,	 then	
epistemic	 cost	 considerations	 certainly	 tilt	 the	 balance	 in	 favour	 of	 idealism,	
due	 to	 the	 latter’s	 lack	 of	 reliance	 on	 inflationary,	 epistemically	 unreliable,	
paradoxical	abstractions.	As	 such,	 the	core	claim	of	 this	essay	 is	not	 so	much	
the	 validity	 of	 idealism	 as	 that	 physically	 objective	 matter	 is	 a	 doubtful	
cognitive	construct,	in	the	strict	constructivist	sense:	insofar	as	we	believe	to	see	
matter	 outside	 and	 independent	 of	mind	when	we	 look	 at	 the	world	 around	
ourselves,	 we	 are	 conflating	 a	 rational-linguistic	 construction	 with	 what	 is	
empirically	observed.	
	
2.6	 Conclusion	
The	pervasive	but	unexamined	assumption	that	mind	and	matter	constitute	a	
dichotomy	is	an	error	arising	from	language	artifacts.	Members	of	dichotomies	
must	 be	 epistemically	 symmetrical	 and,	 therefore,	 reside	 in	 the	 same	 level	 of	
abstraction.	 Physically	 objective	 matter—as	 an	 explanatory	 model—is	 an	
abstraction	of	mind.	We	do	not	know	matter	 in	 the	 same	way	 that	we	 know	
mind,	 for	matter	 is	 an	 inference	and	mind	a	given.	This	breaks	 the	epistemic	
symmetry	 between	 the	 two	 and	 implies	 that	 mainstream	 physicalism	 and	
idealism	cannot	be	mirror	images	of	each	other.	
Failure	to	recognize	that	different	levels	of	epistemic	confidence	are	intrinsic	to	
different	 levels	of	explanatory	abstraction	lies	at	the	root	not	only	of	the	false	
mind-matter	 dichotomy,	 but	 also	 of	 attempts	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 world	
through	 increasingly	 ungrounded	 explanatory	 abstractions.	 Lest	 we	 conflate	
science	and	philosophy	with	hollow	language	games,	we	must	never	lose	sight	
of	 the	 difference	 between	 an	 abstract	 inference	 and	 a	 direct	 observation.	
Keeping	this	distinction	in	mind	allows	us	to	construct	useful	predictive	models	
of	 nature’s	 behaviour—which	 ultimately	 is	 what	 science	 is	 meant	 to	 do—
without	 restrictive	 and	 ultimately	 fallacious	 inferences	 about	 what	 nature	 is.	
																																								 								
6	See	Chapter	4	of	this	dissertation.	
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This,	 in	turn,	 liberates	us	from	thought	artifacts	such	as	the	“hard	problem	of	
consciousness”	and	opens	up	whole	new	avenues	for	making	sense	of	self	and	
world.
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3.	 The	Universe	in	Consciousness	
	
This	 paper	 first	 appeared	 in	 the	 Journal	 of	 Consciousness	 Studies,	 ISSN	 1355-
8250	(print),	Vol.	25,	No.	5-6,	pp.	 125-155,	 in	 June	2018.	A	summary	of	 its	core	
idea	has	appeared	in	Scientific	American	on	18	June	2018.1	
	
3.1	 Abstract	
I	 propose	 an	 idealist	 ontology	 that	 makes	 sense	 of	 reality	 in	 a	 more	
parsimonious	 and	 empirically	 rigorous	manner	 than	mainstream	physicalism,	
bottom-up	 panpsychism	 and	 cosmopsychism.	 The	 proposed	 ontology	 also	
offers	more	explanatory	power	than	these	three	alternatives,	in	that	it	does	not	
fall	prey	to	the	hard	problem	of	consciousness,	the	combination	problem	or	the	
decombination	problem,	respectively.	It	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	there	is	
only	 cosmic	 consciousness.	We,	 as	well	 as	 all	 other	 living	 organisms,	 are	 but	
dissociated	 alters	 of	 cosmic	 consciousness,	 surrounded	 by	 its	 thoughts.	 The	
inanimate	 world	 we	 see	 around	 us	 is	 the	 extrinsic	 appearance	 of	 these	
thoughts.	 The	 living	 organisms	 we	 share	 the	 world	 with	 are	 the	 extrinsic	
appearances	of	other	dissociated	alters.	
	
3.2	 Brief	introduction	
This	 paper	 seeks	 to	 articulate	 an	 ontology	 that	 overcomes	 the	 principal	
limitations	 of	 the	 most	 popular	 alternatives.	 The	 first	 half	 of	 the	 paper	
comprises	a	detailed	analysis	of	relevant	literature,	highlighting	what	advances	
have	 been	 made	 and	 what	 problems	 have	 been	 created	 or	 left	 unsolved	 by	
recent	developments	 in	analytic	philosophy.	 In	 the	 second	half,	 starting	 from	
what	I	consider	to	be	the	most	promising	current	platform,	I	propose	an	idealist	
framework	that	may	open	viable	new	avenues	for	addressing	the	key	questions	
left	unanswered	by	this	current	platform.	At	the	end,	I	hope	to	offer	a	coherent	
view	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 reality	 that	 accounts	 for	 all	 relevant	 facts	 without	
incurring	any	fundamental	problem.	
	
3.3	 The	mainstream	physicalist	ontology	and	its	problems	
The	mainstream	 ontology	 of	 physicalism	 posits	 that	 reality	 is	 constituted	 by	
irreducible	 entities—which,	 like	 Galen	 Strawson	 (2006:	 9),	 I	 shall	 call	
‘ultimates’—outside	 and	 independent	 of	 phenomenal	 consciousness.	 These	
ultimates,	 in	 and	 of	 themselves,	 do	 not	 instantiate	 phenomenal	 properties:	
there	 is	 nothing	 it	 is	 like	 to	 be	 an	 ultimate,	 the	 capacity	 for	 experience	
																																								 								
1	At	the	time	of	this	writing,	the	Scientific	American	essay	was	freely	available	online	at:	
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/could-multiple-personality-
disorder-explain-life-the-universe-and-everything/.	
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emerging	only	at	the	level	of	complex	arrangements	of	ultimates.	They	are	also	
sometimes	held	to	lack	objective	qualities:	in	and	of	themselves,	ultimates	may	
have	no	color,	 flavor,	smell,	etc.	Indeed,	according	to	mainstream	physicalism	
qualities	may	exist	only	 in	 the	phenomenal	 field	of	 the	experiencer,	which	 in	
turn	is	a	product	of	the	operation	of	a	sufficiently	complex	nervous	system.	It	is	
the	 specific	 arrangement	 of	 ultimates	 in	 a	 nervous	 system	 that,	 allegedly,	
somehow	constitutes	or	generates	its	phenomenal	properties.	
The	 key	 problem	 of	 mainstream	 physicalism	 centers	 on	 how	 our	 subjective	
experience	of	qualities—what	it	is	like	to	feel	the	warmth	of	fire,	the	redness	of	
an	 apple,	 the	 bitterness	 of	 disappointment,	 etc.—can	 arise	 from	 mere	
arrangements	 of	 ultimates.	 These	 ultimates	 do	 possess	 abstract	 relational	
properties	 such	 as	 mass,	 spin,	 momentum	 and	 charge,	 but	 there	 is	 nothing	
about	 mass,	 spin,	 momentum	 or	 charge,	 or	 the	 relative	 positions	 and	
interactions	 across	 ultimates,	 in	 terms	 of	 which	 one	 could	 deduce	 what	 the	
warmth	of	fire,	the	redness	of	an	apple	or	the	bitterness	of	disappointment	feel	
like,	 subjectively.	 As	 long	 as	 they	 fit	 with	 the	 broadly	 observed	 correlations	
between	neural	activity	and	reported	experience,	mappings	between	these	two	
domains	are	entirely	arbitrary:	in	principle,	it	is	as	(in)valid	to	state	that	spin	up	
constitutes	 or	 generates	 the	 phenomenal	 property	 ‘coldness’	 and	 spin	 down	
‘warmth’	 as	 it	 is	 to	 say	 the	 exact	 opposite.	 There	 is	 nothing	 intrinsic	 about	
spin—or	about	any	other	property	of	ultimates	or	arrangements	thereof—that	
would	allow	us	to	make	the	distinction.	
This	 central—and	 arguably	 insoluble—problem	 has	 been	 referred	 to	 by	
different	names,	such	as	the	‘explanatory	gap’	(Levine	1983)	and,	more	recently,	
the	 ‘hard	 problem	 of	 consciousness’	 (Chalmers	 1996,	 2003):	 the	 qualities	 of	
experience	 are	 irreducible	 to	 the	 observable	 parameters	 of	 physical	
arrangements—whatever	 the	 arrangement	 may	 be—in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	
impossible	even	 in	principle	 to	deduce	 those	qualities	 from	these	parameters.	
More	 generally,	 the	 argument	 here	 is	 that	 there	 is	 no	 entailment	 from	 facts	
about	ultimates	to	facts	about	experience:	there	is	no	fact	about	ultimates	that	
implies	a	priori	a	fact	about	experience.	
Greg	Rosenberg	(2004:	13–30)	articulated	what	is	perhaps	the	best	refutation	of	
entailment	from	facts	about	ultimates	to	facts	about	experience.	His	argument	
begins	with	the	recognition	that	all	facts	about	ultimates	are	merely	patterns	of	
bare	differences.	This	 echoes	Bertrand	Russell’s	 point	 (2009)	 that	 science	 can	
only	characterize	things	and	phenomena	in	terms	of	how	they	differ	from	other	
things	and	phenomena.	For	instance,	an	ultimate	with	positive	electric	charge	
is	 characterized	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 its	 relevant	 behavior	 differs	 from	 that	 of	 a	
negatively	charged	ultimate.	Charge	is	thus	a	relational	property	defined	on	the	
basis	 of	 bare	 differences.	 Nothing	 can	 be	 scientifically	 stated	 about	 what	 a	
charge,	in	and	of	itself,	intrinsically	is.	The	same	can	be	argued	about	all	other	
facts	about	ultimates.	
Rosenberg	 then	 proceeds	 to	 show	 that	 facts	 about	 experience—phenomenal	
properties—cannot	 be	 entailed	 by	 patterns	 of	 bare	 differences,	 even	 though	
qualitative	 differences	 between	 experiences	 can	 admittedly	 instantiate	 a	
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structure	 of	 bare	 differences.	 Therefore,	 phenomenal	 properties	 cannot	 be	
reduced	to	facts	about	ultimates.	Allow	me	to	unpack	this.	
There	are	qualitative	differences	across	our	experiences	of	various	colors:	what	
it	 is	 like	 to	 see	 yellow	 is	 different	 from	 what	 it	 is	 like	 to	 see	 red.	 These	
qualitative	 differences	 can	 even	 be	 graded	 along	 relevant	 dimensions:	 the	
qualitative	 difference	 between	 seeing	 yellow	 and	 red	 seems	 bigger	 than	 the	
qualitative	difference	between	seeing	yellow	and	orange.	If	one	were	to	assign	a	
number	to	represent	each	of	these	degrees	of	difference,	one	could	abstract	out	
a	purely	quantitative—that	is,	bare—difference	structure	from	the	experiences	
of	 seeing	 various	 colors.	 However,	 that	 a	 bare	 difference	 structure	 can	 be	
abstracted	 out	 from	phenomenal	 properties	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 phenomenal	
properties	are	entailed	by	bare	difference	structures.	Maintaining	so	inverts	the	
logic	of	the	situation:	 it	 is	phenomenal	properties	that	ground	bare	difference	
structures	in	the	first	place.	
To	bring	this	point	home,	Rosenberg	offers	the	following	thought	experiment:	
imagine	a	field	of	tightly	packed	yellow	and	red	dots.	If	one	observes	this	field	
from	a	 sufficient	distance,	one	 sees	 the	color	orange.	 It	 could	 then	be	argued	
that	the	phenomenal	property	‘orange’	arises	from	a	pattern	of	bare	differences	
associated	 with	 the	 delta	 in	 wavelength	 between	 yellow	 and	 red	 photons,	 as	
well	 as	 the	 relative	 size	and	distribution	of	 the	dots.	However,	 if	one	were	 to	
choose	another	pair	of	 colors	with	 the	 same	delta	 in	wavelength—say,	yellow	
and	 green—and	 otherwise	 maintain	 the	 same	 relative	 structure	 of	 dots,	 a	
phenomenal	property	different	from	‘orange’	would	result.	In	other	words,	the	
same	pattern	of	bare	differences	would	yield	a	different	phenomenal	property.	
Hence,	phenomenal	properties	are	not	entailed	by	patterns	of	bare	differences	
and	cannot	be	reduced	to	properties	and	arrangements	of	ultimates.	
This	 and	 other	 arguments	 along	 similar	 lines	 render	mainstream	physicalism	
arguably	untenable.	
	
3.4	 Consciousness	as	an	irreducible	property	of	matter	
At	least	since	the	time	of	René	Descartes,	the	most	recognizable	alternative	to	
physicalism	 has	 been	 ‘substance	 dualism’:	 if	 one	 cannot	 reduce	 phenomenal	
properties	to	physical	elements,	then	the	phenomenal	and	the	physical	may	be	
two	 distinct,	 fundamental	 ontological	 classes.	 There	 are	 different	 versions	 of	
substance	dualism,	but	the	most	intuitive	one	is	arguably	‘interactionism’:	since	
phenomenal	events	seem	to	cause	physical	events	(as	in	when	felt	pain	causes	
me	 to	 move	my	 arm)	 and	 vice	 versa	 (as	 in	 when	 a	 needle	 piercing	my	 arm	
causes	me	to	feel	pain),	then	the	phenomenal	and	the	physical	must	be	causally	
connected.	 However,	 a	 problem	 with	 interactionism	 is	 summarized	 by	
Chalmers	(2016b:	23):	 if	the	physical	domain	is	causally	closed—as	it	seems	to	
be	in	so	far	as	we	have	been	able	to	ascertain	through	the	scientific	method—
then	causal	influences	we	intuitively	attribute	to	the	phenomenal	domain	must	
ultimately	 be,	 in	 fact,	 physical.	 There	 is	 arguably	 no	 place	 for	 phenomenal	
properties	 in	 the	 causal	 nexus.	 Possible	 dualist	 answers	 to	 this	 have	 been	
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proposed	but,	as	acknowledged	by	Chalmers	himself	(who	admits	to	sympathy	
towards	 dualism),	 “there	 is	 at	 least	 a	 prima	 facie	 case	 against	 dualism	 here”	
(ibid.:	 24).	 Chalmers	 then	 posits	 an	 “Hegelian	 synthesis”	 (ibid.)	 between	
mainstream	physicalism	and	substance	dualism,	in	the	form	of	the	notion	that	
ultimates	themselves	may	be	fundamentally	conscious.	
Indeed,	 under	 mainstream	 physicalism,	 ultimates	 are	 elementary	 subatomic	
particles—quarks,	 leptons,	 gauge	 bosons	 and	 scalar	 boson(s)—with	 certain	
fundamental	 properties.	 These	 properties	 are	 relational	 and	 abstract,	 such	 as	
mass,	charge,	spin	and	momentum.	Mainstream	physicalism’s	key	problem,	as	
we	have	seen,	is	its	inability	to	account	for	phenomenal	properties.	So	the	most	
straightforward	way	out	is	to	posit	that	at	least	some	elementary	particles	also	
have	 fundamental	 phenomenal	 properties.	 In	 Strawson’s	 words,	 “Assuming,	
then,	that	there	is	a	plurality	of	physical	ultimates,	some	of	them	at	least	must	
be	intrinsically	experiential,	intrinsically	experience-involving”	(2006:	24).	
I	 shall	 call	 these	 experiencing	 elementary	 particles	 ‘phenomenal	 ultimates’.	 I	
shall	 also	 generally	 refer	 to	 the	broad	ontological	 outlook	described	 above	 as	
‘bottom-up	 panpsychism,’	 even	 though	 I	 am	 aware	 that	 there	 are	 many	
variations	of	 it	 that	would	be	better	discriminated	 from	one	another	 (such	as	
‘panexperientialism,’	 ‘constitutive	 micropsychism,’	 ‘panprotopsychism,’	
‘deferential	monadic	panpsychism,’	etc.).	Be	that	as	it	may,	the	key	general	idea	
here	is	that,	by	positing	phenomenal	properties	to	be	fundamental,	bottom-up	
panpsychism	evades	the	need	to	reduce	these	properties	and	thereby	avoids	the	
hard	problem	altogether.	Moreover,	bottom-up	panpsychism	places	these	new	
fundamental	 properties	 seamlessly	 alongside	 existing	 abstract	 relational	
properties,	 as	 the	 categorical	 basis	 of	 the	 latter.	 This	 neatly	 integrates	
phenomenal	 properties	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 scientific	 thinking,	 for	 they	 now	
occupy	a	proper	place	within	the	causal	nexus.	
To	 see	 why	 this	 seemingly	 elegant	 approach	 nonetheless	 fails,	 notice	 that,	
according	to	bottom-up	panpsychism,	the	unitary	phenomenal	life	of	a	human	
being	 is	 supposedly	 constituted	 by	 micro-level	 phenomenal	 parts.	 At	 some	
point	in	the	remote	past	phenomenal	ultimates	
organized	 into	 increasingly	 complex	 forms,	 both	 experiential	 and	non-	
experiential,	by	many	processes	including	evolution	by	natural	selection.	
And	 just	as	 there	was	spectacular	enlargement	and	 fine-tuning	of	non-
experiential	 forms	 (the	 bodies	 of	 living	 things),	 so	 too	 there	 was	
spectacular	enlargement	and	fine-tuning	of	experiential	forms.	(ibid.:	27)	
However,	 the	 idea	 that	 micro-level	 phenomenal	 states	 can	 combine	 to	 form	
unitary	 macro-level	 phenomenal	 states	 is	 arguably	 incoherent.	 It	 leads	 to	 a	
variety	 of	 ‘combination	 problems’	 (Chalmers	 2016a),	 at	 least	 one	 of	 which	 is	
arguably	 as	 insoluble	 as	 the	 hard	 problem	 itself	 (Carruthers	 and	 Schechter	
2006,	Goff	2006,	2009).	
The	best	argument	against	bottom-up	panpsychism	is	perhaps	Sam	Coleman’s	
(2014).	 As	 bottom-up	 panpsychists	 themselves	 seem	 to	 agree,	 “‘experience	 is	
impossible	without	an	experiencer,’	a	subject	of	experience”	(Strawson	2006:	26,	
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emphasis	 added).	 Therefore,	 bottom-up	 panpsychism	 implies	 that	 each	
phenomenal	ultimate,	by	virtue	of	bearing	phenomenal	properties,	instantiates	
a	 micro-level	 subject.	 Moreover,	 it	 implies	 that	 macro-level	 subjects	 with	 a	
seemingly	 unitary	 perspective,	 such	 as	 you	 and	 me,	 must	 somehow	 arise	
through	some	form	of	bottom-up	combination	of	micro-level	subjects.	This	 is	
called	the	‘subject	combination	problem.’	
Coleman	connects	 subjectivity	with	 the	presence	of	 a	perspective,	 or	point	 of	
view:	
That	a	given	subject	has	a	particular	phenomenological	point	of	view	can	
be	 taken	 as	 saying	 that	 there	 exists	 a	 discrete	 ‘sphere’	 of	 conscious	
experiential	 goings-on	 corresponding	 to	 this	 subject,	 with	 regard	 to	
which	other	subjects	are	distinct	in	respect	of	the	phenomenal	qualities	
they	experience,	and	 they	have	no	direct	 (i.e.	 experiential)	 access	 to	 the	
qualitative	 field	 enjoyed	 by	 the	 first	 subject.	 A	 subject,	 then,	 can	 be	
thought	 of	 as	 a	 point	 of	 view	 annexed	 to	 a	 private	 qualitative	 field.	
(Coleman	2014:	30,	emphasis	added)	
Notice	 Coleman’s	 emphasis	 on	 the	 private	 character	 of	 the	 qualitative	 field	
annexed	to	a	subject.	I	shall	return	to	this	point	later.	
Bottom-up	 panpsychism	 attempts	 to	 model	 the	 combination	 of	 phenomenal	
states	after	the	way	ultimates	combine	physico-chemically.	After	all,	 the	 force	
and	 appeal	 of	 its	 argument	 rests	 on	 the	 analogous	 treatment	 of	 phenomenal	
properties	 and	 standard	 physical	 properties	 such	 as	 mass,	 spin	 and	 charge.	
Therefore,	 Coleman	 also	 makes	 explicit	 what	 combination	 means	 in	 this	
physico-chemical	sense:	
Combination,	thus,	is	the	formation	of	a	whole	from	components	where	
the	 components	 continue	 to	 exist	 in	 the	 whole,	 but	 are	 intrinsically	
altered	by	combining	with	one	another.	(ibid.)	
For	 instance,	 an	 oxygen	 and	 two	 hydrogen	 atoms	 combine	 to	 form	 a	 water	
molecule:	they	become	intrinsically	altered	in	the	process	of	 forming	covalent	
bonds	 with	 one	 another,	 but	 continue	 nonetheless	 to	 exist	 in	 the	 resulting	
molecule.	
In	 this	 framework,	 bottom-up	 panpsychism	 implies	 that	 the	 private	 point	 of	
view	 of	 each	 phenomenal	 ultimate	 that	 constitutes	 you	 becomes	 intrinsically	
altered	in	the	process	of	combining	to	form	the	private	point	of	view	you	enjoy	
right	now—that	 is,	 your	 “unique	experiential	portal	 to	 reality,”	 as	put	by	 Itay	
Shani	 (2015:	 399).	But	 each	must	 nonetheless	 continue	 to	 exist	 in	 you,	 just	 as	
quarks	continue	to	exist	in	protons,	protons	continue	to	exist	in	oxygen	atoms,	
and	oxygen	atoms	continue	to	exist	in	water	molecules.	
However,	 Coleman	 argues,	 “points	 of	 view	 cannot	 combine”	 in	 this	 manner	
(2014:	 32).	 If	 a	 first	 constituent	 lower-level	 subject	 sees,	 say,	 only	 blue,	 and	 a	
second	 sees	 only	 red,	 then	 only	 the	 qualitative	 contents	 of	 their	 respective	
perspectives	 can	 conceivably	 survive—possibly	 in	 altered	 form—as	 combined	
ingredients	of	the	resulting	higher-level	subject’s	phenomenal	 field	(e.g.	 if	 the	
latter	 sees	purple).	But	 the	original	 constituent	points	 of	 view	 cannot	 survive,	
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for	 they	entail	 seeing	only	 red	and	only	 blue,	 respectively.	 Since	 the	 resulting	
higher-level	 subject	 has,	 ex	 hypothesi,	 a	 single	 compound	 portal	 to	 reality,	 it	
cannot	both	see	only	red	and	only	blue.	At	least	one	of	the	constituent	lower-
level	points	of	view	will	thus	necessarily	disappear—in	fact,	both	will	disappear	
if	 the	 higher-level	 subject	 sees	 purple—which	 is	 not	 consistent	 with	
combination	in	the	physico-chemical	sense.	
One	may	argue	that	what	happens	instead	is	that	the	phenomenal	state	of	the	
higher-level	subject	“is	a	novel	state	which	in	some	way	‘absorbs’	or	supersedes	
the	 mental	 states	 of	 the	 constituents”	 (Seager	 2010:	 179).	 In	 this	 so-called	
“combinatorial	infusion”	(ibid.)	scenario,	the	lower-level	points	of	view	cease	to	
exist	in	the	process	of	forming	the	compound	higher-level	one.	By	parting	with	
combination	in	the	physico-chemical	sense,	this	scenario	negates	much	of	the	
force	and	appeal	of	the	bottom-up	panpsychist	argument.	But	the	panpsychist	
can	be	spared	this	regret,	for—as	Coleman	argues—the	scenario	does	not	work	
anyway.	
Coleman’s	reasoning	is	that,	to	avoid	the	appeal	to	magic	entailed	by	brute	or	
strong	 emergence,	 “lower-level	 properties	 must	 contribute	 to	 their	 novel	
product	 in	 virtue	 of	 their	 metaphysical	 nature,	 or,	 otherwise	 put,	 while	
remaining	 true	 to	 what	 they	 are”	 (2014:	 35,	 original	 emphasis).	 But	 “a	 set	 of	
points	of	view	have	nothing	to	contribute	as	such	to	a	single,	unified	successor	
point	of	view.	Their	essential	property	defines	them	against	it:	in	so	far	as	they	
are	 points	 of	 view	 they	 are	 experientially	 distinct	 and	 isolated”	 (ibid.:	 37,	
original	 emphasis).	 So	 the	 resulting	 higher-level	 point	 of	 view	 cannot	 be	
explicated	in	terms	of	the	lower-level	constituent	points	of	view.	
In	 conclusion,	 bottom-up	 panpsychism	 fails	 because	 there	 is	 no	 explicit	 and	
coherent	 way	 to	 ground	 the	 existence	 of	 macro-level	 subjects	 in	 micro-level	
phenomenal	 ultimates.	 Subject	 combination	 arguably	 requires—just	 as	
mainstream	physicalism	does—the	appeal	to	magic	entailed	by	brute	or	strong	
emergence.	 Yet,	 it	 was	 precisely	 this	 requirement	 that,	 in	 the	 case	 of	
mainstream	physicalism,	motivated	the	conception	of	bottom-up	panpsychism	
as	an	alternative	in	the	first	place.	
	
3.5	 The	questionable	logical	bridge	in	bottom-up	panpsychism	
Bottom-up	 panpsychism	 is	 motivated	 by	 the	 idea	 that,	 since	 physics	 only	
models	the	behavior	of	physical	entities	and	says	nothing	about	their	 intrinsic	
nature	(Russell	2009),	phenomenal	consciousness	may	be	this	intrinsic	nature.	
This	 is	eminently	reasonable,	since	the	only	physical	entity	we	are	acquainted	
with	 ‘from	 within’	 is	 our	 own	 nervous	 system,	 whose	 intrinsic	 nature	 surely	
seems	 to	be	phenomenal	 (Eddington	 1928).	But	bottom-up	panpsychism	then	
makes	an	extra	claim:	that	phenomenal	consciousness	has	the	same	fragmented	
structure	that	matter	has	on	the	screen	of	perception.	In	other	words,	since	our	
body	is	constituted	by	myriad	elementary	particles	insofar	as	we	can	perceive	it,	
our	 phenomenal	 inner-life	 must	 itself	 be	 constituted	 by	 micro-level	
phenomenal	parts—or	so	the	argument	goes.	
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This	 extra	 claim	 rests	 on	 a	 questionable	 logical	 bridge:	 it	 attributes	 to	 that	
which	experiences	a	structure	discernible	only	in	the	experience	itself.	Allow	me	
to	elaborate.	
The	 concept	 of	 elementary	 particles—ultimates—arises	 from	 experiments	
whose	outcomes	are	accessible	to	us	only	in	the	form	of	conscious	perception	
(even	 when	 delicate	 instrumentation	 is	 used,	 the	 output	 of	 this	
instrumentation	 is	 only	 available	 to	 us	 as	 conscious	 perception).	 Such	
experiments	show	that	the	images	on	the	screen	of	perception	can	be	divided	
up	into	ever-smaller	elements,	until	we	reach	a	limit.	At	this	limit,	we	find	the	
smallest	discernible	constituents	of	 the	 images,	which	are	 thus	akin	 to	pixels.	
As	 such,	 ultimates	 are	 the	 ‘pixels’	 of	 experience,	 not	 necessarily	 of	 the	
experiencer.	The	latter	simply	does	not	follow	from	the	former.	
Therefore,	 that	 human	 bodies	 are	 made	 of	 elementary	 particles	 does	 not	
necessarily	say	anything	about	the	structure	of	the	experiencer:	a	human	body	
is	 itself	 an	 image	 on	 the	 screen	 of	 perception,	 and	 so	 will	 necessarily	 be	
‘pixelated’	 insofar	as	 it	 is	perceived.	Such	pixelation	reflects	 the	 idiosyncrasies	
of	 the	 screen	of	 perception,	not	necessarily	the	structure	of	the	human	subject	
itself.	 As	 an	 analogy,	 the	 pixelated	 image	 of	 a	 person	 on	 a	 television	 screen	
reflects	 the	 idiosyncrasies	 of	 the	 television	 screen;	 it	 does	 not	mean	 that	 the	
person	herself	is	made	up	of	pixels.	
As	 suggestive	 as	 it	may	 be,	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 phenomenal	 consciousness	 is	
the	 intrinsic	 nature	 of	 the	 physical	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 the	 fragmented	
structure	of	matter	on	the	screen	of	perception	is	the	fundamental	structure	of	
phenomenal	consciousness	itself.	
	
3.6	 What	counts	as	a	fundamental	concrete	entity?	
We	have	seen	in	the	previous	section	that	elementary	particles	are	the	building	
blocks	 or	 ‘pixels’	 of	 what	 is	 perceived,	 not	 necessarily	 of	 the	 subject	 that	
perceives.	 But	 we	 can	 ask	 a	 yet	 deeper	 question:	 Are	 elementary	 particles	
fundamental	 concrete	 entities	 on	 their	 own	 merit?	 Both	 mainstream	
physicalism	and	bottom-up	panpsychism,	in	taking	ultimates	to	be	the	discrete	
building	blocks	of	nature,	seem	to	assume	so.	
There	are,	however,	strong	reasons	to	believe	that	at	least	the	entire	inanimate	
universe	is	one	integrated	whole	without	ultimate	parts.	Jonathan	Schaffer,	for	
instance,	points	out	that,	
physically,	 there	 is	 good	 evidence	 that	 the	 cosmos	 forms	 an	 entangled	
system	 and	 good	 reason	 to	 treat	 entangled	 systems	 as	 irreducible	
wholes.	Modally,	mereology	allows	for	the	possibility	of	atomless	 gunk,	
with	no	ultimate	parts	for	the	pluralist	to	invoke	as	the	ground	of	being.	
(2010:	32,	original	emphasis)	
Terry	Horgan	and	Matjaž	Potrč	(2000)	also	contended	that	only	the	universe	as	
a	whole	can	be	considered	a	concrete	entity	on	its	own	merit,	which	they	called	
the	‘blobject.’	
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The	physical	substantiation	for	this	line	of	thought	is	not	recent.	As	early	as	in	
the	 1930s,	 John	 von	 Neumann	 (1996)	 reasoned	 that,	 when	 two	 inanimate	
quantum	systems	interact,	no	measurement	is	actually	performed	but,	instead,	
the	 two	 systems	 become	 entangled	 with	 one	 another,	 forming	 an	 indivisible	
whole.	 If	 the	 resulting	 whole	 then	 interacts	 with	 a	 third	 system,	 they,	 too,	
become	entangled,	forming	a	new	and	larger	whole;	and	so	forth.	These	are	the	
so-called	‘von	Neumann	chains’	and,	since	everything	in	the	universe	ultimately	
is	a	quantum	system,	the	entire	inanimate	universe	must	constitute	one	single	
von	 Neumann	 chain—that	 is,	 one	 indivisible	 whole	 (von	 Neumann	 also	
remarked	 that	 observation	 by	 a	 conscious,	 living	 human	being	 clearly	 breaks	
the	 chain,	 since	 living	 humans	 demonstrably	 can	 perform	 a	 quantum	
measurement.	Therefore,	conscious	living	beings	must	be	left	out	of	the	present	
argument).	
The	 implication	 is	 that,	 physically,	 there	 are	 arguably	 no	 such	 things	 as	
fundamental	 microscopic	 ultimates.	 Although	 this	 may	 violate	 popular	
assumptions	and	intuitions,	it	also	points	the	way	to	a	third	avenue	of	enquiry	
that	holds	some	promise	as	an	alternative	to	both	mainstream	physicalism	and	
bottom-up	panpsychism.	
	
3.7	 The	whole	universe	as	a	unitary	conscious	entity	
The	idea	that	the	(inanimate)	universe	may	be	an	indivisible	whole	has	proven	
tempting	 to	 those	 seeking	 an	 alternative	 to	 bottom-up	 panpsychism,	 so	 to	
avoid	the	subject	combination	problem:	they	posit	that	“the	cosmos	as	a	whole	
is	 the	 only	 ontological	 ultimate	 there	 is,	 and	 that	 it	 is	conscious”	 (Shani	 2015:	
408,	original	emphasis).	With	this,	there	is	no	longer	any	need	to	explicate	how	
lower-level	 subjects	 combine	 to	 form	 higher-level	 subjects,	 for	 the	 highest-
possible-level	subject	is	already	the	starting	point.	
This	 general	 outlook	 is	 called	 ‘cosmopsychism’	 (Mathews	 2011,	 Jaskolla	 and	
Buck	 2012,	 Shani	 2015,	 Nagasawa	 and	Wager	 2016).	 The	 seminal	 insight	 that	
freed	 cosmopsychism	 from	 the	 limitations	 of	 bottom-up	 panpsychism	 was	
arguably	 that	 of	 Freya	 Mathews	 (2011):	 she	 realized	 that,	 even	 under	 the	
hypothesis	 that	 phenomenal	 consciousness	 is	 the	 intrinsic	 aspect	 of	 the	
physical,	 there	 is	 no	 need	 to	 attribute	 the	 fragmented	 structure	 of	matter	 to	
phenomenal	consciousness	itself.	In	her	words,	“an	extension	of	subjectivity	to	
physical	reality	generally	[i.e.	“force	fields	and	even	space	itself”],	rather	than	its	
restriction	merely	to	matter,	does	seem	to	be	required”	(ibid.:	144).	
Now	 the	 problem	 cosmopsychists	 face	 is	 the	 ‘decombination	 problem’	 (also	
called	 the	 ‘decomposition	 problem’	 in	 Chalmers	 2016a):	 How	 do	 seemingly	
separate	 lower-level	subjects—which,	 from	now	on,	 I	 shall	 follow	Shani	 (2015:	
415)	in	referring	to	as	‘relative	subjects’—form	within	the	conscious	cosmos?	To	
paraphrase	Coleman	(2014:	30),	how	do	they	acquire	their	private	point	of	view,	
whose	 associated	qualitative	 field	other	 relative	 subjects	have	no	direct—that	
is,	 experiential—access	 to?	 After	 all,	 I	 cannot	 read	 your	 thoughts	 and,	
presumably,	neither	can	you	mine.	
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Before	 we	 address	 this	 problem,	 however,	 notice	 that	 there	 are	 at	 least	 two	
possible	interpretations	of	cosmopsychism.	The	first	one	sticks	to	the	bottom-
up	 panpsychist	 view	 that	 a	 phenomenal	 ultimate	 has	 both	 phenomenal	 and	
non-phenomenal	properties.	This	way,	whereas	 it	 takes	the	cosmos	as	a	whole	
to	be	the	sole	phenomenal	ultimate	there	is,	this	interpretation	grants	that	the	
abstract	 relational	 properties	 of	 the	 cosmos	 are	 not	 phenomenal.	 For	 this	
reason,	 I	 shall	 call	 this	 interpretation	 ‘dual-aspect	cosmopsychism.’	According	
to	 it,	 the	 intrinsic	 aspect	 of	 the	 cosmos	 is	 phenomenal,	 but	 its	 extrinsic	
aspect—the	 physical	 structure	 we	 can	 objectively	 measure	 in	 a	 scientific	
sense—is	non-phenomenal	and	circumscribes	 the	cosmos’s	phenomenal	 field.	
In	 a	 sense,	 the	 extrinsic,	 physical	 aspect	 of	 the	 cosmos	 bears	 phenomenality	
within	in.	
Another	 interpretation	 of	 cosmopsychism	 entails	 that	 the	 sole	 ontological	
primitive	 there	 is	 is	 cosmic	 phenomenal	 consciousness—or	 simply	 ‘cosmic	
consciousness’	 for	ease	of	 reference.	Nothing	exists	outside	or	 independent	of	
cosmic	 consciousness.	As	 such,	 under	 this	 interpretation	 one	 should	 say	 that	
the	 cosmos	 is	 constituted	 by	 phenomenality,	 as	 opposed	 to	 bearing	
phenomenality.	 In	 other	 words,	 here	 the	 perceivable	 cosmos	 is	 in	
consciousness,	as	opposed	to	being	conscious.	
The	latter	interpretation	is	Shani’s	(2015)	position.	Indeed,	according	to	him	the	
external,	 physical	 aspect	 of	 the	 cosmos	 is	 ‘its	 appearance	 as	 an	 exterior	
complement	to	...	subjective	realities’	(ibid.:	412,	emphasis	added).	Appearances	
are,	 of	 course,	 phenomenal	 in	 nature.	 I	 shall	 thus	 call	 this	 interpretation	
‘idealist	cosmopsychism,’	since	its	reduction	base	is	purely	phenomenal.	
Shani	does	still	postulate	a	duality	in	cosmic	consciousness	to	account	for	the	
clear	 qualitative	 differences	 between	 the	 outer	world	we,	 as	 relative	 subjects,	
perceive	 and	measure	 and	 the	 inner	 world	 of	 our	 thoughts	 and	 feelings.	 He	
calls	it	the	‘lateral	duality	principle’	(ibid.:	410)	and	describes	it	thus:	
[Cosmic	consciousness]	exemplifies	a	dual	nature:	it	has	a	concealed	(or	
enfolded,	or	implicit)	side	to	its	being,	as	well	as	a	revealed	(or	unfolded,	
or	 explicit)	 side;	 the	 former	 is	 an	 intrinsic	dynamic	domain	of	 creative	
activity,	while	the	latter	is	identified	as	the	outer,	observable	expression	
of	that	activity.	(ibid.,	original	emphasis)	
What	is	important	to	emphasize,	though,	is	that	this	duality	does	not	entail	or	
imply	two	distinct	ontological	classes.	Everything	is	still	phenomenal.	
Now,	 one	 must	 ultimately	 ground	 the	 revealed	 side	 of	 the	 cosmos	 in	 its	
concealed	 side,	 not	 only	 to	 eliminate	 what	 would	 otherwise	 be	 an	 arbitrary	
boundary,	 but	 also	 to	 accommodate	 the	 empirically	 undeniable	 causal	 links	
between	the	revealed	order	of	the	physical	world	we	perceive	and	the	concealed	
order	 of	 thoughts	 and	 feelings.	 After	 all,	 revealed	 physical	 things	 and	
phenomena—think	 of	 psychoactive	 drugs,	 bodily	 trauma,	 electromagnetic	
fields,	 etc.—causally	 affect	 our	 concealed	 thoughts	 and	 feelings.	 Causal	 links	
operating	the	other	way	around	are	also	undeniable:	our	thoughts	and	feelings	
can	 lead	 to	 physical	 manifestations	 in	 the	 form	 of	 bodily	 behaviors.	 If	 the	
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revealed	order	were	not	grounded	in	the	concealed,	but	constituted	a	separate	
phenomenal	 domain	 instead,	 how	 could	 these	 cross-influences	 take	 place?	
Indeed,	Shani	acknowledges	as	much	when	he	writes	that	“the	revealed	order	of	
reality	is	grounded	in	the	concealed”	(ibid.:	416).	
Yet,	Shani	is	not	explicit	in	regards	to	how	this	grounding	works.	He	states	that	
the	physical	world	we	perceive	is	the	way	the	structural	patterns	of	the	creative	
activity	 of	 cosmic	 consciousness	 are	 represented	 in	 relative	 subjects,	 such	 as	
you	 and	me	 (ibid.:	 412).	 This	 is	 fair	 enough	 as	 far	 as	 it	 goes,	 but	what	 is	 the	
mechanism	 of	 representation	 whereby	 concealed	 phenomenal	 activity	
translates	 into	 revealed	 order	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 relative	 subjects?	How	
does	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 relative	 subject	 lead	 to	 such	 a	 significant	 qualitative	
transition	as	the	representation	of	thoughts	and	feelings	(the	concealed	order)	
in	the	form	of	perception	(the	revealed	order)?	
To	 tackle	 the	 decombination	 problem,	 Shani	 posits	 that	 the	 conscious	
perspective	or	point	of	view	of	each	 relative	 subject	has	both	a	 specific	and	a	
generic	character	(ibid.:	423).	Since	a	relative	subject	corresponds	to	a	segment	
of	cosmic	consciousness,	its	specific	character	is	derived	from	the	local	pattern	
of	 phenomenal	 activity	 taking	 place	 in	 that	 segment.	 Its	 generic	 character,	 in	
turn,	 is	derived	 from	the	 intrinsically	 subjective,	 perspectival	 nature	of	 cosmic	
consciousness	as	a	whole.	Let	me	unpack	this.	
Shani	posits	 two	 intrinsic	 features	 of	 cosmic	 consciousness	 as	 constituents	 of	
the	 generic	 character	 of	 each	 relative	 subject:	 sentience	 and	 core-subjectivity	
(ibid.:	426).	In	other	words,	each	relative	subject	is	phenomenally	conscious	by	
virtue	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 cosmic	 consciousness	 is	 itself	 intrinsically	 capable	 of	
experience.	Also,	each	relative	subject	has	‘ipseity,	or	I-ness,	by	which	is	meant	
an	implicit	sense	of	self	which	serves	as	the	dative	...	of	experience,	namely,	as	
that	 to	whom	things	are	given,	or	disclosed,	from	a	perspective’	(ibid.,	original	
emphasis).	The	claim	is	then	that	the	sense	of	I-ness	of	each	relative	subject	is	
the	 sense	 of	 I-ness	 intrinsic	 to	 cosmic	 consciousness	 as	 a	 whole.	 One	 could	
argue	that	sentience	and	core-subjectivity,	so	defined,	are	inextricable	from	one	
another.	But	even	in	this	case,	it	is	still	useful	to	distinguish	between	these	two	
cognitively	 salient	 aspects	 of	 what	 would	 admittedly	 be	 a	 single	 intrinsic	
feature	of	cosmic	consciousness.	So	I	shall	continue	to	speak	of	sentience	and	
core-subjectivity.	
In	 summary,	 according	 to	 Shani	 a	 relative	 subject	 is	 grounded,	 on	 the	 one	
hand,	 in	 the	 intrinsic	 sentience	and	core-subjectivity	of	 cosmic	consciousness	
as	a	whole	and,	on	the	other	hand,	in	the	local	patterns	of	phenomenal	activity	
taking	place	in	the	particular	segment	of	cosmic	consciousness	associated	with	
the	 relative	 subject.	 The	 question	 now	 is:	 What	 are	 these	 local	 patterns	 of	
phenomenal	activity	that	give	rise	to	a	private	qualitative	 field,	 inaccessible	 to	
other	relative	subjects,	as	required	by	Coleman	(2014)?	
Shani	 posits	 that	 the	 smallest	 cohesive	 elements	 of	 nature	 correspond	 to	 the	
revealed	 appearance	 of	 micro-level	 relative	 subjects	 (2015:	 415-16).	 In	 other	
words,	he	 returns	 to	 the	 bottom-up	 panpsychist	 view	 that	 elementary	 particles	
are	subjects.	Shani	motivates	this	with	a	metaphor:	
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A	relative	[subject]	is	a	‘vortex’	surging	from	the	oceanic	background	[of	
cosmic	consciousness].	It	is	a	cohesive	system.	(ibid.)	
He	uses	the	image	of	a	vortex	to	refer	to	localization	of	phenomenal	activity.	
Consider	 ...	 the	 most	 elementary	 ‘vortices’.	 [Their	 corresponding]	
localization	process	 consists,	 then,	 in	 the	 intensification	of	 experience,	
as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 concentration	 of	 focus,	 within	 limited	 and	 relatively	
well-defined	boundaries	 ...	which	 serves	 to	 separate	 the	 system’s	 inner	
reality	from	the	inner	reality	of	the	ocean	surrounding	it	...	The	result	is	
an	 individual	 self	 (however	 primitive)	 engulfed	 in	 its	 own	 experiences	
and	concerns	while	being	ignorant	of	the	deeper	layers	which	bind	it	to	
the	ground	of	all	things	...	[T]he	theory	implies	that	simple	[vortices]	are	
veritable	subjects.	(ibid.:	418,	emphasis	added)	
Having	 effectively	 returned	 to	 the	 idea	 of	micro-level	 phenomenal	 ultimates,	
Shani	 then	argues	 that	macro-level	 relative	 subjects,	 such	as	you	and	me,	are	
formed	 by	 micro-level	 relative	 subjects	 coming	 together.	 The	 rather	 technical	
core	of	his	argument—which	I	shall	not	reproduce	here,	for	it	is	not	relevant	to	
this	 paper—is	 that,	 by	 grounding	 the	micro-level	 relative	 subjects	 in	 cosmic	
consciousness,	 he	 circumvents	 Coleman’s	 (2014)	 attack	 on	 bottom-up	
panpsychism.	
Even	if	 the	 latter	point	 is	valid—and	I	have	no	reason	to	believe	otherwise—I	
see	multiple	 problems	with	 this	move.	 For	 one,	 once	 one	 starts	 from	 cosmic	
consciousness,	 it	 seems	unnecessary	and	rather	convoluted	 to	descend	all	 the	
way	 down	 to	 micro-level	 subjects,	 just	 to	 turn	 around	 again	 and	 go	 up	 to	
macro-level	 subjects.	 The	 only	 motivation	 I	 see	 for	 doing	 so	 is	 the	 arguably	
flawed	 notion,	 discussed	 earlier,	 that	 the	 ‘pixels’	 discernible	 on	 the	 screen	 of	
perception	must	be	 the	building	blocks	of	 the	experiencer,	 as	opposed	 to	 the	
experience.	 By	making	 a	 concession	 to	 this	 physicalist	 intuition,	 Shani	 forces	
two	 problems	 upon	 himself:	 he	 has	 to	 explain	 (a)	 how	 the	 cosmic	 subject	
seemingly	breaks	up	into	myriad	micro-level	relative	subjects,	and	then	(b)	how	
these	 micro-level	 relative	 subjects	 come	 together	 again	 to	 form	 macro-level	
relative	subjects.	
Moreover,	 recall	 that,	 as	 per	 Coleman’s	 definition,	 subjects	 entail	 “a	 point	 of	
view	annexed	to	a	private	qualitative	field”	(Coleman	2014:	30).	So	micro-level	
relative	 subjects	 must	 have	 private	 phenomenal	 fields	 inaccessible	 to	 other	
subjects.	 To	 tackle	 the	 decombination	 problem,	 one	must	 explain	 how	 these	
private	fields	form	within	the	ocean	of	cosmic	consciousness.	But	Shani	seems	
to	 address	 this	 only	 in	 a	 vague,	 tangential	manner.	 For	 starters,	 it	 is	 unclear	
how	or	why	a	mere	“localization	process”	in	the	ocean	of	cosmic	consciousness	
would	lead	to	local	“intensification	of	experience”	and	“concentration	of	focus”	
(Shani	2015:	418).	But	even	if	we	grant	that	it	somehow	does,	a	“concentration	
of	 focus	within	 limited	and	relatively	well-defined	boundaries”	does	not	 seem	
sufficient	 “to	 separate	 the	 system’s	 inner	 reality	 from	 the	 inner	 reality	 of	 the	
ocean	 surrounding	 it”	 (ibid.).	 By	 way	 of	 analogy,	 while	my	 visual	 focus	 right	
now	rests	on	the	characters	I	am	writing,	I	am	not	unaware	of,	or	separate	from,	
the	contents	of	my	peripheral	vision;	I	still	have	direct—that	is,	experiential—
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access	 to	 them.	Moreover,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 imagine	 that	 an	 electron	 could	 have	
sufficiently	 rich	 phenomenal	 properties	 to	 become	 “engulfed	 in	 its	 own	
experiences	and	concerns”	(ibid.).	It	seems	highly	unlikely	that	there	is	enough	
cognitive	complexity—if	there	can	be	cognition	at	all—at	that	microscopic	level	
to	justify	such	an	appeal	to	mere	self-absorption	as	the	mechanism	behind	the	
separation	of	the	electron’s	inner	reality.	
I	 do	 think	 Shani	 is	 on	 the	 correct	 general	 path	 here,	 but	 a	 more	 elaborate,	
explicit	 and	 precise	 case,	 with	 stronger	 empirical	 substantiation,	 seems	 to	 be	
necessary	to	tackle	the	decombination	problem.	
	
3.8	 The	key	questions	to	be	answered	
The	 principle	 of	 parsimony	 implies	 that,	 of	 the	 two	 interpretations	 of	
cosmopsychism	 discussed	 above,	 idealist	 cosmopsychism	 is	more	 economical	
and,	therefore,	should	be	preferred	if	it	can	account	for	all	relevant	facts.	I	shall	
thus	 take	 idealist	 cosmopsychism	 as	 my	 starting	 point	 and	 then	 attempt	 to	
address	 each	 of	 its	 problems	 and	 limitations.	 The	 goal	 is	 to	 account	 for	 all	
relevant	facts	with	cosmic	consciousness	alone	in	the	reduction	base.	Because	I	
do	 not	 feel	 the	 need	 to	 invent	 new	 names	 for	 ideas	 that	 have	 historically	
established	names,	I	shall	call	the	resulting	ontology	simply	idealism.	
Specifically,	 here	 are	 the	 key	 problems	 of,	 and	 questions	 not	 sufficiently	 or	
explicitly	addressed	by,	idealist	cosmopsychism	that	I	now	set	out	to	tackle:	
a) Grounding	 experience	 in	 cosmic	 consciousness:	 How	 do	 myriad,	
ephemeral	 experiential	 qualities	 arise	 in	 one	 enduring	 cosmic	
consciousness?	
b) The	 decombination	 problem:	 How	 do	 private	 phenomenal	 fields	 form	
within	 cosmic	 consciousness?	 Why	 can	 I	 not	 read	 your	 thoughts	 by	
simply	shifting	the	focus	of	my	attention?	
c) Reducing	perception:	How	can	the	revealed	order	of	nature	(the	physical	
world	 we	 measure)	 be	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 concealed	 order	 (its	
underlying	thoughts)?	Why	are	the	respective	qualities	so	different?	
d) Explaining	the	correlations	between	brain	 function	and	 inner	experience:	
If	brain	function	does	not	constitute	or	generate	phenomenality,	why	do	
they	correlate	so	well?	
e) Explaining	 a	 seemingly	 shared,	 autonomous	 world:	 If	 the	 world	 is	
imagined	in	consciousness,	how	can	we	all	be	imagining	essentially	the	
same	world	outside	the	control	of	our	personal	volition?	
	
3.9	 Experiences	as	excitations	of	cosmic	consciousness	
The	 first	 step	 is	 to	 clarify	 the	 relationship	between	cosmic	consciousness	and	
experience.	After	all,	the	two	are	not	interchangeable:	cosmic	consciousness	is,	
ex	hypothesi,	something	relatively	enduring	and	stable,	whereas	experiences	are	
relatively	 ephemeral	 and	 dynamic.	 Yet,	 idealism	 posits	 that	 cosmic	
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consciousness	is	nature’s	sole	ontological	primitive,	so	how	does	the	variety	and	
dynamism	of	experience	come	into	the	picture?	
I	 submit	 that	 (a)	 experiences	 are	 patterns	 of	 self-excitation	 of	 cosmic	
consciousness	and	 that	 (b)	cosmic	consciousness	has	 the	 inherent	disposition	
to	 self-excitation.	 As	 such,	 experiences	 are	 not	 ontologically	 distinct	 from	
cosmic	consciousness,	just	as	a	dance	is	not	distinct	from	the	dancer.	There	is	
nothing	 to	 a	 dance	 but	 the	 dancer	 in	motion.	 In	 an	 analogous	 way,	 there	 is	
nothing	to	experience	but	cosmic	consciousness	‘in	motion.’	
Particular	 experiences	 correspond	 to	 particular	 patterns	 of	 self-excitation	 of	
cosmic	 consciousness,	 just	 as	 particular	 choreographies	 correspond	 to	
particular	patterns	of	self-excitation	of	the	dancer.	These	patterns	can	evolve	in	
time	 and	 differ	 across	 different	 segments	 of	 cosmic	 consciousness.	 It	 is	 the	
variety	and	dynamics	of	excitations	across	the	underlying	‘medium’	that	lead	to	
different	experiential	qualities.	(One	must	be	careful	at	this	point:	by	referring	
to	 cosmic	 consciousness	 as	 a	 ‘medium’	 I	 may	 appear	 to	 be	 objectifying	 it.	
Language	forces	me	into	this	dilemma.	But	cosmic	consciousness	is	subjectivity	
itself,	not	an	object.)	This	way,	even	if	the	‘medium’	is	eternal	and	immutable,	
its	self-excitations	can	come	and	go	in	myriad	patterns.	
This	notion	is	entirely	analogous	to,	and	consistent	with,	how	modern	physics	
attempts	 to	 reduce	 the	 variety	 and	 dynamics	 of	 natural	 phenomena	 to	 an	
enduring	primary	substrate:	quantum	field	theory,	 for	 instance,	posits	 that	all	
fundamental	 particles	 are	 particular	 modes	 of	 self-excitation	 of	 a	 quantum	
field,	which	is	inherently	disposed	to	self-excitation.	Superstring	theories	posit	
essentially	 the	 same,	 but	 now	 the	 self-excited	 substrate	 is	 hyper-dimensional	
strings.	Finally,	according	to	M-theory	the	patterns	of	nature	consist	of	modes	
of	 self-excitation	 of	 a	 hyper-dimensional	 membrane.	 Idealism,	 as	 I	 am	
formulating	 it	 here,	 essentially	 entails	 porting	 the	 evolving	 mathematical	
apparatus	of	modern	physics	 to	cosmic	consciousness	 itself,	 as	opposed	 to	an	
abstract	 conceptual	 object.	 This	 should	 require	 but	 a	 straightforward	 and	
seamless	transposition,	implying	no	loss	of	predictive	power.	
	
3.10	 Tackling	the	decombination	problem	
Cosmic	 consciousness	 comprises	 a	 variety	 of	 phenomenal	 contents—
experiences,	 patterns	 of	 self-excitation—such	 as	 thoughts	 and	 feelings.	 If	 we	
take	the	human	psyche	as	a	representative	sample	of	how	cosmic	consciousness	
operates—which	 is	 the	 best	 we	 can	 do,	 really—we	 can	 infer	 that,	 ordinarily,	
these	 phenomenal	 contents	 are	 internally	 integrated	 through	 cognitive	
associations:	a	feeling	evokes	an	abstract	idea,	which	triggers	a	memory,	which	
inspires	 a	 thought,	 etc.	 These	 associations	 are	 logical,	 in	 the	 sense	 that,	 for	
instance,	 the	memory	 inspires	 the	 thought	because	of	 a	 certain	 implicit	 logic	
linking	 the	 two.	 Ordinary	 phenomenal	 activity	 in	 cosmic	 consciousness	 can	
thus	be	modeled	as	a	connected	directed	graph.	See	Figure	3.1a.	Each	vertex	in	
the	 graph	 represents	 a	 particular	 phenomenal	 content	 and	 each	 edge	 a	
cognitive	 association	 logically	 linking	 contents	 together.	 Every	 phenomenal	
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content	in	the	graph	of	Figure	3.1a	can	be	reached	from	any	other	phenomenal	
content	through	a	chain	of	cognitive	associations.	
	
Figure	3.1:	A	connected	graph	(a)	illustrating	normal	integration	of	phenomenal	
contents,	and	a	disconnected	graph	(b)	illustrating	dissociation	and	the	
corresponding	formation	of	an	alter	(inner	subgraph	in	grey).	
	
Each	 vertex	 in	 Figure	 3.1	 represents	 a	 particular	 pattern	 of	 self-excitation	 of	
cosmic	 consciousness.	 Each	 edge	 represents	 thus	 an	 association	between	 two	
patterns	 of	 self-excitation,	 each	 pattern	 with	 its	 particular	 constituent	
harmonics.	When	the	two	patterns	of	self-excitation	are	concurrently	present—
that	 is,	 when	 the	 two	 associated	 phenomenal	 contents	 are	 experienced	
together—the	 association	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 combination	 of	 the	 respective	
harmonics,	 like	 in	 a	musical	 chord	wherein	multiple	 notes	 are	 played	 at	 the	
same	time.	When	the	association	unfolds	in	temporal	sequence—as	e.g.	in	the	
case	 of	 a	 thought	 that	 fades	 away	 to	 make	 room	 for	 the	 experience	 of	 the	
memory	 it	 evokes—it	 can	 be	 visualized	 as	 a	 transition	 from	 the	 first	 to	 the	
second	pattern	of	self-excitation,	like	notes	played	in	sequence	in	a	melody.	
However,	we	know	from	the	psychiatric	literature	that	sometimes	“a	disruption	
of	and/or	discontinuity	in	the	normal	integration”	of	phenomenal	contents	can	
occur	 in	 the	 human	 psyche	 (Black	 and	 Grant	 2014:	 191).	 This	 is	 called	
dissociation	 and	 is	well	 recognized	 in	 psychiatry	 today	 (American	Psychiatric	
Association	2013).	Dissociation	entails	that	some	phenomenal	contents	cease	to	
be	able	 to	evoke	others.	A	person	suffering	 from	a	particularly	severe	 form	of	
dissociation,	 called	 Dissociative	 Identity	 Disorder	 (DID),	 exhibits	 multiple	
“discrete	 centers	 of	 self-awareness”	 (Braude	 1995:	 67)	 called	alters.	 Each	 alter	
corresponds	thus	to	a	particular	segment	of	the	psychic	space	wherein	it	forms.	
Dissociation	can	be	visualized	as	what	happens	when	the	graph	 in	Figure	3.1a	
becomes	 disconnected,	 such	 as	 shown	 in	 Figure	 3.1b.	 Some	 phenomenal	
contents	 can	 then	 no	 longer	 be	 reached	 from	 others.	 The	 inner	 subgraph	 is	
thus	a	representation	of	an	alter,	corresponding	to	a	particular	segment	of	the	
originally	integrated	psychic	space.	
a	 b	
529173-L-bw-Kastrup
Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 47
Doctoral	Dissertation	 Radboud	University	Nijmegen	 dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup	
	
	 47	
There	 is	 compelling	 empirical	 evidence	 that	 different	 alters	 can	 remain	
concurrently	 conscious.	 In	 Morton	 Prince’s	 well-known	 study	 of	 the	 "Miss	
Beauchamp’	case	of	DID,	one	of	the	alters	“was	a	co-	conscious	personality	in	a	
deeper	 sense.	 When	 she	 was	 not	 interacting	 with	 the	 world,	 she	 did	 not	
become	dormant,	but	persisted	and	was	active”	(Kelly	et	al.	2009:	318).	Braude’s	
more	recent	work	(1995)	corroborates	the	view	that	alters	can	be	co-conscious.	
He	points	 to	 the	 struggle	 of	 different	 alters	 for	 executive	 control	 of	 the	body	
and	the	fact	that	alters	“might	intervene	in	the	lives	of	others	[i.e.,	other	alters],	
intentionally	 interfering	with	 their	 interests	 and	 activities,	 or	 at	 least	 playing	
mischief	 on	 them”	 (ibid.:	 68).	 It	 thus	 appears	 that	 alters	 can	 not	 only	 be	
concurrently	 conscious,	 but	 that	 they	 can	 also	 vie	 for	 dominance	 with	 each	
other.	
Clearly,	 the	 evidence	 indicates	 that	 different	 alters	 entail—to	 paraphrase	
Coleman	(2014)	again—different	co-conscious	points	of	view	annexed	to	private	
qualitative	 fields,	 these	private	qualitative	 fields	being	carved	out	by	virtue	of	
dissociation.	 In	 other	 words,	 different	 alters	 are	 different	 subjects.	 The	
connected	 subgraph	 of	 phenomenal	 contents	 associated	 with	 an	 alter	 (see	
Figure	 3.1b	 again)	 represents	 its	 private	 qualitative	 or	 phenomenal	 field.	
Moreover,	 alters	 form	 within	 a	 single	 overarching	 psyche,	 so	 the	 process	 of	
their	 formation	 entails	 a	 decomposition	 of	 an	 original	 subject	 into	 multiple	
lower-level	subjects.	
I	submit	that	dissociation	in	cosmic	consciousness	is	what	leads	to	the	formation	
of	 relative	 subjects.	 Each	 relative	 subject	 is	 thus	 an	 alter	 of	 cosmic	
consciousness,	 its	 private	 qualitative	 field	 corresponding	 to	 a	 segment	 of	 the	
latter’s	self-excitatory	‘medium.’	
By	 virtue	 of	 corresponding	 to	 a	 segment	 of	 cosmic	 consciousness,	 each	 alter	
retains—as	 Shani	 (2015)	 posited—the	 intrinsic	 features	 of	 sentience	 and	 core-
subjectivity.	 But	 the	 local	 pattern	 of	 dissociative	 phenomenal	 activity	 in	 its	
respective	 segment	 is	 what	 bestows	 an	 alter	 its	 specific	 character,	 its	 unique	
perspective.	 In	other	words,	 the	primary	sense	of	 I-ness	of	all	alters	 is	 that	of	
cosmic	 consciousness	 itself;	 the	 very	 consciousness	 of	 the	 alters,	 as	 an	
ontological	 ‘medium,’	 is	cosmic	consciousness.	But	the	particular	phenomenal	
field	of	an	alter,	which	defines	its	identity	as	a	seemingly	separate	individual,	is	
demarcated	 by	 a	 local	 dissociative	 process—analogous	 to	 DID—in	 the	
corresponding	 segment	 of	 the	 ‘medium.’	 Naturally,	 because	 alters	 are	 fully	
grounded	 in	 cosmic	 consciousness,	 it	 is	 incoherent	 to	 say	 that	 they	 become	
separated	 from	 it;	 only	 an	 illusion	 of	 separation	 arises	 as	 a	 particular	
phenomenal	content	in	the	alter’s	dissociated	qualitative	field.	
The	 key	 to	 my	 argument	 is	 the	 notion	 that	 dissociation	 can	 demarcate	 and	
carve	out	a	private	phenomenal	field.	This	way,	alters	must	become	blind	to	all	
phenomenality	taking	place	outside	their	respective	field,	which	then	explains	
why	 I	 cannot	 read	 your	 thoughts.	 And	 indeed,	 there	 is	 strong	 empirical	
evidence	 for	 the	 literally	 blinding	 power	 of	 dissociation:	 in	 2015,	 doctors	
reported	 on	 the	 case	 of	 a	 German	 woman	 who	 exhibited	 a	 variety	 of	 alters	
(Strasburger	and	Waldvogel	2015).	Peculiarly,	some	of	her	alters	claimed	to	be	
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blind	while	others	could	see	normally.	Through	EEGs,	the	doctors	were	able	to	
ascertain	 that	 the	brain	activity	normally	associated	with	sight	wasn’t	present	
while	a	blind	alter	was	 in	control	of	 the	woman’s	body,	even	though	her	eyes	
were	 open.	 When	 a	 sighted	 alter	 assumed	 control,	 the	 usual	 brain	 activity	
returned.	 Clearly	 thus—if	 nothing	 else,	 for	 sheer	 empirical	 reasons—
dissociation	 is	a	 sufficiently	powerful	potential	 solution	 to	 the	decombination	
problem.	
	
3.11	 At	what	level	does	cosmic	dissociation	occur?	
The	 challenge	 we	 must	 now	 address	 is	 the	 so-called	 “boundary	 problem	 for	
experiencing	subjects”	(Rosenberg	2004:	77-90):	What	measurable	structures	in	
nature	correspond	to—that	is,	are	the	revealed	appearance	of—alters	of	cosmic	
consciousness?	As	we	have	 seen,	Shani	 (2015)	posits	 that	elementary	particles	
are	akin	to	micro-level	alters,	which	in	turn	come	together	to	compose	higher-
level	 relative	 subjects.	However,	 as	 already	mentioned,	 I	believe	 this	 to	be	an	
unnecessarily	 convoluted	 notion.	 Instead,	 I	 submit	 that	 cosmic	 dissociation	
happens	precisely	at	the	level	of	living	beings	with	unitary	consciousness,	such	as	
you	and	me.	You	and	I	are	alters	of	cosmic	consciousness.	
There	are	several	arguments	for	this.	The	first	has	already	been	hinted	at:	given	
that	we	ordinarily	experience	an	integrated	phenomenal	field,	there	is	no	direct	
reason	to	conjecture	that	this	field	is	a	composite	of	lower-level	constituents.	
Secondly,	 we	 have	 seen	 that	 von	 Neumann’s	 reasoning	 regarding	 quantum	
measurement	 (1996)	 implies	 that	 the	 entire	 inanimate	 universe	must	 be	 one	
unfathomable	‘von	Neumann	chain’—that	is,	an	entangled	indivisible	whole.	As	
such,	 it	 is	 arbitrary—physically	 speaking—to	 carve	 out	 any	 segment	 of	 the	
inanimate	universe	and	posit	it	to	be	the	revealed	appearance	of	an	alter.	Von	
Neumann	did,	however,	exclude	conscious	living	organisms	from	the	embrace	
of	von	Neumann	chains,	since	at	least	we,	conscious	human	beings,	clearly	can	
perform	 quantum	 measurements.	 On	 this	 basis,	 only	 conscious	 living	
organisms	 can	 correspond	 to	 alters	 of	 cosmic	 consciousness,	 not	 elementary	
particles	or	any	other	subset	of	the	inanimate	universe.	
Thirdly,	as	observed	by	Mathews,	“the	individuation	of	[inanimate]	objects	...	is	
not	consistently	objectively	determined	...	many	of	our	individuations—of	rocks	
and	mountains,	 for	 instance—have	 basically	 nominal	 status”	 (2011:	 144).	 Take	
what	we	call	a	 ‘car’:	 though	based	on	structural	and	functional	reasoning	that	
helps	 the	 business	 of	 transportation,	 its	 delineation	 is	 ultimately	 arbitrary.	 If	
one	 argues	 that,	 say,	 the	 spark	 plugs	 are	 integral	 to	 the	 car	 because	without	
them	 the	 car	 cannot	 function,	 by	 the	 same	 token	 one	 would	 also	 have	 to	
include	 the	 fuel	 that	 makes	 its	 engine	 run,	 the	 environment	 air	 that	 allows	
combustion	and	cools	the	engine,	the	road	gripped	by	the	tires,	the	ground	that	
sustains	 the	 road,	 the	 gravity	 that	 enables	 grip,	 and	 so	 on.	 The	 decision	 of	
where	 to	stop	 is	motivated	by	convenience.	An	analogous	rationale	applies	 to	
whether	we	distinguish	the	handle	from	the	mug,	the	hood	from	the	jacket,	the	
river	 from	 the	 ocean,	 etc.	 This	 relative	 arbitrariness	 in	 the	 way	 we	 delineate	
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their	 boundaries	 renders	 inanimate	 objects	 problematic	 candidates	 for	 the	
revealed	 appearance	 of	 alters	 of	 cosmic	 consciousness.	 After	 all,	 in	Mathews’	
words,	“the	boundaries	between	subjects	are	not	nominal.	The	individuation	of	
subjects,	or	centers	of	subjectivity,	is	objectively	determined”	(ibid.).	
Mathews	 is	 giving	 us	 an	 important	 clue	 here.	 Indeed,	 the	 boundaries	 of	 our	
own	body	 are	 not	 nominal.	Our	 ability	 to	perceive	 ends	 at	 the	 surface	 of	 the	
body:	our	 skin,	 retinas,	 eardrums,	 tongue	and	 the	mucous	 lining	of	our	nose.	
We	cannot	perceive	photons	hitting	a	wall	or	air	pressure	oscillations	bouncing	
off	 a	 window,	 but	 we	 can	 perceive	 those	 impinging	 on	 our	 retinas	 and	
eardrums,	respectively.	Moreover,	our	ability	to	act	through	direct	phenomenal	
intention	also	ends	at	the	surface	of	the	body:	we	can	move	our	arms	and	legs	
simply	 by	 consciously	 intending	 to	 move	 them.	 However,	 we	 cannot	 do	 the	
same	with	 tables	 and	 chairs.	 Clearly,	 thus,	 the	 delineation	 of	 our	 body	 is	 an	
empirical	 fact.	I	cannot	just	decide	that	the	chair	I	am	sitting	on	is	integral	to	
my	body,	in	the	way	I	can	decide	that	the	handle	is	integral	to	the	mug.	Neither	
can	I	decide	that	a	patch	of	my	skin	is	not	integral	to	my	body,	in	the	way	I	can	
decide	 that	 the	 hood	 is	 not	 integral	 to	 the	 jacket.	 The	 criterion	 here	 is	 not	
merely	a	functional	or	structural	one,	but	the	range	of	phenomenality—sensory	
perception,	 intention—intrinsically	 associated	 with	 our	 body.	 Based	 on	 this	
objective	criterion,	there	is	no	freedom	to	move	boundaries	at	will.	
What	these	considerations	suggest	is	clear:	the	physical	boundary	of	the	body	is	
the	 revealed	 appearance	 of	 the	 dissociative	 boundary	 of	 our	 phenomenal	 field.	
And	in	so	far	as	we	can	assume	that	all	living	organisms	have	phenomenal	inner	
life	 in	 some	 way	 akin	 to	 our	 own,	 the	 conclusion	 can	 be	 generalized:	 living	
organisms	are	the	revealed	appearance	of	alters	of	universal	consciousness;	they	
are	carved	out	of	their	context	by	virtue	of	cosmic	dissociation.	
But	 can	 we	 assume	 that	 all	 living	 creatures	 have	 phenomenal	 inner	 life?	 I	
believe	we	 can:	 insofar	 as	 it	 resembles	 our	 own,	 the	 extrinsic	 behavior	 of	 all	
metabolizing	 organisms	 is	 suggestive	 of	 their	 having	 dissociated	 phenomenal	
fields	 analogous	 to	 ours	 in	 some	 sense.	 This	 is	 obvious	 enough	 for	 cats	 and	
dogs,	 but	 what	 about	 plants	 and	 single-celled	 organisms	 such	 as	 amoebae?	
Well,	 consider	 this:	 “many	 types	of	amoeba	construct	glassy	 shells	by	picking	
up	sand	grains	from	the	mud	in	which	they	live.	The	typical	Difflugia	shell,	for	
example,	is	shaped	like	a	vase,	and	has	a	remarkable	symmetry”	(Ford	2010:	26).	
As	 for	 plants,	 many	 recent	 studies	 have	 reported	 on	 their	 surprisingly	
sophisticated	behavior,	 leading	even	to	a	proposal	 for	a	new	field	of	 scientific	
enquiry	boldly	called	“plant	neurobiology”	(Brenner	et	al.	2006).	Clearly,	thus,	
even	 plants	 and	 single-celled	 organisms	 exhibit	 extrinsic	 behavior	 somewhat	
analogous	 to	 our	 own,	 further	 suggesting	 that	 they,	 too,	 have	 dissociated	
phenomenal	fields.	Of	course,	the	same	cannot	be	said	of	any	inanimate	object	
or	 phenomenon	 (those	 that	 have	 been	 engineered	 by	 humans	 to	 merely	
simulate	 the	 behavior	 of	 living	 beings,	 such	 as	 robots,	 natural	 language	
interfaces,	etc.,	naturally	don’t	count).	
Finally,	we	have	good	empirical	 reasons	 to	believe	 that	normal	metabolism	 is	
essential	for	the	maintenance	of	our	dissociated	phenomenal	fields,	for	when	it	
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slows	down	or	stops	the	dissociative	boundary	seems	to	become	phenomenally	
porous	 (Kastrup	 2017a 2 ).	 So	 metabolism—the	 shared	 and	 differentiating	
characteristic	 of	 all	 living	 organisms—seems,	 again,	 to	 be	 the	 revealed	
appearance	 of	 alters	 of	 cosmic	 consciousness.	 The	 unique	 features	 of	
metabolism—think	 of	 DNA,	 morphogenesis,	 transcription,	 protein	 folding,	
mitosis,	 etc.—unify	 all	 life	 into	 a	 unique,	 clearly	 distinct	 natural	 category,	
despite	 the	widely	different	 forms	organisms	can	 take.	This	category	provides	
the	 unambiguously	 demarcated	 “something	 in	 nature”	 that	 Rosenberg	 was	
looking	for	(2004:	77–90).	
In	conclusion,	I	posit	that	cosmic	dissociation	happens	precisely	at	the	level	of	
individual	 living	 organisms.	 Each	 living	 organism	 is	 an	 alter	 of	 cosmic	
consciousness.	
	
3.12	 Reducing	the	revealed	to	the	concealed	order	
Notice	 that	 the	 revealed	 side	 of	 nature	 relative	 to	 any	 given	 alter	 consists	 of	
images	on	the	screen	of	the	alter’s	conscious	perception.	Therefore,	 if	one	can	
reduce	 perceptions	 at	 the	 level	 of	 individual	 alters	 to	 non-perceptual	
phenomenal	contents	at	the	level	of	cosmic	consciousness	as	a	whole,	one	will	
have	reduced	nature’s	revealed	to	its	concealed	order.	
Before	we	address	this	challenge,	however,	we	need	some	further	background	
on	 dissociation.	 By	 definition,	 phenomenal	 contents	 inside	 an	 alter	 cannot	
evoke	phenomenal	contents	outside	the	alter,	and	vice	versa.	But	they	can	still	
influence	 each	 other.	 Indeed,	 phenomenal	 impingement	 across	 a	 dissociative	
boundary	 is	 empirically	 known.	 John	 Lynch	 and	Christopher	Kilmartin	 (2013:	
100),	 for	 instance,	 report	 that	 dissociated	 feelings	 can	 dramatically	 affect	
thoughts	and	corresponding	behaviors,	whereas	David	Eagleman	 (2011:	 20-54)	
shows	 that	 dissociated	 expectations	 routinely	 mold	 our	 perceptions.	 Indeed,	
the	 entire	 clinical	 field	 of	 depth	 psychology	 is	 based	 on	 the	 notion	 that	
dissociated	phenomenal	 contents	 in	deeper	 layers	of	 the	psyche	 continuously	
impinge	on	the	executive	ego	(Kelly	et	al.	2009:	301–34).	We	can	visualize	this	
as	 in	Figure	3.2a,	wherein	 the	partial	overlap	of	adjacent	vertices	 internal	and	
external	to	an	alter	represents	impingement	across	its	dissociative	boundary.	
Figure	3.2b	 illustrates	 the	same	thing	according	to	a	simplified	representation	
unrelated	to	graph	theory:	the	broader	psychic	space	is	represented	as	a	white	
circle,	with	an	alter	represented	as	a	grey	circle	within	it.	These	circles	are	no	
longer	graph	vertices	but	 represent	 sets	of	phenomenal	 contents.	The	dashed	
arrows	 represent	 the	 impingement	 of	 external	 and	 internal	 phenomenal	
contents—not	explicitly	shown—on	each	other,	across	the	alter’s	boundary.	For	
the	 avoidance	 of	 doubt,	 notice	 that	 these	 dashed	 arrows	 no	 longer	 represent	
cognitive	 associations.	 I	 shall	 use	 this	 simplified	 representation	 henceforth.	
																																								 								
2	See	Chapter	6	of	this	dissertation.	
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Moreover,	 for	 simplicity’s	 sake,	 from	 now	 on	 I	 shall	 also	 refer	 to	 all	 non-
perceptual	phenomenal	contents	simply	as	‘thoughts.’	
	
	
Figure	3.2:	Phenomenal	contents	impinging	on	the	dissociative	boundary	of	an	
alter,	illustrated	in	two	different	but	equivalent	ways,	(a)	and	(b).	
	
I	submit	that,	before	its	first	alter	ever	formed,	the	only	phenomenal	contents	
of	 cosmic	 consciousness	 were	 thoughts.	 There	 were	 no	 perceptions.	 The	
formation	of	the	first	alter	then	demarcated	a	boundary	separating	phenomenal	
contents	 within	 the	 alter	 from	 those	 outside	 the	 alter.	 This	 newly	 formed	
boundary	is	what	enabled	perceptions	to	arise	relative	to	an	alter:	the	thoughts	
surrounding	the	alter	impinged	on	its	dissociative	boundary	from	the	outside.	
And	 since	 phenomenal	 contents	 are	 particular	 patterns	 of	 self-excitation	 of	
cosmic	 consciousness,	 this	 impingement	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 an	 interference	
pattern	 between	 excitations	 within	 and	 outside	 the	 dissociative	 boundary,	
respectively	 (see	 Figure	 3.2a	 again).	What	we	 call	 perception,	 or	 the	 revealed	
side	of	nature,	is	the	alter’s	experience	of	this	interference	pattern	(cf.	Kastrup	
2017e).	 It	 follows	 that	 the	 revealed	 side	 of	 nature	 can	 be	 grounded	 in	 its	
concealed	 side:	 the	 former	 arises	 from	 excitatory	 interference	 between	
dissociated	 but	 mutually	 impinging	 thoughts.	 Indeed,	 I	 submit	 that	 the	
formation	 of	 dissociative	 boundaries	 is	 what	 partitioned	 the	 cosmos	 into	
revealed	and	concealed	sides.	See	Figure	3.3.	
The	thoughts	of	an	alter	can	also	impinge	on	its	dissociative	boundary	from	the	
inside	 and	 thereby	 influence	 the	 surrounding	 phenomenal	 activity	 of	 cosmic	
consciousness	(not	shown	in	Figure	3.3).	This	corresponds	to	the	effects	on	the	
world	of	the	presence	and	actions	of	a	living	organism	within	it.	
	
a	 b	
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Figure	3.3:	Thoughts	in	cosmic	consciousness	cause	perceptions	in	an	alter.	
	
The	 revealed	 or	 extrinsic	 appearance	 of	 an	 alter’s	 boundary	 is	 an	 organism’s	
sense	 organs.	 In	 our	 case,	 these	 are	 our	 skin,	 eyes,	 ears,	 nose	 and	 tongue.	
Therefore,	even	if	the	outside	stimulation	is	very	faint	and	subtle,	evolution	has	
had	billions	of	years	to	optimize	the	sensitivity	of	our	sense	organs—our	alter’s	
boundary—to	pick	up	on	these	faint	signals.	
But	how	can	a	mere	dissociative	boundary	give	rise	 to	a	qualitatively	 different	
category	 of	 experience?	 If	 you	 recall,	 this	 is	 a	 question	 I	 raised	 earlier,	
motivated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 perceptions	 feel	 undoubtedly	 very	 distinct	 from	
thoughts.	
To	 answer	 it,	 let	 us	 first	 consider	 Donald	 Hoffman’s	 interface	 theory	 of	
perception	 (2009):	 it	 asserts	 that	 evolution	 emphasizes	 perceptual	 qualities	
conducive	to	fitness,	not	to	truth.	In	other	words,	we	have	evolved	to	perceive	
not	 the	 phenomenal	 contents	 that	 are	 really	 out	 there—that	 is,	 outside	 our	
alter—but	 just	a	phenomenal	representation	 thereof	 that	helps	us	survive	and	
reproduce.	 Hoffman	 uses	 the	 analogy	 of	 a	 computer	 desktop:	 although	 a	
computer	file	is	represented	in	it	as,	for	instance,	a	blue	rectangle,	this	does	not	
mean	 that	 the	 file	 itself	 has	 the	 qualities	 of	 being	blue	 and	 rectangular.	As	 a	
matter	of	fact,	the	actual	file	does	not	have	those	qualities	at	all:	it	is	a	pattern	
of	open	and	closed	microscopic	switches	in	a	silicon	chip.	In	an	analogous	way,	
my	hypothesis	is	that	the	qualities	we	experience	on	the	screen	of	perception—
colors,	sounds,	flavors,	textures,	etc.—are	not	the	qualities	experienced	by	the	
segment	of	 cosmic	 consciousness	 that	 surrounds	our	 alter,	 but	 their	 ‘desktop	
representation’	instead.	Our	perceptions	do	not	feel	like	the	thoughts	of	cosmic	
consciousness	 because	 a	qualitative	 transition	 between	 these	 two	 experiential	
categories	has	helped	our	ancestors	survive	and	reproduce.	
Thoughts	
Thoughts	
(corresponding	
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The	work	of	Friston,	Sengupta	and	Auletta	(2014)	has	similar	implications	but,	
significantly,	 is	 derived	 from	 an	 entirely	 different	 line	 of	 reasoning.	 Their	
results	 are	based	on	abstract	mathematical	 considerations	and,	 therefore,	 can	
in	 principle	 be	 leveraged	 under	 any	 ontology.	 They	 show	 that	 whenever	 a	
Markov	blanket	 (Pearl	 1988)	defines	 the	boundary	 of	 an	 individual	 organism,	
internal	states	of	the	organism	will	evolve	to	optimize	for	two	conflicting	goals:	
(a)	to	reflect	external	states	of	the	world	beyond	the	Markov	blanket;	and	(b)	to	
minimize	 their	 own	 entropy	 or	 dispersion.	 Goal	 (a)	 is	 about	 allowing	 the	
organism	to	know	what	is	going	on	in	the	world	outside,	so	it	can	take	suitable	
actions	to	survive	in	that	world.	Goal	(b)	is	about	preventing	the	organism	from	
losing	its	internal	structural	and	dynamical	integrity	because	of	the	second	law	
of	 thermodynamics.	 In	 our	 case,	 the	 dissociative	 boundary	 of	 an	 alter	 is	 the	
Markov	blanket,	whose	revealed	appearance	is	our	skin	and	other	sense	organs.	
The	key	insight	of	Friston,	Sengupta	and	Auletta	can	be	paraphrased	as	follows:	
a	 hypothetical	 organism	 with	 perfect	 perception—that	 is,	 able	 to	 perfectly	
mirror	the	phenomenal	states	of	the	surrounding	external	world	in	its	internal	
states—would	 not	 have	 an	 upper	 bound	 on	 its	 own	 internal	 entropy,	 which	
would	 then	 increase	 indefinitely.	 Such	 an	 organism	 would	 dissolve	 into	 an	
entropic	soup.	To	survive,	organisms	must,	instead,	use	their	internal	states	to	
actively	 represent	 relevant	 states	 of	 the	 outside	world	 in	 a	 compressed,	 coded	
form,	so	to	know	as	much	as	possible	about	their	environment	while	remaining	
within	 entropic	 constraints	 compatible	 with	 their	 structural	 and	 dynamical	
integrity.	 This	 way,	 my	 hypothesis	 is	 that	 the	 qualities	 of	 perception	
experienced	 by	 an	 alter	 are	 just	 compressed,	 coded	 representations	 of	 how	
surrounding	 thoughts	 of	 cosmic	 consciousness	 are	 experienced	 from	 the	
concealed	perspective.	As	such,	while	there	must	be	a	correspondence	between	
perception	 and	 surrounding	 thoughts,	 the	 respective	 experiential	 qualities	 do	
not	need	to	be	the	same.	In	fact,	they	will	be	very	different	if	it	helps	organisms	
resist	 entropy.	 Our	 perceptions	 do	 not	 feel	 like	 thoughts	 because	 they	 are	
coded	representations	thereof.	
	
3.13	 Explaining	the	correlations	between	brain	function	and	inner	
experience	
A	principal	argument	for	the	mainstream	physicalist	position	that	the	material	
brain	 somehow	 constitutes	 or	 generates	 consciousness	 is	 the	 empirically	
undeniable	 correlation	 between	 measurable	 brain	 function	 and	 inner	
experience	 (e.g.	 Koch	 2004).	 The	 way	 the	 idealist	 ontology	 proposed	 here	
accommodates	 this	 fact	 was	 already	 implicit	 in	 the	 previous	 section:	 a	
metabolizing	 body—which	 includes	 a	 functioning	 brain—is	 simply	 the	 revealed	
appearance	of	the	dissociated	phenomenal	field	of	an	alter.	The	former	correlates	
with	 the	 latter	 simply	 because	 the	 former	 is	 what	 the	 latter	 looks	 like	 from	
across	a	dissociative	boundary.	Indeed,	this	can	be	empirically	substantiated	in	
a	rather	direct	manner.	
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In	a	2014	study	of	dissociation	(Schlumpf	et	al.),	doctors	performed	functional	
brain	scans	on	both	DID	patients	and	actors	simulating	DID.	The	scans	of	the	
actual	 patients	 displayed	 clear	 differences	 when	 compared	 to	 those	 of	 the	
actors,	 showing	 that	 dissociation	 has	 an	 identifiable	 extrinsic	 appearance.	 In	
other	 words,	 there	 is	 something	 rather	 particular	 that	 dissociative	 processes	
look	 like.	 This	 further	 substantiates	 the	 notion	 that	 living	 organisms	 such	 as	
you	and	me	are	the	revealed	appearance	of	cosmic-level	dissociative	processes.	
After	 all,	 we	 now	 know	 empirically	 that	 dissociation	 is	 identifiable	 when	
observed	 from	 across	 the	 dissociative	 boundary.	 Metabolizing	 bodies	 are	 to	
dissociation	in	cosmic	consciousness	as	certain	patterns	of	brain	activity	are	to	
DID	patients.	
Let	 me	 elaborate	 further	 on	 this	 important	 point.	 For	 any	 given	 alter	 A1	 of	
cosmic	consciousness,	it	is	the	phenomenal	contents	surrounding	A1	that	cause	
its	 perceptions	 of	 the	 world	 around	 it.	 Dissociated	 phenomenal	 contents	
corresponding	to	another	alter	A2	can	be	part	of	the	phenomenal	environment	
surrounding	 A1.	 As	 such,	 the	 inner	 experiences	 of	 A2	 can	 also	 indirectly	
stimulate	 A1’s	 boundary—by	 impinging	 on	 their	 shared	 phenomenal	
environment—and	 thereby	 cause	A1’s	 perceptions	 of	A2.	 This	 is	what	 gives	A1	
access	to	the	revealed	appearance	of	the	inner	experiences	of	A2	in	the	form	of	
A2’s	metabolizing	 body.	 See	 Figure	 3.4.	 And	 since	A2’s	 brain	 is	 integral	 to	 its	
body,	 it	 follows	 that	A2’s	 inner	 experiences	 cause	 the	 perception	 by	A1	 of	 the	
activity	 in	A2’s	brain.	This	 causal	 link	explains	 the	correlations	between	 inner	
experience	and	corresponding	patterns	of	brain	activity.	
	
	
Figure	3.4:	A	metabolizing	body	is	the	revealed	appearance	of	an	alter’s	
dissociated	phenomenal	field.	
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In	essence,	the	claim	here	 is	 that	there	 is	nothing	to	a	metabolizing	body	but	
the	revealed	side—the	extrinsic	appearance—of	the	corresponding	alter’s	inner	
experiences.	Yet,	one	may	object	to	this	by	arguing	that	many	parts	of	the	body	
seem	entirely	unrelated	to	 inner	experience:	whereas	certain	patterns	of	brain	
activity	correlate	with	subjective	reports	of	experience,	a	lot	seems	to	go	on	in	
the	brain	 that	 subjects	have	no	 introspective	 access	 to	 (Westen	 1999,	Hassin,	
Ulleman	 and	 Bargh	 2005,	 Dijksterhuis	 and	 Nordgren	 2006,	 Augusto	 2010,	
Hassin	2013).	Moreover,	what	kind	of	inner	experience	does,	say,	liver	function	
correspond	to?	What	about	big-toe	function?	
The	 answer	 to	 this	 objection	 is	 precise	 and	 compelling,	 but	 elaborate	 and	
specialized	 enough	 to	 have	 required	 its	 own	 paper	 (Kastrup	 2017d3).	 Here,	 I	
shall	simply	remind	the	reader	that	a	subject’s	 lack	of	metacognitive	 access	 to	
an	experience	precludes	reporting	of	the	experience	to	self	or	others,	but	does	
not	 imply	absence	 of	 the	 experience	 from	 the	 subject’s	qualitative	 field.	With	
the	emergence	of	no-report	paradigms	 in	neuroscience	(Vandenbroucke	et	 al.	
2014,	Tsuchiya	et	al.	2015),	we	now	know	that	much	is	experienced	that	cannot	
be	reported	even	to	self,	for	subjects	are	often	not	aware	that	they	have	certain	
experiences.	 Moreover,	 as	 mentioned	 earlier,	 there	 are	 normal	 internal	
dissociations	 in	 the	 human	 psyche—the	 foundational	 claim	 of	 depth	
psychology—that	render	much	of	 its	phenomenal	contents	 inaccessible	to	the	
reporting	ego	(Kelly	et	al.	2009:	301-34).	So	the	hypothesis	I	am	positing	here	is	
not	defeated	by	 the	objection:	 all	 bodily	metabolism—yes,	 even	 liver	 and	 toe	
function—can	still	correspond	to	concealed	phenomenal	contents,	even	though	
these	contents	may	not	be	introspectively	accessible.	
	
3.14	 Explaining	our	shared	world	
The	 final	 explanatory	 burden	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 addressed	 is	 the	 undeniable	
empirical	fact	that	we	all	inhabit	seemingly	the	same	environment,	and	that	the	
laws	 that	 govern	 the	 dynamics	 of	 this	 environment	 operate	 independently	 of	
our	 personal	 volition.	 After	 all,	 if	 the	 world	 is	 imagined—as	 implied	 by	
idealism—how	 come	 we	 are	 all	 imagining	 seemingly	 the	 same	 autonomous	
world?	
Notice	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 phenomenal	 environment	 wherein	 all	
metabolizing	organisms	are	immersed—a	shared	world—is	a	direct	implication	
of	the	argument	already	developed.	To	bring	this	out,	we	simply	need	to	extend	
Figure	3.3	to	multiple	alters,	as	illustrated	in	Figure	3.5.	All	alters	are	immersed,	
like	islands	of	a	single	ocean,	in	the	thoughts	that	constitute	the	concealed	side	
of	 the	 inanimate	 cosmos.	 These	 thoughts	 surround	 all	 alters	 and	 cause	 their	
mutually-consistent	 perceptions	 by	 impinging	 on	 their	 respective	 dissociative	
boundaries.	 And	 since	 the	 volition	 of	 an	 alter	 is	 a	 phenomenal	 content	 also	
dissociated	from	the	rest	of	cosmic	consciousness,	it	follows	that	alters	cannot	
																																								 								
3	See	Chapter	5	of	this	dissertation.	
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change	the	laws	of	nature.	From	the	dissociated	perspective	of	alters,	the	world	
is	thus	autonomous.	
	
	
Figure	3.5:	Alters	are	immersed	in	a	common	phenomenal	environment.	
			
3.15	 Conclusions	
I	have	 elaborated	on	 an	 idealist	 ontology	 that	 can	be	 summarized	 as	 follows.	
There	 is	only	cosmic	consciousness.	We,	as	well	as	all	other	 living	organisms,	
are	but	dissociated	alters	of	cosmic	consciousness,	surrounded	by	its	thoughts.	
The	 inanimate	 world	 we	 see	 around	 us	 is	 the	 revealed	 appearance	 of	 these	
thoughts.	 The	 living	 organisms	 we	 share	 the	 world	 with	 are	 the	 revealed	
appearances	of	 other	dissociated	 alters.	This	 idealist	 ontology	makes	 sense	of	
reality	 in	 a	 more	 parsimonious	 and	 empirically	 rigorous	 manner	 than	
mainstream	physicalism,	bottom-up	panpsychism	and	cosmopsychism.	 It	 also	
offers	more	explanatory	power	than	these	three	alternatives,	in	that	it	does	not	
fall	prey	to	the	hard	problem	of	consciousness,	the	combination	problem	or	the	
decombination	problem,	respectively.	
 
Thoughts	
Alter	1	
Th
ou
gh
ts
	
Alter	n	
Tho
ugh
ts	
Alter	2	
Thoughts	
(shared	environment)	
Cosmic	consciousness	
529173-L-bw-Kastrup
Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 57
 
4.	 On	the	Plausibility	of	Idealism:	Refuting	Criticisms	
	
This	 paper	 first	 appeared	 in	Disputatio:	 International	 Journal	 of	 Philosophy,	
ISSN:	0873-626X,	Vol.	9,	No.	44,	pp.	13-34,	in	May	2017.	
	
4.1	 Abstract	
Several	 alternatives	 vie	 today	 for	 recognition	 as	 the	most	 plausible	 ontology,	
from	 physicalism	 to	 panpsychism.	 By	 and	 large,	 these	 ontologies	 entail	 that	
physical	 structures	 circumscribe	 consciousness	 by	 bearing	 phenomenal	
properties	within	 their	 physical	 boundaries.	 The	ontology	 of	 idealism,	 on	 the	
other	 hand,	 entails	 that	 all	 physical	 structures	 are	 circumscribed	 by	
consciousness	 in	 that	 they	 exist	 solely	 as	 phenomenality	 in	 the	 first	 place.	
Unlike	the	other	alternatives,	however,	idealism	is	often	considered	implausible	
today,	 particularly	 by	 analytic	 philosophers.	 A	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 the	 strong	
intuition	that	an	objective	world	transcending	phenomenality	 is	a	self-evident	
fact.	Other	arguments—such	as	the	dependency	of	phenomenal	experience	on	
brain	function,	the	evidence	for	the	existence	of	the	universe	before	the	origin	
of	conscious	life,	etc.—are	also	often	cited.	In	this	essay,	I	will	argue	that	these	
objections	against	the	plausibility	of	idealism	are	false.	As	such,	this	essay	seeks	
to	show	that	idealism	is	an	entirely	plausible	ontology.	
	
4.2	 Introduction	
The	 mainstream	 physicalist	 ontology	 posits	 that	 reality	 is	 constituted	 by	
irreducible	physical	entities—which	Strawson	(2006:	9)	has	called	“ultimates”—
outside	 and	 independent	 of	 phenomenality.	 According	 to	 physicalism,	 these	
ultimates,	 in	and	of	 themselves,	do	not	 instantiate	phenomenal	properties.	 In	
other	 words,	 there	 is	 nothing	 it	 is	 like	 to	 be	 an	 ultimate,	 phenomenality	
somehow	emerging	only	at	the	level	of	complex	arrangements	of	ultimates.	As	
such,	 under	 physicalism	 phenomenality	 is	 not	 fundamental,	 but	 instead	
reducible	to	physical	parameters	of	arrangements	of	ultimates.	
What	 I	 will	 call	 ‘microexperientialism,’	 in	 turn,	 posits	 that	 there	 is	 already	
something	it	is	like	to	be	at	least	some	ultimates	(Strawson	et	al.	2006:	24-29),	
combinations	 of	 these	 experiencing	 ultimates	 somehow	 leading	 to	 more	
complex	 experience.	 As	 such,	 under	 microexperientialism	 phenomenality	 is	
seen	 as	 an	 irreducible	 aspect	 of	 at	 least	 some	 ultimates.	 The	 ontology	 of	
panexperientialism	(Griffin	 1998:	77-116,	Rosenberg	2004:	91-103,	Skrbina	2007:	
21-22)	 is	 analogous	 to	microexperientialism,	 except	 in	 that	 the	 former	 entails	
the	stronger	claim	that	all	ultimates	instantiate	phenomenal	properties.	
Micropsychism	(Strawson	et	 al.	 2006:	 24-29)	and	panpsychism	(Skrbina	2007:	
15-22)	 are	 analogous—maybe	 even	 identical—to	 microexperientialism	 and	
panexperientialism,	 respectively,	 except	perhaps	 in	 that	 some	 formulations	of	
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the	former	admit	cognition—a	more	complex	form	of	phenomenality—already	
at	the	level	of	ultimates,	as	an	irreducible	aspect	of	these	ultimates.	
While	 microexperientialism,	 panexperientialism,	 micropsychism	 and	
panpsychism	entail	that	bottom-up	combinations	of	simple	subjects	give	rise	to	
more	 complex	 ones,	 such	 as	 human	 beings,	 cosmopsychism	 (Nagasawa	 and	
Wager	 2016)	 takes	 the	 opposite	 route.	 Indeed,	 “the	 first	 postulate	 of	
cosmopsychism	 is	 that	 the	 cosmos	 as	 a	whole	 is	 the	 only	 ontological	 ultimate	
there	is,	and	that	it	is	conscious”	(Shani	2015:	408,	original	emphasis).	
Finally,	 the	 ontology	 of	 idealism	 is	 characterized	 by	 a	 combination	 of	 two	
propositions:	 (a)	phenomenal	 consciousness	 is	 irreducible;	and	 (b)	 everything	
else—the	whole	of	nature—is	reducible	to	a	unitary	and	universal	phenomenal	
consciousness	(henceforth,	I	shall	refer	to	phenomenal	consciousness	simply	as	
‘consciousness’).	
Idealism	may	be	consistent	with—even	identical	to—certain	interpretations	of	
cosmopsychism.	According	to	Shani,	 for	 instance,	cosmopsychism	entails	 that	
“an	omnipresent	cosmic	consciousness	 is	the	single	ontological	ultimate	there	
is”	(2015:	390).	This	perfectly	embodies	the	defining	tenet	of	idealism	insofar	as	
it	 implies	 that	 everything—including	 the	 physical—can	 be	 reduced	 to	 the	
phenomenal.	Shani	also	writes	that	matter	is	the	cosmos	“in	its	appearance	as	
exterior	 complement	 to	 the	 subjective	 realities	 of	 created	 selves”	 (2015:	 412,	
emphasis	 added).	 The	 notion	 that	 matter	 is	 the	 phenomenal	 appearance	 of	
equally	 phenomenal	 dynamics	 is	 also	 eminently	 idealist.	 Therefore,	 these	
interpretations	 of	 cosmopsychism	 are	 essentially	 indistinguishable	 from	
idealism	and	I	shall,	henceforth,	refer	to	them	simply	as	idealism.	
Other	 possible	 interpretations	 of	 cosmopsychism	 entail	 that	 the	 cosmos	 as	 a	
whole	 bears	 phenomenal	 properties—that	 is,	 has	 inner	 life—but	 also	 has	 an	
aspect—the	 physical	 universe	 we	 can	 measure—that	 is	 irreducible	 to	 these	
phenomenal	properties.	Naturally,	this	implies	a	form	of	dual-aspect	monism,	a	
la	Spinoza	(Skrbina	2007:	88).	Indeed,	under	these	views	the	cosmos	can	still	be	
said	to	be	conscious,	but	not	 in	 consciousness.	In	the	former	case,	the	cosmos	
bears	 phenomenality;	 in	 the	 latter—which	 is	 the	 idealist	 view—the	cosmos	 is	
constituted	 by	 phenomenality.	 Interpretations	 of	 cosmopsychism	 that	 are	not	
consistent	with	idealism	shall	not	be	further	addressed	in	this	paper.	
In	 what	 follows,	 I	 will	 attempt	 to	 rebut	 the	most	 common	 objections	 to	 the	
plausibility	of	 idealism.	I	will	seek	to	show	that	these	objections	are	based	on	
circular	 reasoning,	 conflation,	 unexamined	 assumptions	 and	 several	 other	
misconceptions.	
	
4.3	 The	felt	concreteness	objection	
English	writer	Samuel	Johnson	is	said	to	have	argued	against	Bishop	Berkeley’s	
idealism	by	kicking	a	 large	stone	while	exclaiming:	 “I	 refute	 it	 thus!”	 (Boswell	
1820:	218).	Johnson	was	clearly	appealing	to	the	felt	concreteness	of	the	stone	to	
suggest	 that	 it	 could	 not	 be	 just	 a	 figment	 of	 imagination.	 Indeed,	 the	 felt	
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concreteness	of	 the	world	 is	probably	 the	main	 reason	why	people	 intuitively	
reject	the	notion	that	reality	unfolds	in	consciousness.	If	a	truck	hits	you,	you	
will	hurt,	even	if	you	are	an	idealist.	
However,	 notice	 that	 appeals	 to	 concreteness,	 solidity,	 palpability	 and	 any	
other	quality	that	we	have	come	to	associate	with	things	outside	consciousness	
are	 still	 appeals	 to	 phenomenality.	 After	 all,	 concreteness,	 solidity	 and	
palpability	 are	 qualities	 of	 experience.	 What	 else?	 A	 stone	 allegedly	 outside	
consciousness,	 in	 and	 by	 itself,	 is	 entirely	 abstract	 and	 has	 no	 qualities.	 If	
anything,	 by	 pointing	 to	 the	 felt	 concreteness	 of	 the	 stone	 Johnson	 was	
implicitly	 suggesting	 the	 primacy	 of	 experience	 over	 abstraction,	 which	 is	
eminently	idealist.	
We	have	come	to	automatically	 interpret	 the	felt	concreteness	of	the	world	as	
evidence	 that	 the	 world	 is	 outside	 consciousness.	 But	 this	 is	 an	 unexamined	
artifact	of	subliminal	thought-models.	Our	only	access	to	the	world	is	through	
sense	perception,	which	is	itself	phenomenal.	The	notion	that	there	is	a	world	
outside	 and	 independent	 of	 the	 phenomenal	 is	 an	 explanatory	model,	 not	 an	
empirical	fact.	No	phenomenal	quality	can	be	construed	as	direct	evidence	for	
something	outside	phenomenality.	
	
4.4	 The	private	minds	objection	
As	 discussed	 in	 Section	 4.2,	 under	 idealism	 there	 is	 only	 one	 universal	
consciousness.	 Yet,	 at	 a	 personal	 level,	 our	 mental	 lives	 are	 clearly	 separate	
from	 one	 another.	 I	 do	 not	 have	 direct	 access	 to	 your	 thoughts	 and	 feelings	
and,	presumably,	neither	do	you	to	mine.	Moreover,	I	do	not	seem	to	be	aware	
of	what	is	happening	across	the	galaxy	and,	presumably,	neither	are	you.	So,	if	
all	 reality	 is	 reducible	 to	 one	 universal	 consciousness,	 how	 can	 there	 be	
separate	private	minds	such	as	yours	and	mine?	
To	make	 sense	 of	 this	 under	 idealism,	we	need	 to	 review	 a	mental	 condition	
called	dissociation	(Braude	1995,	Kelly	et	al.	2009:	167-174	&	348-352,	Schlumpf	
et	al.	2014,	Strasburger	and	Waldvogel	2015).	Indeed,	it	is	now	well	established	
in	 psychiatry	 that	 mental	 contents	 can	 undergo	 “a	 disruption	 of	 and/or	
discontinuity	 in	 [their]	 normal	 integration”	 (Black	 and	 Grant	 2014:	 191).	 This	
normal	integration	of	mental	contents	takes	place	through	chains	of	cognitive	
associations:	 a	 perception	 may	 evoke	 an	 abstract	 idea,	 which	 may	 trigger	 a	
memory,	which	may	inspire	a	thought,	etc.	These	associations	are	logical,	in	the	
sense	 that	 e.g.	 the	memory	 inspires	 the	 thought	 because	 of	 a	 certain	 implicit	
logic	 linking	 the	 two.	 Integrated	mentation	 can	 thus	 be	modeled,	 for	 ease	 of	
visualization,	as	a	connected	directed	graph.	See	Figure	4.1a.	Each	vertex	in	the	
graph	 represents	 a	 particular	 mental	 content	 and	 each	 edge	 a	 cognitive	
association	logically	linking	mental	contents	together.	Every	mental	content	in	
the	graph	of	Figure	4.1a	can	be	reached	from	any	other	mental	content	through	
a	 chain	 of	 cognitive	 associations.	 Dissociation,	 in	 turn,	 can	 be	 visualized	 as	
what	happens	when	the	graph	becomes	disconnected,	such	as	shown	in	Figure	
4.1b.	 Some	 mental	 contents	 can	 then	 no	 longer	 be	 reached	 from	 others.	
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Following	 the	 psychiatric	 convention,	 I	 shall	 refer	 to	 the	 subgraph	with	 grey	
vertices	as	a	(dissociated)	alter.	
	
	
Figure	4.1:	A	connected	graph	(a)	illustrating	normal	integration	of	mental	
contents,	and	a	disconnected	graph	(b)	illustrating	dissociation	and	the	
corresponding	formation	of	an	alter	(subgraph	in	grey).	
	
Because	 cognitive	 associations	 are	 essentially	 logical,	 as	 opposed	 to	 spatio-
temporal,	 the	 scheme	 of	 representation	 in	 Figure	 4.1	 allows	 for	 the	
simultaneous	 experience	 of	 multiple	 mental	 contents	 linked	 together	 in	 a	
connected	 subgraph.	This	 is	 empirically	 justifiable:	 a	perception,	 for	 instance,	
can	be	experienced	at	the	same	time	as	the	thoughts	it	evokes	and	the	emotions	
evoked	 by	 these	 thoughts.	 Moreover—and	 by	 the	 same	 token—the	 two	
disconnected	 subgraphs	 in	 Figure	 4.1b	 can	 also	 represent	 two	 concurrently	
conscious	subjects	of	experience.	The	substantiation	for	this	is	again	empirical:	
there	is	compelling	evidence	that	different	alters	of	the	same	psyche	can	be	co-
conscious	(Kelly	et	al.	2009:	317-322,	Braude	1995:	67-68).	
An	 alter	 loses	 direct	 access	 to	 mental	 contents	 surrounding	 it,	 but	 remains	
integral	 to	 the	underlying	 consciousness	 that	 constitutes	 it.	The	disconnection	
between	an	alter	and	surrounding	mental	contents	 is	 logical,	not	ontic.	As	an	
analogy,	 a	 database	may	 contain	 entries	 that	 are	 not	 indexed	 and,	 therefore,	
cannot	be	reached,	but	this	does	not	physically	separate	those	entries	from	the	
rest	of	the	database.	
Dissociation	 can	 coherently	 explain	how	 seemingly	 separate	but	 concurrently	
conscious	 subjects	 of	 experience—such	 as	 you	 and	 me—can	 form	 under	
idealism:	 each	 is	 an	 alter	 of	 universal	 consciousness.	 And	 because	 each	 alter	
becomes	unable	to	evoke	the	mental	contents	of	another,	their	respective	inner	
lives	acquire	a	seemingly	private	character,	even	though	they	remain	integral	to	
the	underlying	consciousness	that	constitutes	them.	
	
a	 b	
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4.5	 The	stand-alone	world	objection	
If	 all	 there	 is	 is	 consciousness,	 does	 the	 world	 continue	 to	 exist	 when	 not	
consciously	 observed	 by	 a	 living	 being?	 A	 negative	 answer	 to	 this	 question	
seems	 extremely	 implausible	 yet	 difficult	 to	 avoid	 under	 idealism.	 Bishop	
Berkeley	has	famously	attempted	to	circumvent	it	by	appealing	to	a	divinity,	as	
captured	in	Ronald	Knox’s	limerick,	God	in	the	Quad:	
	
There	was	a	young	man	who	said	“God	
Must	find	it	exceedingly	odd	
To	think	that	the	tree	
Should	continue	to	be	
When	there’s	no	one	about	in	the	quad.”	
Reply:	
“Dear	Sir:	Your	astonishment’s	odd;	
I	am	always	about	in	the	quad.	
And	that’s	why	the	tree	
Will	continue	to	be	
Since	observed	by,	Yours	faithfully,	God.”	
	
Legitimate	as	an	appeal	to	a	divinity	might	have	been	in	Berkeley’s	time,	today	
more	rigor	is	expected	from	a	viable	ontology.	So	how	do	we	solve	the	problem	
of	a	stand-alone	world	under	idealism?	
With	 reference	 to	 the	 discussion	 in	 the	 preceding	 section,	 notice	 that,	 by	
definition,	mental	 contents	 inside	 an	 alter	 of	 universal	 consciousness	 cannot	
directly	evoke	mental	contents	outside	the	alter,	or	vice-versa.	But	they	can	still	
influence	 or	 impinge	 on	 each	 other.	 Indeed,	 mental	 impingement	 across	 a	
dissociative	boundary	is	empirically	known.	Lynch	and	Kilmartin	(2013:	100),	for	
instance,	report	that	dissociated	feelings	can	dramatically	affect	our	thoughts,	
while	 Eagleman	 (2011:	 20-54)	 shows	 that	 dissociated	 expectations	 routinely	
mold	 our	 perceptions.	 We	 can	 visualize	 this	 as	 in	 Figure	 4.2a,	 wherein	 the	
partial	overlap	of	adjacent	vertices	internal	and	external	to	the	alter	(cf.	Figure	
4.1b)	represents	mental	impingement	across	its	dissociative	boundary.	
Figure	 4.2b	 illustrates	 the	 exact	 same	 thing	 according	 to	 a	 simplified	
representation:	the	broader	consciousness	is	represented	as	a	white	circle	with	
an	alter	represented	as	a	grey	circle	within	it.	The	dashed	arrows	represent	the	
impingement	 of	 external	 and	 internal	mental	 contents	 on	 each	 other,	 across	
the	alter’s	boundary.	I	will	henceforth	use	this	simplified	representation.	
Now	 notice	 that	mental	 contents	 of	 universal	 consciousness	 that	 surround—
but	remain	external	to—an	alter	can	impinge	on	the	alter’s	boundary	from	the	
outside.	Under	idealism,	it	can	be	coherently	argued	that	this	is	what	gives	rise	
to	sense	perceptions:	the	physical	world	around	us	is	the	extrinsic	appearance	
on	the	screen	of	perception	of	phenomenality	surrounding	our	respective	alter.	
See	Figure	4.3.	
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Figure	4.2:	Mental	contents	impinging	on	the	dissociative	boundary	of	an	alter,	
illustrated	in	two	different	ways	(a)	and	(b).	
	
	
Figure	4.3:	Mental	contents	of	universal	consciousness	surrounding	an	alter	can	
cause	the	alter’s	sense	perceptions	by	impinging	on	its	dissociative	boundary.	
	
The	 stand-alone	character	of	 the	world	can	 thus	be	coherently	explained:	 the	
world	 is	 a	 perceptual	 representation	 of	 phenomenality	 dissociated	 from	 our	
personal	 psyche	 and,	 as	 such,	 independent	 of	 our	 personal	 inner	 life.	 That	
which	underlies	the	physical	world	we	perceive	continues	to	exist—in	the	form	
of	phenomenality	outside	our	respective	alter—even	as	we	sleep.	
	
a	 b	
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world)	
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4.6	 The	autonomy	of	nature	objection	
A	 closely	 related	 objection	 is	 this:	 nature	 unfolds	 according	 to	 patterns	 and	
regularities—the	 ‘laws	 of	 nature’—independent	 of	 our	 personal	 volition.	
Human	 beings	 cannot	 change	 these	 laws.	 But	 if	 nature	 is	 in	 consciousness,	
should	that	not	be	possible	by	a	mere	act	of	imagination?	
This	 objection	 can	 be	 rebutted	 along	 the	 same	 lines	 as	 the	 previous	 one.	
However,	 there	 is	 a	 more	 direct	 and	 intuitive	 refutation.	 Notice	 that	 the	
implicit	 assumption	here	 is	 that	 all	mental	 activity	 is	 acquiescent	 to	 volition,	
which	is	patently	false	even	in	our	own	personal	psyche.	After	all,	by	and	large	
we	 cannot	 control	 our	 dreams,	 nightmares,	 emotions	 and	 even	many	 of	 our	
thoughts.	 They	 come,	 develop	 and	 go	 on	 their	 own	 terms.	 At	 a	 pathological	
level,	 schizophrenics	 cannot	 control	 their	 visions	 and	 people	 suffering	 from	
obsessive-compulsive	 disorder	 are	 constantly	 at	 the	 mercy	 of	 oppressive	
thoughts.	There	are	numerous	examples	of	conscious	activity	that	escapes	the	
control	of	 volition.	Often,	we	do	not	 even	 recognize	 this	 activity	 as	our	own;	
that	is,	we	do	not	identify	with	it.	It	unfolds	as	autonomous,	seemingly	external	
phenomena,	 such	 as	 dreams	 and	 schizophrenic	 hallucinations.	 Yet,	 all	 this	
activity	 is	 unquestionably	 within	 consciousness.	 We	 perceive	 it	 as	 separate	
from	ourselves	because	the	segment	of	our	psyche	that	gives	rise	to	this	activity	
is	dissociated	from	the	ego,	the	segment	with	which	we	do	identify.	
So	that	there	is	activity	in	universal	consciousness	that	we	do	not	identify	with	
and	cannot	control	 is	entirely	consistent	with	 idealism.	This	activity	 is	simply	
dissociated	from	our	ego	and	its	sense	of	volition.	
	
4.7	 The	shared	world	objection	
If	 all	 reality	 is	 in	 consciousness,	 then	 the	world	 is	 akin	 to	 a	 dream.	As	 such,	
idealism	implies	that	we	are	all	partaking	in	roughly	the	same	dream.	Yet,	since	
our	bodies	are	separate,	we	cannot	be	sharing	a	dream;	or	so	the	objection	goes.	
The	 objection	 begs	 the	 question	 by	 implicitly	 assuming	 that	 the	 body	
circumscribes	 dreaming	 consciousness,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 other	 way	 around.	
Only	under	 this	 assumption	does	 the	 impossibility	 of	 sharing	 a	dream	 follow	
from	the	fact	that	bodies	are	separate.	But	under	idealism,	it	is	the	body	that	is	
in	universal	consciousness,	not	consciousness	in	the	body.	Once	this	is	properly	
understood	 according	 to	 the	 framework	 developed	 in	 the	 preceding	 sections,	
the	 rebuttal	 of	 this	 objection	 becomes	 rather	 straightforward:	we	 all	 seem	 to	
inhabit	 the	 same	 world	 because	 our	 respective	 alters	 are	 surrounded	 by	 the	
same	universal	 field	of	phenomenality,	 like	whirlpools	 in	a	 single	 stream.	See	
Figure	4.4,	which	simply	extends	Figure	4.3	to	multiple	alters.	
	
529173-L-bw-Kastrup
Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 64
	 Analytic	Idealism	 	
	
	64	
	
Figure	4.4:	Alters	of	universal	consciousness	and	their	shared	world.	
	
4.8	 The	natural	order	objection	
The	 world	 we	 perceive	 around	 ourselves	 is	 governed	 by	 stable	 and	 orderly	
natural	 laws.	 Therefore,	 if	 the	 contents	 of	 perception	 are	 a	 representation	 of	
phenomenality	 in	 universal	 consciousness,	 then	 this	 phenomenality	 must	 be	
stable	 and	 orderly	 at	 root.	 But	 our	 own	 personal	 thoughts	 and	 emotions	 are	
notoriously	unstable	and	disorderly.	So	how	plausible	 is	 it	 that	 the	order	and	
stability	 we	 discern	 in	 the	 laws	 of	 nature	 represent	 thoughts	 or	 emotions	 in	
universal	consciousness?	
The	 misconception	 here,	 of	 course,	 is	 that	 of	 anthropomorphization:	 to	
attribute	to	universal	consciousness	as	a	whole	cognitive	characteristics	known	
only	 in	 small	 dissociated	 segments	 of	 it,	 such	 as	 human	 beings.	 Nothing	 in	
idealism	 precludes	 the	 possibility	 that	 phenomenality	 in	 universal	
consciousness	 unfolds	 according	 to	 very	 stable	 and	 orderly	 patterns	 and	
regularities,	whose	extrinsic	appearance	corresponds	to	the	laws	of	nature.	That	
our	 human	 thoughts	 and	 emotions	 seem	 rather	 reactive	 and	 unstable	 is	 a	
product	of	evolution	under	the	pressures	of	natural	selection	within	a	particular	
planetary	 ecosystem.	 At	 a	 universal	 level,	 consciousness	 has	 not	 undergone	
such	evolutionary	pressures.	
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Under	 physicalism,	 the	 laws	 of	 nature	 are	 seen	 as	 irreducible	 causal	 patterns	
somehow	 built	 into	 the	 fabric	 of	 the	 cosmos.	 It	 is	 the	 dynamic	 unfolding	 of	
these	patterns	that	leads	to	the	order	and	complexity	we	see	around	ourselves.	
Under	 idealism,	 such	 irreducible	 causal	 patterns	 are	 posited	 to	 be	 somehow	
built	 into	 universal	 consciousness	 itself,	 instead	 of	 an	 objective	 fabric	 of	
spacetime.	 Yet,	 beyond	 this	 distinction,	 they	 are	 the	 same	 patterns	 that	
physicalism	entails,	as	inherent	to	consciousness	as	physical	laws	are	allegedly	
inherent	 to	 the	 fabric	 of	 spacetime.	 Idealism	 poses	 no	 extra	 difficulty	 than	
physicalism	in	this	regard.	
This	can	be	better	understood	with	a	simple	terminology	move.	Certain	schools	
of	 psychology	 speak	 of	 ‘psychological	 archetypes’:	 innate,	 built-in	 templates	
according	 to	which	mental	 dynamics	 unfold	 (Jung	 1991).	As	 such,	we	 can	 say	
that,	 under	 idealism,	 the	 laws	 of	 nature	 are	 the	 archetypes	 of	 universal	
consciousness.	They	are	built-in	 templates	according	 to	which	 the	 ‘vibrations’	
of	 universal	 consciousness—that	 is,	 phenomenality—develop,	 analogously	 to	
how	the	physical	constraints	of	a	vibrating	surface	determine	its	natural	modes	
of	vibration.	
	
4.9	 The	equivalence	objection	
As	we	have	 seen	 in	Sections	4.5	 to	4.7,	 idealism	acknowledges	 that	 there	 is	 a	
world	 outside	 personal	 psyches,	 since	 personal	 psyches	 are	 but	 dissociated	
segments	of	a	broader	universal	consciousness.	The	objection,	then,	is	that	the	
notion	 of	 a	 broad	 stream	 of	 phenomenality	 outside	 personal	 psyches	 is	
equivalent	to	the	physicalist	postulate	of	a	world	outside	consciousness.	
Except	 for	 solipsism,	 any	 viable	 ontology	 must	 entail	 at	 least	 one	 inference	
beyond	direct	experience.	This	is	necessary	to	make	sense	of	the	fact	that	we	all	
inhabit	 the	 same	 world	 beyond	 ourselves	 and	 are	 unable	 to	 change	 its	
governing	 laws.	For	 this	 reason,	physicalism	 infers	 the	existence	of	a	universe	
outside	consciousness,	which	we	all	inhabit.	Idealism,	on	the	other	hand,	infers	
simply	 that	 consciousness	 itself	 extends	 beyond	 its	 face-value	 personal	
boundaries.	 This	 way,	 while	 physicalism	 postulates	 a	 fundamentally	 new	
ontological	 class	 next	 to	 experience,	 idealism	 simply	 extrapolates	 the	
boundaries	 of	 consciousness—the	 sole	 undeniable	 ontological	 class	 and	
primary	 datum	 of	 existence—beyond	 those	 we	 can	 probe	 directly.	 To	 put	 it	
metaphorically,	 while	 idealism	 makes	 sense	 of	 reality	 by	 inferring	 that	 the	
Earth	extends	beyond	the	visible	horizon,	physicalism	does	so	by	inferring	the	
existence	 of	 an	 isomorphic	 but	 ontologically	 distinct	 ‘shadow’	 Earth.	 Clearly,	
the	former	is	a	more	parsimonious	inference	and,	as	such,	not	equivalent	to	the	
latter.	
More	 importantly,	 the	 implications	 of	 idealism	 are	 radically	 different	 from	
those	 of	 physicalism.	 For	 instance,	 while	 physicalism	 implies	 that	
consciousness	 ends	 upon	 the	 death	 of	 the	 body,	 idealism	 implies	merely	 the	
end	 of	 the	 corresponding	 dissociation,	 not	 of	 consciousness	 proper.	 I	 have	
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elaborated	on	further	differences	in	implications	elsewhere	(Kastrup	2015:	185-
198).	
	
4.10	 The	primacy	of	brain	function	objection	
Not	 only	 are	 there	 (a)	 clear	 correlations	 between	 specific	 patterns	 of	 brain	
activity	and	reported	inner	experience	(Koch	2004),	we	know	that	(b)	physical	
interference	with	the	brain—such	as	head	trauma	and	the	use	of	psychoactive	
drugs—can	 influence	 one’s	 inner	 life	 rather	 dramatically.	 This	 may	 seem	 to	
suggest	 an	 arrow	 of	 causation	 pointing	 from	 a	 physical	 body	 outside	
consciousness	to	phenomenality,	which	would	contradict	idealism.	
To	 make	 sense	 of	 observation	 (a),	 we	 need	 to	 briefly	 recapitulate	 earlier	
discussions.	 As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 Section	 4.4,	 under	 idealism	 private	minds—
such	 as	 our	 own	 human	 psyche—can	 be	 explained	 as	 dissociated	 alters	 of	
universal	consciousness.	We	have	also	seen	in	Section	4.5	that	the	standalone	
world	around	us	can	be	explained	as	the	extrinsic	appearance	of	phenomenality	
surrounding—but	outside—our	respective	alter.	Now,	from	the	point	of	view	of	
a	given	alter	A,	nothing	prevents	 the	dissociated	mental	 activity	of	 an	alter	B	
from	being	part	of	the	phenomenality	surrounding	A.	B	is	then	part	of	A’s	world	
and,	 as	 such,	 must	 also	 have	 an	 extrinsic	 appearance	 on	 A’s	 screen	 of	
perception.	 In	 other	 words,	 there	must	 be	 something	 alters	 look	 like	 from	 a	
second-person	point	of	 view.	And	 since	we	know	 from	direct	 experience	 that	
our	 private	 inner	 life	 extends	 only	 to	 the	 boundaries	 of	 our	 metabolizing	
body—after	all,	we	cannot	perceive	things	that	do	not	impinge	on	our	skin	or	
other	 sense	 organs,	 or	 move	 anything	 beyond	 our	 own	 body	 through	 direct	
intention—metabolizing	bodies	seem	prima	facie	to	be	the	extrinsic	appearance	
of	dissociated	alters	of	universal	consciousness.	If	so,	this	means	that	all	living	
beings	have	private	 inner	 lives	 in	 some	way	analogous	 to	our	own,	but	 tables	
and	 chairs	 do	 not.	 The	 latter	 are	 simply	 aspects	 of	 the	 inanimate	 universe,	
which,	 as	 a	 whole,	 is	 the	 extrinsic	 appearance	 of	 phenomenality	 outside	 all	
alters.	
Brain	activity,	of	course,	 is	 integral	to	a	metabolizing	human	body.	Therefore,	
under	 idealism,	 brain	 activity	 is	 simply	 part	 of	 what	 one’s	 private	 inner	
experiences—self-reflective	and	otherwise,	as	I	will	elaborate	upon	in	the	next	
section—look	 like	 from	across	a	dissociative	boundary.	To	put	 it	another	way,	
one’s	brain	activity	 is	part	of	a	phenomenal	 representation	of	one’s	 inner	 life.	
And	of	course,	a	representation	must	correlate	with	the	phenomenal	process	it	
is	 the	 appearance	 of,	 without	 requiring	 anything	 ontologically	 distinct	 from	
consciousness.	 That	 this	 correlation	 is	 empirically	 observed	 is	 thus	 entirely	
consistent	with	idealism.	
A	possible	counterargument	here	is	this:	the	patterns	of	neural	activity	one	can	
measure	with	functional	brain	scanners	can	be	enormously	complex	in	terms	of	
information	content;	perhaps	more	complex	than	the	contents	of	consciousness	
we	 have	 introspective	 access	 to.	 What	 does	 the	 extra	 complexity	 then	
correspond	 to?	 The	 key	 to	 answering	 this	 question	 is	 in	 the	 next	 section,	
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wherein	a	distinction	will	be	made	between	contents	of	consciousness	we	have	
introspective	 access	 to—that	 is,	 can	 self-reflect	 upon—and	 contents	 of	
consciousness	 that,	 despite	 still	 being	 experienced,	 fall	 outside	 the	 reach	 of	
introspection.	 The	 extra	 complexity,	 insofar	 as	 it	 indeed	 is	 the	 case,	
corresponds	to	the	latter.	
Regarding	observation	(b)	of	the	objection,	the	suggested	arrow	of	causation	is	
based	on	an	unexamined	but	pervasive	assumption:	that	the	physical	is	in	some	
sense	 distinct	 from,	 yet	 causally	 effective	 upon,	 the	 phenomenal.	 This	 is	
precisely	 what	 idealism	 denies.	 Under	 idealism,	 the	 physical	 is	 simply	 the	
contents	of	perception,	 a	particular	 type	of	phenomenality.	As	 such,	what	we	
call	 ‘physical	 interference	 with	 the	 brain’	 is	 the	 extrinsic	 appearance	 of	
phenomenality	 external	 to	 an	 alter	 that	 disrupts	 the	 inner	 experiences	 of	 the	
alter	from	across	its	dissociative	boundary.	The	disruption	‘pierces	through’	the	
boundary,	so	to	speak.	And	that	certain	types	of	phenomenality	disrupt	other	
types	 of	 phenomenality	 is	 not	 only	 entailed	 by	 idealism,	 but	 also	 empirically	
trivial.	 After	 all,	 our	 thoughts	 disrupt	 our	 emotions—and	 vice-versa—every	
day.	For	the	same	reason	that	thoughts	disrupt	emotions,	‘physical	interference	
with	 the	 brain’	 disrupts	 an	 organism’s	 inner	 life.	 None	 of	 this	 contradicts	
idealism.	
	
4.11	 The	unconscious	mentation	objection	
In	Libet’s	now	famous	experiments	(1985),	neuroscientists	were	able	to	record,	
a	 fraction	 of	 a	 second	 before	 subjects	 reported	 making	 a	 decision	 to	 act,	
mounting	 brain	 activity	 associated	 with	 the	 initiation	 of	 a	 simple	 voluntary	
action.	At	first	sight,	this	would	seem	to	indicate	that	decisions	are	made	in	a	
neural	 substrate	 outside	 consciousness,	 thereby	 contradicting	 idealism.	 I	 use	
Libet’s	 experiments	 here	merely	 as	 an	 example,	 for	 today	 we	 know	 of	 many	
other	instances	of	seemingly	unconscious	mentation,	such	as	moving	one’s	foot	
halfway	 to	 the	 brake	 pedal	 before	 one	 becomes	 aware	 of	 danger	 ahead	
(Eagleman	2011:	5).	Under	idealism,	since	everything	is	in	consciousness,	there	
cannot	be	such	a	thing	as	unconscious	mentation.	So	what	is	going	on?	
The	 misconception	 here	 is	 a	 conflation	 of	 consciousness	 proper	 with	 a	
particular	 configuration	 of	 consciousness.	 Indeed,	 to	 report	 an	 experience—
such	 as	 making	 a	 decision	 to	 act	 or	 seeing	 danger	 ahead—to	 another	 or	 to	
oneself,	one	has	to	both	(a)	have	the	experience	and	(b)	know	that	one	has	the	
experience,	which	Schooler	(2002)	called	a	“re-representation.”	In	other	words,	
one	 can	 only	 report	 phenomenality	 that	 one	 is	 self-reflectively	 aware	 of	 at	 a	
metacognitive	 level.	 But	 self-reflection	 is	 just	 a	 particular	 configuration	 of	
consciousness,	 whereby	 consciousness	 turns	 in	 upon	 itself	 to	 experience	
knowledge	of	its	own	phenomenality	(Kastrup	2014:	104-110).	Nothing	precludes	
the	 possibility	 that	 phenomenality	 takes	 place	 outside	 the	 field	 of	 self-
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reflection.	 In	 this	 case,	 we	 cannot	 report	 the	 phenomenality—not	 even	 to	
ourselves—because	we	do	not	know	that	we	experience	it.1	
The	 argument	 above	 is	 not	 idiosyncratic,	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 unreportable	
phenomenality	 is	well	established	 in	neuroscience	today	(Tsuchiya	et	 al.	2015,	
Vandenbroucke	 et	 al.	 2014).	 Indeed,	 as	 elaborated	 upon	 by	 Schooler	 (2002),	
reportability	 is	 an	 extra	 function	 at	 a	 metacognitive	 level,	 on	 top	 of	
phenomenality	 proper.	 So	 the	 possibility	 that	 presents	 itself	 to	 us	 is	 that	 all	
mentation	is	actually	conscious,	even	though	we	cannot	report	much	of	 it.	As	
such,	 the	 decisions	 made	 by	 Libet’s	 subjects	 could	 well	 have	 been	 made	 in	
consciousness,	 but	 outside	 the	 field	 of	 self-reflection.	 The	 corresponding	
phenomenality	 then	 entered	 this	 field	 a	 fraction	 of	 a	 second	 later,	 thereby	
becoming	 reportable.	 Analogously,	 drivers	may	 consciously	 see	 danger	 ahead	
before	they	can	tell	themselves	that	 they	see	danger	ahead.	The	appearance	of	
unconscious	mentation	due	to	unreportability	does	not	contradict	idealism.	
	
4.12	 The	unconsciousness	objection	
Along	similar	lines,	the	idea	here	is	that,	when	we	e.g.	faint	or	undergo	general	
anesthesia,	 we	 become	 seemingly	 unconscious.	 Yet,	 we	 do	 not	 cease	 to	 exist	
because	of	it,	which	may	seem	to	contradict	the	idealist	tenet	that	our	body	is	
the	extrinsic	appearance	of	conscious	inner	life.	
Let	us	consider	this	more	carefully.	Imagine	that	you	wake	up	in	the	morning	
after	hours	of	deep	sleep.	You	may	remember	nothing	of	what	happened	during	
those	preceding	hours,	concluding	that	you	were	unconscious	all	night.	Then,	
later	 in	 the	day,	you	suddenly	 remember	 that	you	actually	had	a	very	 intense	
dream.	So	you	were	not	unconscious	all	night,	you	simply	could	not	remember	
your	experiences.	
Indeed,	all	we	can	assert	with	confidence	upon	coming	round	from	episodes	of	
seeming	unconsciousness	is	that	we	cannot	remember	phenomenality	occurring	
during	 those	 episodes.	 The	 actual	 absence	 of	 phenomenality	 is	 impossible	 to	
assert	with	confidence.	As	a	matter	of	 fact,	many	things	we	have	traditionally	
associated	with	unconsciousness	are	now	known	to	entail	intense	experiences.	
For	 instance,	 fainting	 caused	 by	 e.g.	 asphyxiation,	 strangulation	 or	
hyperventilation	is	known	to	correlate	with	euphoria,	insights	and	visions	(Neal	
2008:	310-315,	Rhinewine	and	Williams	2007,	Retz	2007).	G-force-induced	 loss	
of	consciousness	(G-LOC)	is	also	known	to	correlate	with	“memorable	dreams”	
(Whinnery	 and	 Whinnery	 1990).	 There	 is	 even	 evidence	 for	 “implicit	
perception”	during	general	anesthesia	(Kihlstrom	and	Cork	2007).	
Sleep,	of	course,	is	known	to	correlate	with	dreams.	But	even	during	phases	of	
sleep	 wherein	 electroencephalogram	 readings	 show	 no	 dream-related	 neural	
activity,	there	are	other	types	of	activity	that	may	correlate	with	non-recallable	
phenomenality	 distinct	 from	 dreams.	 Indeed,	 this	 is	 precisely	 what	 a	 recent	
																																								 								
1	This	is	elaborated	upon	in	much	more	detail	in	Chapter	5	of	this	dissertation.	
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study	points	out:	 “there	are	good	empirical	and	 theoretical	 reasons	 for	 saying	
that	a	 range	of	different	 types	of	 sleep	experience,	 some	of	which	are	distinct	
from	dreaming,	can	occur	in	all	stages	of	sleep”	(Windt,	Nielsen	and	Thompson	
2016:	 871,	 emphasis	 added).	 The	 authors	 identify	 three	 different	 categories	 of	
sleep	experiences	distinct	 from	dreams:	 (a)	non-immersive	 imagery	and	 sleep	
thinking,	 (b)	 perceptions	 and	 bodily	 sensations,	 and	 (c)	 ‘selfless’	 states	 and	
contentless	 sleep	 experiences	 that	 may	 be	 similar	 to	 those	 reported	 by	
experienced	meditators.	
As	 such,	 what	 the	 empirical	 data	 shows	 is	 that	 episodes	 of	 seeming	
unconsciousness	are	associated	with	an	impairment	of	memory	access,	but	not	
necessarily	with	absence	of	phenomenality.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	there	are	strong	
indications,	as	mentioned	above,	that	the	opposite	is	true.	
	
4.13	 The	solipsism	objection	
Some	 conflate	 idealism	 with	 solipsism,	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 world	 is	 one’s	
personal	dream,	all	other	living	creatures	being	just	figments	of	one’s	personal	
imagination.	Under	solipsism,	there	is	nothing	it	is	like	to	be	other	people;	they	
have	no	inner	life;	they	exist	only	as	appearances	in	the	personal	psyche	of	the	
dreamer.	As	such,	whatever	empirical	evidence	one	brings	to	bear	and	whatever	
one	says	to	a	solipsist	must	be	regarded	by	the	solipsist	as	figments	of	his	or	her	
own	imagination,	which	renders	solipsism	unfalsifiable.	So	the	objection	here	is	
that,	 by	 being	 unfalsifiable,	 solipsism—and	 therefore	 idealism—is	 beneath	
philosophical	debate.	
Naturally,	idealism	is	not	solipsism.	Under	idealism,	there	is	something	it	is	like	
to	be	other	living	creatures;	they	also	have	private	inner	lives.	So	idealists	take	
other	people	seriously	as	legitimate	sources	of	reported	experiences	and	views,	
not	just	as	figments	of	one’s	own	imagination.	Moreover,	idealists	acknowledge	
that	 there	 is	 a	 world	 outside	 and	 independent	 of	 their	 personal	 (dissociated)	
psyche,	as	discussed	in	Sections	4.5	to	4.7.	They	simply	do	not	acknowledge	that	
this	 world	 is	 ontologically	 distinct	 from	 consciousness	 itself.	 Indeed,	 by	
acknowledging	 that	 dissociation	 in	 universal	 consciousness	 implies	 a	 world	
outside	their	own	personal	mentation,	 idealists	 look	upon	this	world	in	a	way	
entirely	compatible	with	naturalism	and	scientific	inquiry.	
Unlike	solipsism,	idealism	has	the	burden	to	explain	observations	non-trivially.	
Consider	three	basic	facts	that	are	often	used	to	justify	physicalism:	(a)	the	laws	
of	nature	are	 independent	of	our	personal	volition;	 (b)	we	all	 seem	to	 inhabit	
the	same	world;	and	(c)	 there	are	 tight	correlations	between	observable	brain	
activity	 and	 reported	 inner	 life.	 Solipsism	 trivializes	 all	 three	 facts	 in	 lieu	 of	
actually	 making	 sense	 of	 them:	 the	 solipsist	 allegedly	 dreams	 them	 all	 up,	
rather	arbitrarily.	The	idealist,	on	the	other	hand,	by	acknowledging	the	inner	
lives	of	other	people	and	the	autonomous	nature	of	the	world,	has	the	burden	
to	 reconcile	 these	 three	 facts	 with	 the	 notion	 that	 reality	 unfolds	 in	
consciousness.	If	idealism	is	correct,	(a)	how	come	we	cannot	simply	imagine	a	
different	and	better	world?	If	the	world	is	akin	to	a	dream	in	consciousness,	(b)	
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how	come	we	are	all	having	the	same	dream?	If	consciousness	is	not	generated	
by	 the	 brain,	 (c)	 how	 come	 there	 are	 such	 tight	 correlations	 between	 brain	
activity	and	inner	experience?	These	questions	have	already	been	answered	in	
Sections	 4.6,	 4.7	 and	 4.10,	 respectively.	 The	 important	 point	 here	 is	 this:	
idealism	is	 falsifiable	 in	 that,	 if	 it	cannot	answer	 these	and	other	questions	 in	
terms	of	universal	consciousness	alone,	it	must	be	discarded.	
	
4.14	 The	cosmological	history	objection	
There	 is	 overwhelming	 evidence	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 universe	 before	
conscious	life	arose.	Therefore—or	so	the	objection	goes—it	is	untenable	to	say	
that	 the	 universe	 exists	 in	 consciousness.	 This	 may	 strike	 some	 readers	 as	
obviously	question-begging—which,	of	 course,	 it	 is—but	please	bear	with	me	
for	the	sake	of	completeness.	
The	implicit	assumption	here	is	that	consciousness	arises	only	with	biology,	as	
a	 product	 of	 biology.	Naturally,	 this	 is	 precisely	what	 idealism	denies.	Under	
idealism,	 biology	 is	 merely	 the	 extrinsic	 appearance	 of	 dissociated,	 local	
differentiations	 of	 consciousness	 (that	 is,	 alters),	 not	 the	 constituent	 or	
generator	 of	 consciousness.	 There	 was	 universal	 consciousness	 before	 such	
dissociated,	 local	 differentiations	 arose.	And	 there	was	 phenomenality	 in	 this	
universal	 consciousness	 corresponding	 to	 the	 inanimate	universe	prior	 to	 the	
origin	of	life.	
	
4.15	 The	implausibility	of	cosmic	inner	life	objection	
The	last	objection	I	will	address	in	this	essay	is,	like	the	first,	purely	intuitive.	It	
asks	rhetorically:	How	plausible	is	it	that	the	inanimate	universe	as	a	whole	is	
the	 extrinsic	 appearance	 of	 some	 kind	 of	 universal	 inner	 life?	 The	 intuitive	
appeal	of	the	question	is	understandable.	After	all,	we	only	have	introspective	
access	to	our	own	(dissociated)	personal	inner	life,	so	to	gauge	the	presence	of	
other	 or	 broader	 inner	 life	 we	 depend	 on	 perceivable	 external	 indicators.	 In	
other	 people	 and	 animals,	 these	 indicators	 are	 their	 behavior.	 But	within	 the	
extremely	small	range	of	space	and	time	in	which	we	live	our	lives—and	even	in	
which	human	history	as	a	whole	has	unfolded—we	simply	cannot	perceive	any	
intuitively-appealing	indicator	of	universal	inner	life.	
Yet,	 we	 can	 approach	 the	 question	 from	 a	 different	 angle.	 Consider	 a	 living	
brain	exposed	by	surgeons	during	an	operation.	It	is	a	very	concrete	object	that	
can	be	seen,	touched,	cut,	cauterized,	etc.	It	is	composed	of	the	same	types	of	
atoms	and	force	fields	that	make	up	the	universe	as	a	whole.	There	is	nothing	
magical	about	a	brain	insofar	as	we	can	gauge	on	the	screen	of	perception.	And	
neither	 can	 we	 discern	 any	 intuitively-appealing	 indicator	 of	 inner	 life	 by	
simply	looking	at	an	exposed	brain.	
Nonetheless,	we	all	know	that	‘behind’	the	living	brain	lies	the	entire	inner	life	
of	a	person,	with	love	affairs	and	heartbreaks,	successes	and	disappointments,	
great	 adventures	 and	 quiet	 introspective	 insights,	 great	 joy	 and	 indescribable	
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suffering.	 ‘Behind’	 that	 very	 concrete	object	under	 the	 surgeon’s	 scalpel	 there	
lies	a	world	of	phenomenality.	Counterintuitive	or	not,	this	is	the	way	nature	is:	
what	 we	 call	 physical	 structures—such	 as	 living	 brains—can	 correspond	 in	
some	way	to	rich	phenomenality.	We	may	not	know	how	 this	is	so,	but	we	do	
know	that	it	is	so.	
Therefore,	unless	we	solve	the	‘hard	problem	of	consciousness’	(Chalmers	2003)	
and	 explain	 what	 makes	 brains	 different	 from	 the	 inanimate	 universe	 as	 a	
whole	in	this	regard,	if	brains	correspond	to	inner	life	it	is	not	at	all	implausible	
that	the	inanimate	universe	as	a	whole	could	as	well.	After	all,	brains	are	made	
of	the	same	‘stuff’	that	the	rest	of	the	universe	is	also	made	of.	
One	 could	 argue	 at	 this	 point	 that	 only	 particular	 structural	 and	 functional	
organizations	 of	 this	 ‘stuff,’	 as	 found	 in	 brains,	 are	 conducive	 to	 the	 kind	 of	
information	processing	associated	with	human	inner	life.	For	instance,	Tononi	
(2004)	 has	 shown	 that	 reportable	 experiences	 correlate	 only	 with	 complex	
networks	of	information	integration	in	the	brain.	Although	it	has	recently	been	
shown	that	there	are	structural	similarities	between	brains	and	the	universe	at	
its	 largest	 scales	 (Krioukov	 et	 al.	 2012), 2 	it	 is	 implausible	 that	 analogous	
information	 integration	 takes	 place	 at	 a	 universal	 level.	 The	 distances	 and	
signal	propagation	times	involved	do	not	permit	it	(Siegel	2016).	
However,	 the	hypothesis	offered	here	 is	not	 that	 the	universe	has	human-like	
cognition	 and	 associated	 information	 integration.	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 the	
hypothesis	is	not	even	that	the	universe	has	cognition,	defined	as	the	capacity	
to	acquire	knowledge	or	understanding.	Instead,	the	claim	is	simply	that	there	
is	raw	 experience—qualia,	pure	and	simple—associated	with	 the	universe	as	a	
whole,	which	does	not	require	anything	like	the	kind	of	information	integration	
underlying	human	self-reflection.	
	
4.16	 Conclusions	
Idealism	 is	a	unique	ontology	 in	 that,	unlike	physicalism	and	panpsychism,	 it	
asserts	that	physical	structures	are	circumscribed	by	consciousness,	as	opposed	
to	the	other	way	around.	Yet,	analytic	philosophy	has	traditionally	considered	
idealism	implausible.	In	this	essay,	I	have	argued	that	the	alleged	implausibility	
of	idealism	is	based	on	misconceptions,	such	as:	
• Unfounded	 intuition—e.g.	 taking	 the	 concreteness	 of	 the	 world	 to	
indicate	 its	 independence	 from	 consciousness,	 or	 asserting	 the	
implausibility	of	universal	inner	life;	
• Lack	of	philosophical	 imagination—e.g.	 assuming	 that	multiple	private	
minds	and	a	stand-alone	world	cannot	be	coherently	reduced	to	a	single	
universal	consciousness;	
																																								 								
2	This	 conclusion	has	been	confirmed	and	amplified	by	a	 later	 study	done	by	Franco	
Vazza	and	Alberto	Feletti	(2017).	
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• Demonstrably	 wrong	 assumptions—e.g.	 that	 all	 mental	 activity	 is	
acquiescent	to	volition;	
• Question-begging—e.g.	 arguing	 that	 different	 people	 cannot	 share	 a	
dream	because	their	bodies	are	separate,	and	arguing	that	the	universe	
cannot	be	in	consciousness	because	it	existed	before	conscious	life	first	
arose;	
• Anthropomorphization—e.g.	 taking	 all	 conceivable	 processes	 in	
consciousness	to	necessarily	be	unstable	and	disorderly;	
• Failure	to	understand	the	implications	of	idealism—e.g.	asserting	that	a	
field	 of	 phenomenality	 outside	 personal	 psyches	 is	 equivalent	 to	 a	
physical	world	outside	phenomenality;	
• Unexamined	 assumptions—e.g.	 that	 the	 physical	 is	 in	 some	 sense	
distinct	from,	yet	causally	effective	upon,	the	phenomenal;	
• Conflation—e.g.	 conflating	 consciousness	 proper	 with	 self-reflection,	
conflating	 unconsciousness	 with	 failure	 to	 recall	 phenomenality,	 and	
conflating	idealism	with	solipsism.	
As	 such,	 idealism	 is	 an	 entirely	 plausible	 ontology	 that	 may	 offer	 the	 most	
parsimonious	and	explanatorily	powerful	option	yet	to	make	sense	of	reality.	
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5.	 There	Is	an	‘Unconscious,’	but	It	May	Well	Be	Conscious	
	
This	paper	first	appeared	in	Europe’s	Journal	of	Psychology,	ISSN:	1841-0413,	Vol.	
13,	 No.	 3,	 pp.	 559-572,	 in	 August	 2017.	 A	 summary	 of	 this	 paper	 has	 also	
appeared	in	Scientific	American	on	19	September	2017.1	
	
5.1	 Abstract	
Depth	psychology	finds	empirical	validation	today	in	a	variety	of	observations	
that	 suggest	 the	 presence	 of	 causally	 effective	 mental	 processes	 outside	
conscious	 experience.	 I	 submit	 that	 this	 is	 due	 to	 misinterpretation	 of	 the	
observations:	 the	 subset	 of	 consciousness	 called	 ‘meta-consciousness’	 in	 the	
literature	 is	 often	 mistaken	 for	 consciousness	 proper,	 thereby	 artificially	
creating	 space	 for	 an	 ‘unconscious.’	The	 implied	hypothesis	 is	 that	all	mental	
processes	may	in	fact	be	conscious,	the	appearance	of	unconsciousness	arising	
from	 our	 dependence	 on	 self-reflective	 introspection	 for	 gauging	 awareness.	
After	re-interpreting	the	empirical	data	according	to	a	philosophically	rigorous	
definition	 of	 consciousness,	 I	 show	 that	 two	 well-known	 phenomena	
corroborate	 this	 hypothesis:	 (a)	 experiences	 that,	 despite	 being	 conscious,	
aren’t	 re-represented	 during	 introspection;	 and	 (b)	 dissociated	 experiences	
inaccessible	to	the	executive	ego.	If	consciousness	is	inherent	to	all	mentation,	
it	may	be	fundamental	in	nature,	as	opposed	to	a	product	of	particular	types	of	
brain	function.	
	
5.2	 Introduction	
The	 foundational	 theoretical	 inference	 of	 the	 clinical	 approach	 called	 ‘depth	
psychology’—whose	origins	can	be	traced	back	to	the	works	of	Frederic	Myers,	
Pierre	Janet,	William	James,	Sigmund	Freud	and	Carl	Jung—is	that	the	human	
psyche	 comprises	 two	 main	 subdivisions:	 a	 conscious	 and	 an	 unconscious	
segment	(Kelly	et	al.	2009:	301-334).	The	conscious	segment	comprises	mental	
activity	 to	 which	 one	 has	 introspective	 access.	 The	 so-called	 ‘ego’	 is	 the	 felt	
sense	 of	 personal	 self	 that	 arises	 in	 association	 with	 a	 subset	 of	 this	
introspectively-accessible	 activity—e.g.	 some	 bodily	 sensations,	 images,	
thoughts,	 beliefs,	 etc.—and	 it	 is	 in	 this	 sense	 that	 I	 use	 the	 word	 ‘ego’	
throughout	this	paper.	In	contrast,	the	unconscious	segment	comprises	mental	
activity	 to	 which	 one	 has	 no	 introspective	 access.	 Inaccessible	 as	 it	 may	 be,	
depth	psychologists	contend	that	mental	activity	in	the	 ‘unconscious’—a	term	
often	used	 as	 a	 noun—still	 can	 and	does	 influence	 one’s	 conscious	 thoughts,	
feelings	and	behaviors.	A	more	modern	articulation	of	 the	notion	of	a	mental	
unconscious—as	 opposed	 to	 what	 has	 historically	 been	 called	 “unconscious	
																																								 								
1	At	the	time	of	this	writing,	the	Scientific	American	essay	was	freely	available	online	at:	
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/consciousness-goes-deeper-than-
you-think/.	
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cerebration”	 (Kelly	 et	 al.	 2009:	 340-352)—can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 writings	 of	
Kihlstrom	(1997),	for	example.2	
Recent	 empirical	 results	 seem	 to	 corroborate	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 a	 mental	
unconscious	 by	 revealing	 the	 presence	 of	 mental	 activity	 individuals	 cannot	
access	 through	 introspection,	 but	 which	 nonetheless	 causally	 conditions	 the	
individuals’	 conscious	 thoughts,	 feelings	 and	 behaviors	 (e.g.	 Westen	 1999,	
Augusto	 2010,	 Eagleman	 2011).	 Hassin	 goes	 as	 far	 as	 insisting,	 “unconscious	
processes	 can	 carry	out	 every	 fundamental	high-level	 function	 that	 conscious	
processes	 can	 perform”	 (2013:	 196).	 He	 reviews	 empirical	 evidence	 indicating	
that	 the	 unconscious	 is	 capable	 of	 cognitive	 control,	 the	 pursuit	 of	 goals,	
information	 broadcasting	 and	 even	 reasoning	 (Hassin	 2013:	 197-200).	 This	
echoes	 Dijksterhuis	 and	 Nordgren,	 whose	 experiments	 indicate	 that	 the	
unconscious	 can	 encompass	 “all	 psychological	 phenomena	 associated	 with	
thought,	 such	 as	 choice,	 decision	 making,	 attitude	 formation	 and	 attitude	
change,	 impression	 formation,	 diagnosticity,	 problem	 solving,	 and	 creativity”	
(2006:	 96).	 Even	 practitioners	 of	 cognitive	 therapy,	 who	 have	 traditionally	
ignored	 the	 unconscious,	 have	 more	 recently	 found	 clinical	 value	 in	
interpreting	possible	 indirect	manifestations	of	 inaccessible	mental	 activity	 in	
the	 form	 of	 dreams	 (Rosner,	 Lyddon	 and	 Freeman	 2004).	 This	 new	 scientific	
approach	 to	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 an	 unconscious	 has	 been	 called	 “the	 new	
unconscious”	(Hassin,	Uleman	and	Bargh	2005).	
Clearly,	 there	 is	 significant	 evidence	 for	 the	 presence	 of	 causally-effective	
mental	 activity	 that	 we	 ordinarily	 cannot	 access	 through	 introspection.	 The	
question,	 however,	 is	 whether	 mental	 activity	 inaccessible	 through	
introspection	is	necessarily	unconscious.	It	is	true	that,	from	the	perspective	of	
clinical	 psychology,	 these	 two	 modalities	 are	 operationally	 indistinguishable,	
since	 the	clinicians’	 sole	gauge	of	 their	patients’	 range	of	consciousness	 is	 the	
patients’	own	introspective	reports.	However,	from	a	theoretical	standpoint,	 it	
is	conceivable	that	mental	activity	the	ego	cannot	access	through	introspection	
could	 still	 be	 conscious,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 being	 phenomenally	 experienced	
somewhere	 in	 the	 psyche.	 If	 so,	 this	 has	 significant	 implications	 for	 our	
understanding	of	the	nature	of	consciousness—and	of	its	relationship	to	brain	
function—in	 the	 fields	 of	 neuropsychology,	 neuroscience	 and	 philosophy	 of	
mind.	
Indeed,	although	the	conflation	between	lack	of	introspective	access	and	lack	of	
consciousness	 is	 operationally	 justifiable	 in	 a	 clinical	 setting,	 the	 widespread	
use	of	the	qualifier	 ‘unconscious’	today	suggests	an	intrinsic	dichotomy	in	the	
																																								 								
2	Throughout	this	dissertation,	I	use	the	word	‘mental’	as	a	synonym	of	‘phenomenal’;	
except	in	this	chapter.	Because	this	chapter	was	originally	published	as	an	article	in	a	
psychology	 journal,	 here	 the	 word	 ‘mental’	 is	 associated	 with	 cognitive	 activity,	
instead	 of	 qualia.	 According	 to	 this	 definition,	 mental	 processes	 aren’t	 necessarily	
conscious,	 for	 cognition	 can	 conceivably	 take	 place	 unconsciously.	 And	 if	 they	 are	
conscious,	 mental	 processes	 then	 entail	 the	 acquisition	 of	 knowledge	 and/or	
understanding,	which	implies	more	than	just	the	presence	of	phenomenality.	
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nature	of	mental	processes:	some	supposedly	aren’t	experienced	whilst	others,	
somehow,	 are.	 This	 implies	 that	 consciousness	 is	 not	 fundamental	 to	
mentation,	 but	 a	 property	 that	 emerges	 from	 particular	 arrangements	 or	
configurations	 of	 neurons.	 Primed	 and	 driven	 by	 this	 assumption,	 significant	
resources	are	spent	in	neuropsychology	and	neuroscience	today	in	an	effort	to	
figure	out	what	these	arrangements	or	configurations	are.	Hypotheses	currently	
under	investigation	vary	from	vast	topologies	of	information	integration	across	
neurons	 (Tononi	 2004)	 to	 microscopic	 quantum	 processes	 within	 neural	
microtubules	(Hameroff	2006).	
The	present	paper,	on	the	other	hand,	elaborates	on	the	possibility	that	these	
efforts	 are	 misguided,	 for	 introspectively-inaccessible	 mental	 processes	 may	
still	be	conscious:	they	may	be	phenomenally	experienced	in	a	manner—or	in	a	
segment	of	the	psyche—that	escapes	egoic	introspection.	This	way,	the	notion	
of	an	unconscious,	despite	 the	broad	use	and	 influence	of	 the	term	in	today’s	
psychology,	 may	 at	 root	 be	 a	 linguistic	 inaccuracy	 originating	 from	 mere	
operational	convenience.	 If	 so,	 then	consciousness	may	not	be	 the	product	of	
specific	 arrangements	 or	 configurations	 of	 neural	 activity,	 but	 a	 fundamental	
property	 of	 all	 mentation.	 The	 implications	 of	 this	 possibility	 for	
neuropsychology,	 neuroscience	 and	 philosophy	 of	 mind	 are	 hard	 to	
overestimate.	
	
5.3	 Defining	and	gauging	consciousness	
Before	 we	 can	 meaningfully	 discuss	 unconsciousness—the	 alleged	 lack	 of	
consciousness—we	must,	of	course,	have	clarity	regarding	the	meaning	of	the	
word	 ‘consciousness.’	 What	 does	 it	 mean	 to	 say	 that	 a	 mental	 process	 is	
conscious?	 In	 this	 paper,	 I	 shall	 use	 a	 rigorous	 definition	 well-accepted	 in	
neuropsychology,	 neuroscience	 and	 philosophy	 of	 mind:	 mental	 activity	 is	
conscious	 if,	and	only	if,	there	is	something—anything—it	is	like	to	have	such	
mental	activity	in	and	of	itself	(Nagel	1974,	Chalmers	2003).	(A	less	rigorous	but	
more	 easily	 understandable	 formulation	 of	 this	 definition	 is	 this:	 mental	
activity	 is	 conscious	 if	 there	 is	 something	 it	 feels	 like	 to	 have	 such	 mental	
activity	in	and	of	itself.	The	verb	‘to	feel,’	however,	is	too	ambiguous	to	be	used	
in	 a	 rigorous	 definition,	 so	 philosophers	 of	 mind	 have	 reached	 consensus	
around	 the	 formulation	 I	 originally	 proposed	 above.)	 This	 way,	 if	 mental	
activity	 is	unconscious,	then	there	 is	nothing	it	 is	 like	to	have	such	activity	 in	
and	of	 itself,	even	if	 it,	 in	turn,	causes	or	 influences	conscious	activity.	Notice	
that	this	definition	of	consciousness	honors	our	intuitive	understanding	of	the	
word:	 you	 only	 consider	 yourself	 conscious	 right	 now	 because	 there	 is	
something	it	is	like	to	be	you	while	you	read	this	paper.	Otherwise,	you	would	
necessarily	be	unconscious.	
To	remain	consistent	with	our	intuitive	understanding	of	words,	I	shall	also	say	
that	mental	 activity	 corresponds	 to	 experience	 if,	 and	 only	 if,	 it	 is	 conscious.	
You	experience	reading	this	paper	because	you	are	conscious	of	it	right	now.	If	
you	were	not,	what	sense	would	there	be	in	saying	that	you	experience	it?	
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According	 to	 these	 definitions,	 higher-order	 thought	 (as	 defined	 in	 Schooler	
2002:	 340)	 is	 unnecessary	 for	 there	 to	 be	 consciousness.	 The	 presence	 of	 the	
mere	qualities	of	 raw	experience—which	philosophers	of	mind	call	qualia—is	
already	 sufficient	 for	 a	 mental	 process	 to	 be	 considered	 conscious.	 In	 this	
context,	 the	 categorization	 proposed	 by	 Schooler	 is	 helpful:	 he	 distinguishes	
between	 “non-conscious	 (unexperienced),	 conscious	 (experienced),	 and	meta-
conscious	 (re-represented)”	 mental	 processes	 (2002:	 339).	 Only	 the	 latter	
entails	higher-order	thought.	
Now	notice	that	direct	insight	into	one’s	conscious	inner	life	is	limited	to	those	
experiences	one’s	ego	can	access	through	introspection	and	then	report	to	self	
or	 others.	 In	 the	 words	 of	 Klein,	 “It	 is	 only	 in	 virtue	 of	 knowledge	 by	
acquaintance	 that	 we	 know	 our	 mental	 states.	 …	 Accordingly,	 the	 use	 of	
introspective	reports	as	a	reliable	and	informative	source	of	information	about	
mental	 states	 has	 seen	 a	 resurgence	 over	 the	 past	 few	 decades”	 (2015:	 361,	
original	 emphasis).	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 study	 of	 the	 Neural	 Correlates	 of	
Consciousness	 (NCCs)	 still	 largely	 consists	 in	 correlating	 objective	
measurements	 of	 neural	 activity	with	 introspective	 assessments	 (Koch	 2004):	
patterns	of	neural	activity	accompanied	by	reported	experience	are	considered	
NCCs.	 Indeed,	 as	 Newell	 and	 Shanks	 recently	 wrote,	 “Whereas	 issues	 about	
how	 to	 define	 and	 measure	 awareness	 were	 once	 highly	 prominent	 and	
controversial,	it	now	seems	to	be	generally	accepted	that	awareness	should	be	
operationally	defined	as	reportable	knowledge”	(2014:	15).	
The	problem	is	 that,	as	 I	 shall	 shortly	elaborate	upon,	 for	 the	subject’s	ego	to	
access	and	report	an	experience	there	must	be:	(a)	an	associative	link	between	
the	ego	and	the	experience;	and	(b)	a	meta-conscious	re-representation	of	the	
experience.	 Therefore,	 while	 subjects	 can	 report	 non-dissociated	 meta-
conscious	 processes,	 they	 fundamentally	 cannot	 distinguish	 between	 truly	
unconscious	 processes	 and	 conscious	 processes	 that	 simply	 aren’t	 meta-
conscious,	for	both	types	are	equally	unreportable	to	self	and	others.	This	is	an	
alarming	 conclusion,	 for	 much	 of	 the	 work	 indicating	 the	 presence	 of	 an	
unconscious	 is	based	on	(the	 lack	of)	 introspective	reports	of	experience.	The	
next	two	sections	expand	on	all	this.	
In	 what	 follows,	 I	 shall	 assume	 that	 introspective	 reports	 are	 as	 good	 as	
“reliable,	relevant,	immediate,	and	sensitive”	(Newell	and	Shanks	2014:	3).	This	
is	 charitable	 towards	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 an	 unconscious,	 for—as	 Newell	 and	
Shanks	 argued	 (2014)—much	 of	 the	 evidence	 behind	 this	 hypothesis	 can	 be	
attributed	 to	 methodological	 artifacts:	 delayed	 introspective	 assessments	
leading	 to	 impaired	recall,	experimenters	not	providing	sufficient	opportunity	
for	 subjects	 to	 report	 the	 introspective	 insights	 they	 actually	 have,	 cross-task	
confusion,	etc.	My	goal	 is	 to	show	that,	even	 if	 the	research	underpinning	the	
existence	of	an	unconscious	were	free	of	methodological	artifacts,	there	would	
still	 be	 compelling	 reasons	 to	 posit	 that	mental	 processes	 unaccompanied	 by	
introspective	reports	of	experience	can	be	conscious	nonetheless.	
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5.4	 Non-self-reflective	experiences	
To	gain	 introspective	access	 to	an	experience	 it	 is	not	enough	to	merely	have	
the	experience;	we	must	also	consciously	know	that	we	have	it.	After	all,	what	
introspective	 insight	 could	we	 gain	 about	 an	 experience	 of	which	we	 are	 not	
explicitly	aware?	Schooler	elaborates:	
Critical	 to	 both	 the	 centrality	 of	 the	 conscious/non-conscious	
distinction,	 and	 its	 equation	with	 reportability,	 is	 the	 assumption	 that	
people	are	explicitly	aware	of	their	conscious	experiences.	However,	this	
assumption	is	challenged	when	subjective	experience	is	dissociated	from	
the	 explicit	 awareness	 of	 that	 experience.	 Such	 dissociations	
demonstrate	 the	 importance	 of	 distinguishing	 between	 consciousness	
and	‘meta-consciousness.’	(2002:	339.)	
The	 conscious	 knowledge	of	 the	 experience—which	 comes	 in	 addition	 to	 the	
experience	itself—is	what	Schooler	calls	a	“re-representation”:	
Periodically	 attention	 is	 directed	 towards	 explicitly	 assessing	 the	
contents	 of	 experience.	 The	 resulting	 meta-consciousness	 involves	 an	
explicit	 re-representation	 of	 consciousness	 in	 which	 one	 interprets,	
describes,	or	otherwise	characterizes	the	state	of	one’s	mind.	(2002:	339-
340,	emphasis	added.)	
Although	 re-representation	 is	 necessary	 for	 introspection,	 it	 is	 largely	 absent,	
for	 instance,	 in	 dreams	 (Windt	 and	 Metzinger	 2007).	 This	 demonstrates	
compellingly	that	mental	activity	does	not	need	to	be	re-represented	in	order	to	
be	 experienced—after	 all,	 who	 can	 seriously	 doubt	 that	 dreams	 are	
experienced?—but	only	to	be	introspectively	accessed.	During	ordinary	dreams	
we	simply	experience,	without	consciously	knowing	that	we	experience.	
More	 formally,	 suppose	 that	 one	 has	 an	 experience	X.	 To	 gain	 introspective	
access	 to	 X	 one	 must	 have	 conscious	 knowledge	 N	 of	 X.	 But	 N—the	 “re-
representation”—is	a	separate	experience	in	its	own	right.	One	experiences	the	
knowing	of	X	as	a	quality	closely	related	to,	but	distinct	from,	X	 itself.	N	is	not	
encompassed,	 entailed	 or	 implied	 by	X.	 Indeed,	 Schooler	 highlights	 the	 fact	
that	re-representations	can	even	misrepresent	the	original	experiences:	
Once	 meta-consciousness	 is	 triggered,	 translation	 dissociations	 can	
occur	 if	 the	 re-representation	 process	 misrepresents	 the	 original	
experience.	Such	dissociations	are	particularly	 likely	when	one	verbally	
reflects	 on	 non-verbal	 experiences	 or	 attempts	 to	 take	 stock	 of	
ambiguous	 or	 subtle	 perceptual	 experiences.	 (2002:	 340,	 emphasis	
added.)	
To	make	these	abstract	considerations	more	concrete,	consider	your	breathing	
right	now:	the	sensation	of	air	flowing	through	your	nostrils,	the	movements	of	
your	 diaphragm,	 the	 inflation	 and	deflation	 of	 your	 lungs,	 etc.	Were	 you	not	
experiencing	 these	sensations	a	moment	ago,	before	 I	directed	your	attention	
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to	them?3	Or	were	you	just	unaware	that	you	were	experiencing	them	all	along?	
By	directing	your	attention	to	these	sensations,	did	I	make	them	conscious	or	
did	 I	 simply	 cause	 you	 to	 experience	 the	 extra	 quality	 of	 knowing	 that	 the	
sensations	were	conscious?	Clearly,	even	waking	experiences	can	occur	without	
re-representation.	
Re-representations	 are	 the	 product	 of	 a	 self-reflective	 configuration	 of	
consciousness,	whereby	 the	 latter	 turns	 in	 upon	 itself	 so	 to	 objectify	 its	 own	
contents	(Kastrup	2014:	104-110).	In	humans,	this	usually	occurs	through	the	use	
of	“semiotic	mediation”	(Valsiner	1998),	which	is	our	ability	to	re-represent	our	
experiences	by	naming	them	explicitly	or	implicitly.	Gillespie	gives	an	example:	
“In	order	to	obtain	dinner	one	must	first	name	…	one’s	hunger	…	This	naming,	
which	is	a	moment	of	self-reflection,	is	the	first	step	in	beginning	to	construct,	
semiotically,	a	path	of	action	that	will	lead	to	dinner”	(2007:	678).	
Naturally,	nothing	prevents	experiences	from	occurring	outside	the	field	of	self-
reflection—that	 is,	 occurring	 without	 being	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly	 named.	
Nixon,	for	instance,	calls	these	“unconscious	experiences”	(2010:	216),	which	in	
my	view	is	an	oxymoron	but	illustrates	the	subtlety	of	the	point.	He	lists	several	
examples:	 blindsight	 (Stoerig	 and	 Cowey	 1997),	 prosopagnosia	 (Sacks	 1985),	
sleepwalking,	post-hypnotic	suggestion,	etc.	Indeed,	the	emergence	of	so-called	
“no-report	 paradigms”	 in	 contemporary	 neuroscience	 attests	 to	 the	 abundant	
presence	of	waking	experiences	that	are	unreportable	because	they	fall	outside	
the	field	of	self-reflection	(Tsuchiya	et	al.	2015,	Vandenbroucke	et	al.	2014).	
Moreover,	 the	 neural	 activity	 patterns	 of	 the	 NCCs	 themselves	 suggest	
circumstantially—yet	 compellingly—that	many	NCCs	 correspond	merely	 to	 a	
self-reflective	configuration	of	 consciousness.	To	 see	 this,	notice	 first	 that	 the	
conscious	knowledge	N	of	an	experience	X	is	triggered	by	the	occurrence	of	X.	
For	 instance,	 it	 is	 the	 occurrence	 of	 a	 sense	 perception	 that	 triggers	 the	
realization	that	one	is	perceiving	something.	N,	 in	turn,	evokes	X	by	directing	
attention	back	to	it:	the	realization	that	one	is	perceiving	something	naturally	
shifts	one’s	mental	focus	back	to	the	original	perception.	So	we	end	up	with	a	
back-and-forth	cycle	of	evocations	whereby	X	triggers	N,	which	in	turn	evokes	
X,	which	again	triggers	N,	and	so	forth.	See	Figure	5.1	for	an	illustration.	
	
																																								 								
3 	Notice	 that	 attention	 is	 required	 to	 explicitly	 assess	 an	 experience	 at	 a	
metacognitive—that	is,	self-reflective—level.	
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Figure	5.1:	Illustrative	caricature	of	oscillatory	evocations	between	an	
experience	(X)	and	the	meta-conscious	knowledge	of	the	experience	(N).	
	
As	it	turns	out,	recent	characterizations	of	the	NCCs	show	precisely	this	pattern	
of	 reverberating	 back-and-forth	 communications	 between	 different	 brain	
regions	 (Dehaene	 and	 Changeux	 2011,	 Boly	 et	 al.	 2011,	 van	 Gaal	 et	 al.	 2011).	
When	 damage	 to	 the	 primary	 visual	 cortex	 presumably	 interrupts	 this	
reverberation,	patients	display	blindsight	(Paller	and	Suzuki	2014:	387)—that	is,	
the	 ability	 to	 correctly	 discriminate	 moving	 objects	 despite	 the	 reported	
inability	 to	 see	 them.	 This	 is	 precisely	 what	 one	 would	 expect	 if	 the	
reverberation	 in	 question	were	 the	 oscillations	 between	X	 and	N:	 the	 objects	
are	 consciously	 perceived—therefore	 explaining	 how	 the	 patients	 can	
discriminate	 them—but	 the	 patients	 do	 not	 know	 that	 they	 consciously	
perceive	the	objects.	
I	thus	submit	that	many	NCCs	are,	 in	fact,	the	correlates	only	of	a	potentially	
very	 small	 subset	 of	 consciousness—namely,	 meta-consciousness	 or	 self-
reflection—instead	 of	 consciousness	 proper.	 The	 introspectively	 inaccessible	
character	 of	 experience	 that	 isn’t	 re-represented	 constitutes	 the	 first	
mechanism	through	which	seemingly	unconscious	mental	activity	may,	in	fact,	
be	 conscious.	There	 is	 yet	 another	mechanism,	which	will	 be	 explored	 in	 the	
next	section.	
	
5.5	 Dissociated	experiences	
Dissociative	 states	 are	 well	 recognized	 in	 psychiatry	 today,	 featuring	
prominently	 in	 the	 DSM-5	 (American	 Psychiatric	 Association	 2013).	 Their	
hallmark	 is	 “a	disruption	of	and/or	discontinuity	 in	 the	normal	 integration	of	
consciousness,	 memory,	 identity,	 emotion,	 perception,	 body	 representation,	
motor	 control,	 and	 behavior”	 (Black	 and	 Grant	 2014:	 191).	 In	 other	 words,	
dissociation	entails	fragmentation	of	the	contents	of	consciousness.	
There	are	different	forms	of	dissociation.	Klein	(2015),	for	instance,	discusses	a	
form	 in	which	 the	 subject’s	 ego	 loses	 the	 sense	 of	 ownership	 of	 some	 of	 the	
subject’s	 own	 mental	 states.	 This	 occurs	 when	 consciousness	 can	 no	 longer	
N	X	
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“relate	 to	 its	 object	 in	 a	 particular,	 self-referential	 way”	 (Klein	 2015:	 362).	He	
lists	several	examples,	such	as	the	case	of	a	man	who,	after	an	accident,	could	
accurately	 report	 the	 content	 of	 his	memories	 but	 “was	 unable	 to	 experience	
that	content	as	his	own”	(Klein	2015:	368).	Notice,	however,	that	the	man’s	ego	
could	still	access	the	content;	just	not	identify	with	it.	
In	what	follows,	I	shall	focus	on	a	strong	form	of	dissociation	in	which	the	ego	
cannot	 even	 access	 certain	 contents	 of	 consciousness.	 In	 its	 pathological	
variations,	 this	 is	 known	 as	 Dissociative	 Identity	 Disorder	 (DID).	 A	 person	
suffering	 from	DID	 exhibits	multiple,	 disjoint	 centers	 of	 consciousness	 called	
alters.	Each	alter	experiences	the	world	as	a	distinct	personality	(Braude	1995).	
Although	there	has	been	debate	about	the	authenticity	of	DID	as	a	psychiatric	
condition—after	all,	 it	 is	conceivable	that	patients	could	fake	it—research	has	
confirmed	DID’s	 legitimacy	 (Kelly	et	 al.	 2009:	 167-174	&	 348-352).	Two	 recent	
studies	are	particularly	interesting	to	highlight.	In	2015,	doctors	reported	on	the	
case	 of	 a	 German	 woman	 who	 exhibited	 a	 variety	 of	 alters	 (Strasburger	 and	
Waldvogel).	 Peculiarly,	 some	 of	 her	 alters	 claimed	 to	 be	 blind	 while	 others	
could	see	normally.	Through	EEGs,	the	doctors	were	able	to	ascertain	that	the	
brain	activity	normally	associated	with	sight	wasn’t	present	while	a	blind	alter	
was	in	control	of	the	woman’s	body,	even	though	her	eyes	were	open.	When	a	
sighted	alter	assumed	executive	control,	the	usual	brain	activity	returned.	This	
is	 a	 sobering	 result	 that	 shows	 the	 literally	blinding	 power	 of	 dissociation.	 In	
another	 study	 (Schlumpf	 et	 al.	 2014),	 investigators	 performed	 functional	
magnetic	 resonance	 imaging	 (fMRI)	 brain	 scans	 on	 both	 DID	 patients	 and	
actors	 simulating	 DID.	 The	 scans	 of	 the	 actual	 patients	 displayed	 clear	 and	
significant	 differences	 when	 compared	 to	 those	 of	 the	 actors.	 Undoubtedly,	
thus,	DID	is	real.	
Normally,	only	one	of	the	alters	has	executive	control	of	the	body	at	any	given	
moment.	The	important	question	for	the	purposes	of	the	present	paper	is	then	
this:	Can	the	other	alters,	who	are	not	in	control	of	the	body,	remain	conscious	
or	do	they	simply	fade	into	unconsciousness?	If	they	can	remain	conscious,	the	
implication	 is	 that	 a	 person	 can	 have	 multiple	 concurrent	 but	 dissociated	
centers	 of	 consciousness,	 as	 originally	 hypothesized	 by	 Frederic	 Myers	 and	
Pierre	 Janet	 (Kelly	et	 al.	 2009:	 305-317).	Presumably,	 then,	 each	center	has	 its	
own	private,	parallel	stream	of	experiences.	
Occasionally,	however,	the	dissociation	isn’t	bilateral:	a	first	alter	is	able	to	gain	
partial	 access	 to	 the	 experiences	 of	 a	 second,	without	 the	 second	 alter	 being	
able	 to	 access	 the	 experiences	 of	 the	 first.	 This	 rare	 kind	 of	 unilateral	
dissociation	 provides	 tantalizing	 indications	 that	 alters	 can	 remain	 conscious	
even	when	not	in	control	of	the	body.	In	Morton	Prince’s	well-known	study	of	
the	 ‘Miss	Beauchamp	case’	of	DID,	one	of	 the	alters—called	Sally—“was	a	co-
conscious	personality	in	a	deeper	sense.	When	she	was	not	interacting	with	the	
world,	she	did	not	become	dormant,	but	persisted	and	was	active”	(Kelly	et	al.	
2009:	318).	Sally	maintained	that	she	knew	
everything	 Miss	 Beauchamp	 …	 does	 at	 the	 time	 she	 does	 it,—knows	
what	 she	 thinks,	 hears	what	 she	 says,	 reads	what	 she	writes,	 and	 sees	
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what	she	does;	that	she	knows	all	this	as	a	separate	co-self,	and	that	her	
knowledge	does	not	come	to	her	afterwards	…	in	the	form	of	a	memory.	
(Prince,	as	quoted	in	Kelly	et	al.	2009:	318)	
Stephen	Braude’s	more	 recent	work	 reinforces	 the	view	 that	alters	can	be	co-
conscious	 “discrete	 centers	 of	 self-awareness”	 (1995:	 67).	 He	 points—as	
evidence	 for	 this	 hypothesis—at	 the	 struggle	 of	 different	 alters	 for	 executive	
control	 of	 the	 body	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 alters	 “might	 intervene	 in	 the	 lives	 of	
others	 [i.e.	 other	 alters],	 intentionally	 interfering	 with	 their	 interests	 and	
activities,	 or	 at	 least	 playing	 mischief	 on	 them”	 (Braude	 1995:	 68).	 It	 thus	
appears	 that	alters	 can	not	only	be	concurrently	 conscious,	but	 that	 they	can	
also	vie	for	dominance	with	each	other.	
Strong	 dissociation	 is	 not	 restricted	 to	 DID—its	 extreme	 form—or	 to	
pathology,	 for	 that	 matter.	 Indeed,	 the	 foundational	 hypothesis	 of	 depth	
psychology	 entails	 a	 form	 of	 natural	 dissociation	 between	 the	 conscious	 ego	
and	 the	 so-called	 ‘unconscious.’	 As	 such,	 it	 is	 plausible—in	 fact,	 there	 is	
overwhelming	clinical	evidence	 for	 it	 in	the	annals	of	depth	psychology—that	
we	 all	 have	 at	 least	 one	 dissociated	mental	 subsystem	 that	we	 cannot	 access	
through	 introspection.	 Ernest	 Hilgard	 (1977)	 conceived	 of	 these	 dissociated	
subsystems	as	conscious,	much	as	Myers,	Janet	and	Braude	did.	
Thus,	 the	 possibility	 that	 presents	 itself	 to	 us	 is	 that	we	may	 all	 have	 one	 or	
more	conscious	‘others’	within	ourselves,	dissociated	from	our	ego.	If	this	is	so,	
then	 (a)	 our	 ego	 ordinarily	 has	 no	 introspective	 access	 to	 the	 experiences	 of	
these	 ‘others’;	and,	consequently,	(b)	the	study	of	the	NCCs	is	 largely	blind	to	
the	potentially	 idiosyncratic	patterns	of	neural	 activity	 corresponding	 to	 such	
dissociated	 experiences.	 This	 is	 the	 second	 mechanism	 through	 which	
apparently	unconscious	mental	activity	may,	after	all,	be	conscious.	
	
5.6	 A	model	of	dissociation	
Wegner	 (2002)	 proposes	 an	 analogy	 for	 explaining	 alters:	 different	 operating	
systems	 running	 on	 the	 same	 hardware.	 This	 way,	 the	 transfer	 of	 executive	
control	 from	 one	 alter	 to	 another	 would	 be	 analogous	 to	 shutting	 down	
Windows	 and	 rebooting	 the	 computer	 with	 Linux.	 This,	 of	 course,	 only	
accounts	for	strictly	alternating	personalities	and	thus	fails	to	explain	much	of	
the	clinical	data	cited	above.	Nonetheless,	it	still	suggests	a	starting	point	for	a	
plausible	model	of	dissociation.	
If	we	define	an	experiential	 frame	as	the	set	of	all	qualities	we	experience	at	a	
given	moment—encompassing	our	conscious	perceptions,	thoughts,	emotions,	
bodily	sensations,	imagination,	etc.—conscious	life	can	be	modeled	as	a	chain	
of	 experiential	 frames.	 This	 is	 graphically	 illustrated	 in	 Figure	 5.2,	 wherein	
experiential	 frames	F1	 to	Fn	 are	 shown.	Each	 frame	 is	evoked	by	 the	previous	
frame	 through	 cognitive	 associations,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 e.g.	 our	 particular	
thoughts	 in	 the	 present	 moment	 largely	 determine	 which	 emotions	 we	
experience	 in	 the	next	moment;	or	 that	our	emotions	 in	 the	present	moment	
largely	 determine	 our	 actions—and	 therefore	 perceptions—in	 the	 next	
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moment;	and	so	on.	These	cognitive	associations	are	represented	by	the	arrows	
linking	frames	together	in	Figure	5.2.	
	
	
Figure	5.2:	Conscious	life	as	a	chain	of	experiential	frames	connected	through	
cognitive	associations.	
	
Wegner’s	 suggestion	 can	 then	 be	 visualized	 as	 in	 Figure	 5.3.	 The	 chain	 of	
experiential	frames—denoted	F—corresponding	to	a	first	alter	is	interrupted	by	
experiential	 frames—denoted	 F’—corresponding	 to	 a	 second	 alter.	 The	 key	
point	is	that,	once	executive	control	is	assumed	by	the	experiential	frames	F’	of	
the	second	alter,	the	corresponding	experiential	frames	F	of	the	first	alter	cease	
to	exist.	There	is	no	parallelism	of	experience:	either	the	mental	contents	of	the	
first	 alter	 are	 experienced	 or	 those	 of	 the	 second	 alter;	 never	 those	 of	 both	
concurrently.	As	 such,	 this	 is	 a	 sequential	model	 of	 dissociation	 and,	 as	we’ve	
seen,	it	isn’t	sufficient	to	explain	the	clinical	data	cited.	
	
	
Figure	5.3:	The	sequential	model	of	dissociation	in	the	context	of	DID.	
	
Alternatively,	we	can	hypothesize	that	the	chains	of	experiential	frames	of	both	
alters	are	always	present,	concurrently	and	in	parallel.	Executive	control	of	the	
body	simply	switches	between	the	two	parallel	chains,	as	shown	in	Figure	5.4.	
Experiential	 frames	 drawn	 in	 grey	 represent	 those	without	 executive	 control,	
but	still	conscious.	This	is	thus	a	parallel	model	of	dissociation,	which	illustrates	
the	 hypothesis	 of	 “co-consciousness”	 (a	 term	 originally	 coined	 by	 Morton	
Prince,	as	discussed	by	Kelly	et	al.	2009:	317).	
	
F1	 F2	 F3	 F4	 F5	 Fn	…	
F1	 F2	
F’3	 F’4	
F5	 Fn	…	
Alter	1	
Alter	2	
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Figure	5.4:	The	parallel	model	of	dissociation	in	the	context	of	DID.	
	
We	have	seen	that	DID	is	a	pathological	form	of	dissociation,	but	that	we	may	
all	naturally	have	 strongly	dissociated	mental	 subsystems	 that	never—or	very	
seldom—vie	for	executive	control	of	the	body.	These	would	constitute	the	so-
called	 ‘unconscious’	 of	 depth	 psychology.	 Figure	 5.5	 illustrates	 how	 such	
strongly	 dissociated	mental	 subsystems	 can	 be	modeled	 under	 the	 proposed	
framework.	 For	 simplicity,	 only	 the	 ego	 and	 one	 dissociated	 subsystem	 are	
shown.	 The	 ‘other’	 in	 this	 case—represented	 by	 the	 dissociated	 chain	 of	
experiential	 frames	 F’—is	 content	 to	 live	 its	 inner	 life	 in	 the	 background	 of	
egoic	activity.	It	only	manifests	its	presence	through	indirect,	subtle	influences	
on	egoic	experiences,	as	represented	by	the	dashed	arrows	vertically	linking	the	
two	chains.	These	subtle	 influences	can	take	many	forms,	such	as:	dissociated	
emotions	 influencing	our	egoic	 thoughts	and	behaviors	 (Lynch	and	Kilmartin	
2013:	 100);	 dissociated	 beliefs	 and	 expectations	 influencing	 our	 egoic	
perceptions	 (Eagleman	2011:	 20-54);	dissociated	drives	manifesting	 themselves	
symbolically	in	the	form	of	dreams	(von	Franz	and	Boa	1994,	Jung	2002,	Fonagy	
et	al.	2012);	etc.	
	
	
Figure	5.5:	The	parallel	model	of	dissociation	in	a	depth-psychological	context.	
	
Admittedly,	limitations	in	our	ability	to	gauge	consciousness	currently	prevent	
us	from	asserting	with	certainty,	on	an	empirical	basis,	that	the	parallel	model	
of	dissociation	 is	correct.	However,	by	the	same	token,	we	can	also	not	assert	
that	 it	 isn’t.	 The	 brain	 seems	 to	 have	 sufficient	 resources	 for	 this	 kind	 of	
…	
…	
Alter	1	
Alter	2	
F1	 F2	 F3	 F4	 F5	 Fn	
F’3	 F’4	 F’5	 F’n	F’1	 F’2	
…	
…	
Ego	chain	
Dissociated	chain	
F1	 F2	 F3	 F4	 F5	 Fn	
F’3	 F’4	 F’5	 F’n	F’1	 F’2	
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parallelism	and,	if	anything,	the	clinical	data	is	suggestive	of	its	validity	(again,	
Kelly	 et	 al.	 2009:	 305-322	 and	 Braude	 1995).	 The	 parallel	 model	 should,	
therefore,	be	considered	not	only	plausible	but	perhaps	even	probable,	in	which	
case	 it	 further	substantiates	the	notion	that	the	 ‘unconscious’	may	be—well—
conscious.	
	
5.7	 Discussion	
I	have	 elaborated	on	 the	hypothesis	 that	 there	may	be	no	 such	a	 thing	as	 an	
unconscious	 mental	 process.	 All	 mental	 processes	 may	 be	 conscious,	 in	 the	
sense	that	there	may	be	something	 it	 is	 like	to	have	such	mental	processes	 in	
and	of	themselves.	Our	impression	that	some	mental	processes	are	unconscious	
may	 arise	 from	 (a)	 their	 consisting	 in	 non-self-reflective	 experiences	 not	
amenable	 to	 introspection	 or	 (b)	 their	 being	 strongly	 dissociated	 from	 the	
executive	ego	and,	therefore,	inaccessible	to	it.	
Underlying	 this	 entire	 paper	 is	 the	 differentiation	 between	 consciousness	
proper	 and	 particular	 configurations	 of	 consciousness,	 such	 as	 self-reflection	
and	 dissociative	 states.	 It	 is	 rather	 disturbing	 how	 often	 these	 notions	 are	
conflated	 not	 only	 in	 general	 psychology,	 but	 also	 in	 neuroscience	 and	
philosophy	 of	mind.	 For	 instance,	 a	 relatively	 recent	 article	 (Gabrielsen	 2013)	
talks	 about	 the	 emergence	 of	 consciousness	 in	 human	 babies	 when	 what	 is	
discussed	 is—as	 per	 the	 argument	 developed	 in	 this	 paper—likely	 to	 be	 the	
emergence	of	meta-consciousness.4	
Dijksterhuis	and	Nordgren	also	“define	conscious	thought	as	object-relevant	or	
task-relevant	 cognitive	 or	 affective	 thought	 processes	 that	 occur	 while	 the	
object	 or	 task	 is	 the	 focus	 of	 one’s	 conscious	 attention”	 (2006:	 96,	 emphasis	
added).	They	insist,	“it	 is	very	important	to	realize	that	attention	 is	 the	key	to	
distinguish	 [sic]	 between	 unconscious	 thought	 and	 conscious	 thought.	
Conscious	thought	is	thought	with	attention”	(Dijksterhuis	and	Nordgren	2006,	
emphasis	added).	In	appealing	to	attention,	as	opposed	to	experience	or	qualia,	
they	 are	 implicitly	 associating	 consciousness	 with	 self-reflection	 or	 re-
representation,	as	discussed	in	Section	5.4.	
Even	more	strikingly,	Cleeremans	(2011)	explicitly	defines	consciousness	as	self-
reflection.	 He	 overtly	 conflates	 experience	 with	 meta-consciousness	 and	
reportability:	
Awareness,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 always	 seems	 to	 minimally	 entail	 the	
ability	of	knowing	that	one	knows.	This	ability,	after	all,	forms	the	basis	
for	 the	 verbal	 reports	 we	 take	 to	 be	 the	 most	 direct	 indication	 of	
awareness.	And	when	we	observe	the	absence	of	such	ability	to	report	on	
the	knowledge	involved	in	our	decisions,	we	rightfully	conclude	that	the	
decision	was	based	on	unconscious	knowledge.	Thus,	it	is	when	an	agent	
																																								 								
4	For	 clarity,	 by	 “emergence	 of	 meta-consciousness”	 I	 mean	 here	 the	 early,	 or	 even	
precursor,	stages	of	meta-consciousness.	
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exhibits	knowledge	of	the	fact	that	he	is	sensitive	to	some	state	of	affairs	
that	 we	 take	 this	 agent	 to	 be	 a	 conscious	 agent.	 This	 second-order	
knowledge,	 I	 argue,	 critically	 depends	 on	 learned	 systems	 of	 meta	
representations,	 and	 forms	 the	 basis	 for	 conscious	 experience.	
(Cleeremans	2011:	3)	
This	isn’t	a	recent	problem.	When	one	reads	the	original	texts	of	the	founders	
of	depth	psychology	whilst	holding	the	distinction	between	consciousness	and	
meta-consciousness	 in	 mind,	 one	 quickly	 realizes	 that,	 when	 they	 spoke	 of	
unconsciousness,	the	founders	often	meant	a	lack	of	meta-consciousness—not	
of	 experience	 proper.	 This	 is	 abundantly	 evident,	 for	 instance,	 in	 an	 essay	
written	by	Carl	Jung	in	the	1920s	or	early	1930s,	called	“The	Stages	of	Life”	(Jung	
2001:	97-116).	
It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 distinction	 between	 experience	 and	 meta-
consciousness	is	merely	a	semantic	point.	However,	consider	this:	by	conflating	
consciousness	 proper	 with	 self-reflective	 consciousness,	 we	 also	 indirectly	
equate	 non-self-reflective	 consciousness	 with	 unconsciousness;	 we	 absurdly	
imply	 that	 dreams—which	 largely	 lack	 self-reflection	 (Windt	 and	 Metzinger	
2007)—aren’t	 experienced.	 Instead	 of	 the	 three	 categories	 proposed	 by	
Schooler—namely,	 “non-conscious	 (unexperienced),	 conscious	 (experienced),	
and	meta-conscious	 (re-represented)”	 (2002:	 339)—we	 are	 left	with	 only	 two:	
non-conscious	and	meta-conscious.	Consequently,	we	are	forced	to	collapse	the	
conscious	onto	the	non-conscious	and,	in	the	process,	end	up	disregarding	the	
extraordinary	phenomenon	of	qualities	of	experience.5	Clearly,	this	isn’t	merely	
semantic.	
Most	 importantly,	 the	 philosophical	 implications	 of	 mistaking	 consciousness	
for	meta-consciousness	 are	 significant.	 If	 some	 mental	 processes	 were	 truly	
unconscious	while	others	are	conscious,	 it	would	 follow	 that	consciousness	 is	
the	 product	 of	 some	 specific	 anatomical	 and/or	 functional	 arrangements	 of	
brain	activity.	In	other	words,	consciousness	would	be	derivative,	as	opposed	to	
fundamental.	 Philosophically,	 this	 would	 corroborate	 the	 ontology	 of	
physicalism	 (Stoljar	 2016)	 while	 contradicting	 alternatives	 like	 panpsychism	
(Strawson	 et	 al.	 2006),	 cosmopsychism	 (Shani	 2015)	 and	 idealism	 (Kastrup	
2017b).	 It	 would	 leave	 us	 with	 no	 way	 to	 circumvent	 the	 arguably	 insoluble	
‘hard	problem	of	consciousness’	(Chalmers	2003).	
On	 the	other	hand,	 if	 consciousness	 is	 inherent	 to	 all	mental	processes,	 then	
the	 specific	 anatomical	 and/or	 functional	 parameters	 of	 different	 processes	
correspond	 merely	 to	 different	 contents	 and/or	 configurations	 of	
consciousness—that	is,	to	the	particular	qualities	that	are	experienced—but	do	
not	determine	the	presence	or	absence	of	consciousness	itself.	This	allows	us	to	
circumvent	 the	 ‘hard	 problem	 of	 consciousness’	 altogether,	 by	 inferring	 that	
consciousness	is	primary.	While	it’s	not	my	intent	in	this	paper	to	argue	for	or	
against	 any	 particular	 ontology	 of	mind,	 it	 is	 significant	 that	 a	 lucid,	 critical	
																																								 								
5	That	 is,	 we	 end	 up	 sweeping	 the	 ‘hard	 problem	 of	 consciousness’	 (Chalmers	 2003)	
under	the	rug.	
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interpretation	 of	 the	 available	 empirical	 data	 leaves	 more	 avenues	 of	
philosophical	inquiry	open.	
If	we	are	true	to	the	spirit	of	the	words	‘consciousness’	and	‘experience,’	diligent	
in	 our	 interpretation	 of	 empirical	 observations—both	 experimental	 and	
clinical—and	 rigorous	 in	 our	 use	 of	 concepts,	 we	 are	 led	 not	 only	 to	 the	
conclusion	that	all	mental	processes	may	be	conscious,	but	that	consciousness	
itself	may	be	fundamental.	
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6.	 Self-Transcendence	Correlates	with	Brain	Function	
Impairment	
	
This	 paper	 first	 appeared	 in	 the	 Journal	 of	 Cognition	 and	 Neuroethics,	 ISSN:	
2166-5087,	Vol.	4,	No.	3,	pp.	33-42,	in	January	2017.	A	summary	of	this	paper	has	
also	appeared	in	Scientific	American	on	29	March	2017.1	
	
6.1	 Abstract	
A	 broad	 pattern	 of	 correlations	 between	 mechanisms	 of	 brain	 function	
impairment	 and	 self-transcendence	 is	 shown.	 The	 pattern	 includes	 such	
mechanisms	 as	 cerebral	 hypoxia,	 physiological	 stress,	 transcranial	 magnetic	
stimulation,	 trance-induced	 physiological	 effects,	 the	 action	 of	 psychoactive	
substances	 and	even	physical	 trauma	 to	 the	brain.	 In	 all	 these	 cases,	 subjects	
report	 self-transcending	 experiences	 often	 described	 as	 “mystical”	 and	
“awareness-expanding,”	 as	 well	 as	 self-transcending	 skills	 often	 described	 as	
“savant.”	The	idea	that	these	correlations	could	be	rather	trivially	accounted	for	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 disruptions	 to	 inhibitory	 neural	 processes	 is	 reviewed	 and	
shown	 to	 be	 implausible.	 Instead,	 this	 paper	 suggests	 that	 an	 as-of-yet	
unrecognized	causal	principle	underlying	the	entire	pattern	might	be	at	work,	
whose	 further	 elucidation	 through	 systematic	 research	 could	 hold	 great	
promise.	
	
6.2	 Introduction	
In	this	paper,	‘self-transcendence’	is	defined	as	the	abrupt—thus	not	gradual—	
broadening	of	one’s	 sense	of	 self	 through	a	step-function	enrichment	of	one’s	
subjective	inner	life.	This	can	happen,	for	instance,	when	one	suddenly	acquires	
(a)	a	feeling	that	one	is	no	longer	confined	to	the	spatio-temporal	locus	of	the	
physical	body;	 (b)	entirely	new	mental	 skills	 that	one	has	never	attempted	 to	
develop	 through	 learning	 or	 training;	 or	 (c)	 unfamiliar	 emotions,	 insights	 or	
inner	imagery.	This	essay	attempts	to	show	that	there	is	a	consistent	pattern	of	
correlations	 between	 self-transcendence—so	 defined—and	 a	 broad	 variety	 of	
brain	function	impairment	mechanisms.	In	other	words,	several	types	of	brain	
function	 impairment	are	consistently	accompanied	by	richer	 inner	 life.	This	 is	
counterintuitive	and	suggests	a	common	underlying	causal	principle	yet	to	be	
understood	in	its	full	scope.	
In	the	next	sections,	several	mechanisms	of	brain	function	impairment	and	the	
resulting	self-transcendence	effects	will	be	reviewed.	The	goal	is	to	establish	a	
broad	 pattern	 by	 highlighting	 the	 similarities	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 and	 their	
effects.	
																																								 								
1	At	the	time	of	this	writing,	the	Scientific	American	essay	was	freely	available	online	at:	
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/transcending-the-brain/.	
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6.3	 Cerebral	hypoxia	
Fainting	or	near-fainting	caused	by	restrictions	of	oxygen	supply	to	the	brain	is	
known	 to	 induce	 liberating	 feelings	 of	 self-transcendence.	 For	 instance,	 the	
potentially	fatal	‘choking	game’	played	by	teenagers	worldwide	(Macnab	2009)	
is	an	attempt	to	induce	such	feelings	through	partial	strangulation	(Neal	2008:	
310-315).	 The	 psychotherapeutic	 technique	 of	 holotropic	 breathwork	
(Rhinewine	 and	Williams	 2007),	 as	 well	 as	 more	 traditional	 yogic	 breathing	
practices,	 use	 hyperventilation	 to	 achieve	 similar	 effects:	 by	 increasing	 blood	
alkalinity	 levels,	 they	 interfere	 with	 normal	 oxygen	 uptake	 in	 the	 brain	 and	
ultimately	 lead	 to	 what	 is	 described	 as	 an	 expansion	 of	 ordinary	 awareness	
(Taylor	 1994).	 Even	 straightforward	 hyperventilation	 outside	 a	 therapeutic	
context	 can	 lead	 to	 self-transcending	 experiences,	 such	 as	 described	 in	 this	
anecdotal—though	representative—report:	
One	of	us	stood	against	a	tree	and	breathed	deeply	for	a	while	and	then	
took	 a	 very	 deep	 breath.	Another	 pushed	down	hard	 on	his	 ribcage	…	
This	rendered	the	subject	immediately	unconscious	…	When	I	tried	it,	I	
didn’t	think	it	would	work,	but	then	suddenly	I	was	in	a	meadow	which	
glowed	in	yellow	and	red,	everything	was	extremely	beautiful	and	funny.	
This	seemed	to	last	for	ages.	I	must	say	that	I	have	never	felt	such	bliss	
ever	again.	(Retz	2007)	
Finally,	 pilots	 undergoing	 G-force	 induced	 Loss	 of	 Consciousness	 (G-LOC)—
whereby	blood	is	forced	out	of	the	brain,	causing	hypoxia—report	“memorable	
dreams”	phenomenologically	similar	to	near-death	experiences	(Whinnery	and	
Whinnery	1990),	which	are	notoriously	self-transcending	in	character.	
	
6.4	 Generalized	physiological	stress	
Near-Death	Experiences	(NDEs)	are	the	prime	examples	of	self-transcendence	
associated	with	dramatically	 reduced	brain	 function	due	 to	e.g.	 cardiac	arrest	
(van	Lommel	2001).	They	 reportedly	entail	 life-transforming	phenomenality—
encompassing	 insights,	 emotions	 and	 rich	 inner	 imagery—far	 surpassing	 the	
envelop	 of	 ordinary	 experiences	 (Kelly	 et	 al.	 2009:	 367-421),	 despite	
overwhelming	 disruption	 to	 the	 brain’s	 ability	 to	 operate.	A	 recent	 and	well-
publicized	NDE,	which	occurred	while	the	patient	was	under	close	supervision	
of	medical	staff,	captures	this	self-transcendent	dimension.	In	the	patient’s	own	
words:	
I	certainly	don’t	 feel	 reduced	or	smaller	 in	any	way.	On	the	contrary,	 I	
haven’t	 ever	been	 this	huge,	 this	powerful,	or	 this	all-encompassing.	…	
[I]	felt	greater	and	more	intense	and	expansive	than	my	physical	being.	
(Moorjani	2012:	69)	
In	a	related	manner,	traditional	initiatory	rituals	in	pre-literate	cultures	sought	
to	 reveal	 the	 true	 nature	 of	 self	 and	 world	 through	 physical	 ordeals	 (Eliade	
2009).	It	 is	reasonable	to	imagine	that	these	ordeals—such	as	long	sessions	in	
sweat	lodges,	exposure	to	the	elements,	extreme	exertion	and	even	poisoning—
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physically	 compromised	 brain	 function	 through	 generalized	 physiological	
stress,	thereby	inducing	self-transcending	experiences.	
	
6.5	 Electromagnetic	impairment	
The	 use	 of	 transcranial	magnetic	 stimulation	 can	 inhibit	 activity	 in	 localized	
areas	 of	 the	 brain	 by	 impairing	 the	 associated	 electromagnetic	 fields.	 As	
reported	 in	 a	 study	 (Blanke	 et	 al.	 2002),	 when	 neural	 activity	 in	 the	 angular	
gyrus	of	a	patient	with	epilepsy	was	inhibited	in	this	way,	self-transcending	out-
of-body	experiences	were	induced.	
	
6.6	 Trance-induced	impairment	
During	 the	 practice	 of	 so-called	 ‘psychography,’	 an	 alleged	medium	 enters	 a	
trance	 state	 and	 writes	 down	 information	 allegedly	 originating	 from	 a	
transcendent	source	beyond	the	medium’s	ordinary	self.	A	neuroimaging	study	
(Peres	2012)	revealed	that	experienced	mediums	displayed	marked	reduction	of	
activity	 in	 key	 brain	 regions—such	 as	 the	 frontal	 lobes	 and	 hippocampus—
when	compared	to	regular,	non-trance	writing.	Despite	this,	text	written	under	
trance	 scored	 consistently	 higher	 in	 a	 measure	 of	 complexity	 than	 material	
produced	without	 trance.	 As	 an	 observant	 science	 journalist	 remarked,	more	
complex	writing	
typically	would	require	more	activity	in	the	frontal	and	temporal	lobes—
but	 that’s	 precisely	 the	 opposite	 of	 what	 was	 observed.	 To	 put	 this	
another	 way,	 the	 low	 level	 of	 activity	 in	 the	 experienced	 mediums’	
frontal	 lobes	 should	 have	 resulted	 in	 vague,	 unfocused,	 obtuse	 garble.	
Instead,	it	resulted	in	more	complex	writing	samples	than	they	were	able	
to	produce	while	not	entranced.	Why?	No	one’s	sure.	(DiSalvo	2012)	
	
6.7	 Chemical	impairment	
Psychedelic	substances	have	been	known	to	induce	powerful	self-transcending	
experiences	(Strassman	2001,	Griffiths	et	al.	2006,	Strassman	et	al.	2008).	It	had	
been	 assumed	 that	 they	 did	 so	 by	 exciting	 parts	 of	 the	 brain.	 Yet,	 recent	
neuroimaging	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 psychedelics	 do	 largely	 the	 opposite	
(Carhart-Harris	 et	 al.	 2012,	 Palhano-Fontes	 et	 al.	 2015,	 Carhart-Harris	 et	 al.	
2016). 2 	In	 an	 article	 he	 wrote	 for	 Scientific	 American	 Mind,	 neuroscientist	
Christof	 Koch	 (2012b)	 expressed	 his	 surprise	 at	 these	 results.	 Carhart-Harris	
(2012:	2138),	for	instance,	reported	“only	decreases	in	cerebral	blood	flow”	under	
the	influence	of	a	psychedelic.	Perhaps	even	more	significantly,	“the	magnitude	
																																								 								
2	A	 later	 study	 performed	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Zürich	 has	 confirmed	 this	 further,	
showing	that	a	psychedelic	causes	“significantly	reduced	absolute	perfusion”	(that	is,	
blood	 flow)	 in	 just	 about	 every	 region	 of	 the	 brain,	 whilst	 leading	 to	 “profound	
subjective	drug	effects”	(Lewis	et	al.	2017).	
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of	 this	 decrease	 [in	 brain	 activity]	 predicted	 the	 intensity	 of	 the	 subjective	
effects”	 of	 the	 psychedelic	 (ibid.).	 As	 such,	 the	 significant	 self-transcending	
experiences	 that	 follow	 psychedelic	 intake	 are—counterintuitively—
accompanied	by	reductions	of	brain	activity.	
	
6.8	 Physical	damage	
If	the	trend	above	is	consistent,	we	should	expect	some	types	of	physical	brain	
damage	 to	also	correlate	with	 self-transcending	experiences.	And	 indeed,	 this	
has	been	 reported.	 In	a	 recent	 study	 (Cristofori	 2016),	CT	scans	of	more	 than	
one	 hundred	 Vietnam	War	 veterans	 showed	 that	 damage	 to	 the	 frontal	 and	
parietal	 lobes	 increased	 the	 likelihood	 of	 self-transcending	 “mystical	
experiences.”	 In	 a	previous	 study	 (Urgesi	et	 al.	 2010),	patients	were	 evaluated	
before	 and	 after	 brain	 surgery	 for	 the	 removal	 of	 tumors,	 which	 caused	
collateral	 damage	 in	 surrounding	 tissue.	 Statistically	 significant	 increases	 in	
feelings	of	self-transcendence	were	reported	after	the	surgery.	
The	self-transcending	character	of	experiences	that	accompany	certain	types	of	
brain	injury	has	been	evocatively	described	by	neuroanatomist	Jill	Bolte	Taylor,	
following	a	stroke	that	damaged	her	brain’s	left	hemisphere:	
my	perception	of	my	physical	boundaries	was	no	longer	limited	to	where	
my	skin	met	air.	I	felt	like	a	genie	liberated	from	its	bottle.	The	energy	of	
my	spirit	seemed	to	flow	like	a	great	whale	gliding	through	a	sea	of	silent	
euphoria.	(Taylor	2009:	67)	
The	 similarity	 to	 Moorjani’s	 experience	 quoted	 earlier	 (2012:	 69)	 is	 striking,	
despite	the	latter	having	been	caused	by	generalized	physiological	stress,	not	a	
left-hemisphere	stroke.	
Not	 only	 ‘mystical	 experiences’	 correlate	 with	 brain	 damage,	 but	 also	 the	
emergence	of	new	mental	skills.	The	literature	reports	many	cases	of	so-called	
‘acquired	 savant	 syndrome,’	 wherein	 an	 accident	 or	 disease	 leading	 to	 brain	
injury	 gives	 rise	 to	 genius-level	 abilities	 (Lythgoe	 et	 al.	 2005,	 Treffert	 2006,	
Treffert	2009:	1354,	Piore	2013).	There	are	examples	of	such	abilities	arising	after	
meningitis,	 bullet	 wounds	 to	 the	 head	 and	 even	 with	 the	 progression	 of	
dementia	(Miller	et	al.	1998,	2000).	
	
6.9	 Discussion	
As	we’ve	seen,	there	is	a	broad	pattern	associating	a	variety	of	brain	impairment	
mechanisms	 with	 self-transcending	 experiences.	 A	 potential	 explanation	 for	
this	is	that	brain	function	impairment	could	disproportionally	affect	inhibitory	
neural	 processes,	 thereby	 generating	 or	 bringing	 into	 awareness	 other	 neural	
processes	 associated	 with	 self-transcending	 experiences.	 There	 are,	 however,	
problems	with	this	explanation.	
Under	 the	 physicalist	 assumption	 that	 experience	 is	 constituted	 or	 generated	
by	brain	activity,	an	increase	in	the	richness	of	experience—as	often	entailed	by	
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self-transcendence—must	 be	 accompanied	 by	 an	 increase	 in	 the	metabolism	
associated	with	the	neural	correlates	of	experience	(Kastrup	2016b).	This	 is	so	
because	(a)	there	supposedly	is	nothing	to	experience	but	its	neural	correlates;	
and	(b)	richer	experience	spans	a	broader	information	space	in	awareness	that	
only	 increased	metabolism	 can	 create	 in	 the	 physical	 substrate	 of	 the	 brain.	
Any	 other	 alternative	 would	 decouple	 experience	 from	 the	 workings	 of	 the	
living	brain	information-wise,	contradicting	physicalism.	As	such,	it	is	difficult	
to	see	why	a	reduction	of	oxygen	supply	to	the	brain	as	a	whole—as	in	partial	
strangulation,	hyperventilation,	G-LOC,	cardiac	arrest,	 etc.—would	 selectively	
affect	inhibitory	neural	processes,	while	maintaining	enough	oxygen	supply	to	
feed	an	increase	in	the	neural	correlates	of	experience.	
Alternatively,	one	could	speculate	that	self-transcending	experiences	occur	only	
after	normal	brain	 function	resumes,	 subsequent	 to	e.g.	 restoration	of	oxygen	
supply.	This,	however,	cannot	account	for	several	of	the	cases	reviewed	above.	
For	 instance,	 during	 the	 neuroimaging	 studies	 of	 the	 psychedelic	 state	 (e.g.	
Carhart-Harris	 et	 al.	 2012)	 researchers	 collected	 subjective	 reports	 of	 self-
transcendence	 while	 concurrently	 monitoring	 the	 subjects’	 reduced	 brain	
activity	 levels.	 The	 same	 holds	 for	 the	 neuroimaging	 study	 of	 psychography	
(Peres	 2012).	 Similarly,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 acquired	 savant	 (e.g.	 Treffert	 2006,	
Treffert	2009:	1354)	new	mental	skills	are	also	concomitant	with	the	presence	of	
physical	 damage	 in	 the	 brain.	 And	 even	 in	 the	 case	 of	 NDEs,	 there	 are	
arguments	 for	 why	 confabulation	 after	 resumption	 of	 normal	 brain	 function	
cannot	account	for	some	of	the	reported	experiences	(Kelly	et	al.	2009:	419-421).	
Appeals	 to	 impairment	 of	 inhibitory	 processes	 to	 explain	 acquired	 savant	
syndrome	 are	 particularly	 difficult	 to	 defend.	They	necessarily	 entail	 that	 the	
savant	 skills	 are	 pre-developed	 in	 the	 brain	 but	 remain	 inhibited.	 Brain	
function	impairment	occasioned	by	e.g.	trauma	then	supposedly	unlocks	these	
dormant	 skills	 by	 shutting	 down	 inhibitory	 processes.	 One	 must	 wonder,	
however,	how	the	brain	could	have	developed	extraordinary	skills,	such	as	e.g.	
prodigious	aptitude	for	calculations,	without	any	training.	And	if	these	skills—
many	of	which	are	advantageous	for	survival—were	latent	in	us	all,	why	would	
the	brain	have	evolved	to	keep	them	inhibited	in	the	first	place?	
It	 is	 conceivable	 that	 individual	 cases	 of	 self-transcendence	 could	 have	 their	
own	idiosyncratic	explanation,	unrelated	to	the	other	cases,	and	that	the	overall	
pattern	 suggested	 in	 this	 paper	 is	 a	 red	 herring.	 For	 instance,	 one	 could	
tentatively	explain	(a)	the	euphoric	effects	of	hypoxia	by	speculating	that	it	e.g.	
somehow	 triggers	 the	 brain’s	 reward	 system,	 while	 accounting	 for	 (b)	 the	
expansion	of	one’s	sense	of	identity	beyond	the	physical	body—as	reported	by	
Taylor	 (2009:	67)—through	e.g.	damage	 to	 the	orientation	association	area	of	
the	left	brain	hemisphere.	But	given	the	sometimes-striking	similarities	 in	the	
phenomenality	reported	across	the	cases	reviewed	and	the	fact	that	all	cases—
despite	 their	 different	 mechanisms	 of	 action—entail	 impairment	 of	 brain	
function,	 the	 question	 is	 whether	 it	 is	 plausible	 that	 no	 common	 causal	
principle	is	at	work.	
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The	 current	 data	 is	 at	 least	 suggestive	 of	 a	 single,	 yet-unrecognized	 causal	
principle	underlying	all	cases.	More	systematic	studies	of	the	subjective	effects	
of	 brain	 function	 impairment—leveraging	 e.g.	 psychedelic	 compounds	 and	
trans-cranial	magnetic	stimulation—in	specific	brain	regions	could	help	unveil	
this	 principle.	 Could	 one	 e.g.	 reliably	 trigger	 savant	 skills	 or	 mystical	
experiences	 by	 inhibiting	 neural	 activity	 in	 particular	 areas	 under	 controlled	
conditions?	What	would	the	implications	of	such	a	scenario	be?	Questions	such	
as	these	hold	not	only	great	public	interest,	but	also	high	significance	for	both	
neuroscience	and	neurophilosophy.	
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7.	 Concluding	Remarks	
	
7.1	 Matter	as	the	outer	appearance	of	inner	experience	
The	ontology	discussed	in	this	dissertation	has	at	its	foundation	an	observation	
as	simple	as	it	is	far-reaching:	matter	is	the	outer	appearance	of	inner	experience.	
This,	and	only	 this,	is	what	matter	is.	Nature	generously	teaches	us	this	lesson	
every	time	we	look	at	a	living	organism’s	brain:	the	neural	activity	we	discern	is	
part	of	what	the	organism’s	inner	life	looks	like	when	registered	from	a	second-
person	 perspective;	 that	 is,	 from	 across	 a	 dissociative	 boundary.	 The	matter	
constituting	 those	 neurons	 is	 the	 extrinsic	 appearance	 of	 feeling,	 emotion,	
thought,	 imagination,	 etc.	 And	 since	 this	 is	 what	 matter	 is,	 the	 inanimate	
universe—also	 made	 of	 matter—must	 itself	 be	 the	 extrinsic	 appearance	 of	
universal	inner	life.	After	all,	why	would	matter	be	one	thing	under	one	set	of	
circumstances—namely,	when	constituting	a	living	brain—and	then	something	
else	 under	 another	 set	 of	 circumstances—namely,	 when	 constituting	 the	
inanimate	universe	of	rocks,	clouds	and	stars?	This	indicates	that	the	inanimate	
universe	as	a	whole	must	be,	in	a	certain	sense,	akin	to	a	brain.	And	indeed,	the	
network	 topology	of	 the	universe	 at	 its	 largest	 scales	does	 resemble	 that	 of	 a	
brain	 (Krioukov	et	 al.	 2012);	 so	much	so	 that	astrophysicist	Franco	Vazza	and	
neuroscientist	Alberto	Feletti	considered	the	similarity	“truly	remarkable”	and	
“striking”:	
It	 is	 truly	a	remarkable	 fact	 that	the	cosmic	web	 is	more	similar	 to	the	
human	brain	 than	 it	 is	 to	 the	 interior	of	a	galaxy;	or	 that	 the	neuronal	
network	is	more	similar	to	the	cosmic	web	than	it	is	to	the	interior	of	a	
neuronal	 body.	Despite	 extraordinary	 differences	 in	 substrate,	 physical	
mechanisms,	and	size,	the	human	neuronal	network	and	the	cosmic	web	
of	 galaxies,	when	 considered	with	 the	 tools	 of	 information	 theory,	 are	
strikingly	similar.	(2017)	
Allow	me	to	reiterate	my	point,	in	the	hope	that	repetition	helps	reveal	its	full	
force:	 ‘matter’	 is	 merely	 the	 name	 we	 give	 to	 the	 extrinsic	 appearance	 of	
conscious	experience,	as	perceived	from	across	a	dissociative	boundary.	There	is	
nothing	more	to	it.	This	painfully	simple	insight,	repeatedly	intimated	in	nature,	
is	all	one	needs	to	come	to	a	categorical	 interpretation	of	natural	phenomena	
that	answers	all	 fundamental	questions	and	avoids	all	 fundamental	problems,	
such	 as	 the	 ‘hard	 problem	 of	 consciousness’	 and	 the	 ‘subject	 combination	
problem.’	
	
7.2	 Alternative	formulations	of	dissociation-based	idealism	
The	formulation	of	 idealism	developed	in	this	dissertation	rests	on	the	notion	
of	 dissociation—a	 localized	 blockage	 in	 the	 excitatory	 dynamics	 of	 universal	
consciousness—as	 a	 primary	 causal	 phenomenon	 inherent	 to	 the	 possible	
behaviors	of	nature’s	sole	ontological	primitive.	In	other	words,	dissociation	is	
thought	to	explain	life	and	the	world,	as	opposed	to	being	explained	by	them.	
529173-L-bw-Kastrup
Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 94
	 Analytic	Idealism	 	
	
	94	
But	the	formulation	presented	Chapter	3	is,	in	principle,	not	the	only	one	that	
could	be	woven	around	this	ground-level	notion	of	dissociation.	One	could,	for	
instance,	conceive	of	an	alternative	formulation	based	on	the	observation	that	
regular	dream	images	are	directly	generated	by	our	dreaming	psyche—through	
self-excitation—already	 in	 the	 very	 form	 that	 they	 are	 experienced.	 In	 other	
words,	dream	images	aren’t	coded	phenomenal	representations	of	some	other	
phenomenal	 dynamics;	 they	 aren’t	 extrinsic	 appearances	 of	 qualitatively	
different	 intrinsic	views.	 Instead,	 they	are	a	 self-contained	movie	directly	and	
autonomously	 generated	 by	 our	 dreaming	 psyche.	 So	 an	 alternative	
formulation	 of	 idealism	 could	 be	 this:	 instead	 of	 thinking	 of	 the	 inanimate	
universe	 as	 the	 extrinsic	 appearance	 of	 the	 states	 of	 a	 transpersonal	
phenomenal	 field,	 the	 corresponding	 images	 could	 be	 generated	 at	 a	 level	 of	
universal	consciousness	prior	to,	or	underlying,	dissociation	already	in	the	form	
we	experience	them.	
To	visualize	this,	imagine	that	alters	of	universal	consciousness—that	is,	living	
organisms	 such	 as	 you	 and	 me—are	 analogous	 to	 the	 seemingly	 separate	
branches	 of	 a	 shrub,	which	 ultimately	 come	 together	 at	 the	 hidden	 rhizome.	
This	 way,	 dissociation	 is	 the	 process	 that	 creates	 branches	 by	 seemingly	
separating	 segments	 of	 the	 shrub.	 But	 this	 process	 operates	 somewhat	
superficially,	 in	 that	 it	doesn’t	affect	 the	unitary	 rhizome.	 In	 this	analogy,	 the	
inanimate	universe	we	all	seem	to	co-inhabit	is	a	collective	dream	generated	by	
the	 rhizome	 and	 then	 broadcast—after	 some	 perspectival	 filtering	 and	
adaptation—to	all	branches	already	in	the	form	it	 is	experienced.	The	Jungian	
notion	of	a	‘collective	unconscious’	(Jung	1991)	capable	of	producing	archetypal	
dreams	fits	nicely	with	the	hypothesis	I	am	trying	to	describe	here:	according	to	
it,	the	world	is	the	waking	dream	generated	by	the	‘collective	unconscious’	and	
then	broadcast	to	each	of	our	individual	psyches.	
This	isn’t	as	far-fetched	as	it	may	sound	at	first.	Indeed,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	
5,	 there	 is	 an	 empirically	 known	 form	 of	 dissociation	 according	 to	 which	
subjects	 lose	 the	 sense	 of	 ownership	 of	 their	 own	 phenomenal	 states	 (Klein	
2015).	In	this	context,	it	is	not	unreasonable	to	imagine	that	empirical	reality	is	
a	 collective	 stream	 of	 imagination	 that	 we	 lose	 our	 sense	 of	 ownership	 of,	
thereby	 mistakenly	 concluding	 that	 it	 corresponds	 to	 a	 world	 outside	 and	
independent	of	consciousness.	
Nonetheless,	 such	 a	 seemingly	 elegant	 formulation	 of	 idealism	 fails	 because,	
whereas	it	can	parsimoniously	explain	the	inanimate	universe,	it	cannot	explain	
the	presence	of	other	conscious	organisms	 in	 it.	If	the	collective	dream	we	call	
‘the	world’	were	broadcast	from	the	rhizome	to	the	individual	branches,	why	or	
how	 would	 one	 branch	 experience	 the	 presence	 of	 other	 branches—that	 is,	
other	 people	 and	 living	 organisms—in	 its	 dream?	After	 all,	 two	 TV	 receivers	
tuned	to	the	same	channel	can	display	the	same	movie,	but	not	images	of	each	
other	within	that	movie.	
For	 the	 same	 reason	 that	 this	 alternative	 formulation	 of	 idealism	 does	 away	
with	a	transpersonal	phenomenal	 field	surrounding	the	alters,	 it	must	also	do	
away	with	 the	 conscious	 inner	 life	 of	 other	 living	 organisms.	 This	 effectively	
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reduces	it	to	solipsism	and	renders	redundant	the	very	need	to	explain	a	shared	
world	to	begin	with.	
The	 key	 difference	 between	 this	 alternative	 formulation	 and	 the	 analytic	
idealism	elaborated	in	Chapter	3	is	this:	the	former	entails	that	the	images	on	
our	personal	screen	of	perception	are	themselves	irreducible.	The	latter,	on	the	
other	hand,	posits	that	personal	perceptions	are	grounded	in	the	phenomenal	
states	 of	 a	 transpersonal	 field,	 which	 in	 turn	 are	 qualitatively	 different	 from	
personal	perceptions.	
Bishop	Berkeley’s	formulation	of	idealism	is	similar	to	the	alternative	discussed	
here,	 insofar	 as	 it	 also	 entails	 that	 personal	 perceptions	 are	 irreducible.	 As	
explained	by	Barfield,	“Berkeley	held	that	…	the	representations	as	such	[that	is,	
personal	perceptions],	 are	 sustained	by	God	 in	 the	absence	of	human	beings”	
(2011:	 36,	 original	 emphasis).	 Even	 some	 present-day	 academic	 philosophers	
continue	 to	 entertain	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 contents	 or	 qualities	 of	 personal	
perception	 are	 themselves	 irreducible:	 “In	 perception,	 our	 finite	 unities	 of	
consciousness	come	to	literally	overlap	with	the	unity	of	consciousness	that	is	
reality”	(Yetter-Chappell	2018).	So	the	phenomenal	states	one	experiences	when	
one	sees	the	world	are	supposedly	the	same	phenomenal	states	encompassed	by	
“the	unit	of	consciousness	that	 is	reality,”	with	which	one	overlaps	during	the	
act	of	perceiving.	
I	 believe	 that	 all	 formulations	 of	 idealism	 entailing	 such	 irreducibility	 of	
personal	 perceptions	 fail,	 either	 because	 of	 the	 difficulties	 discussed	 in	 the	
previous	section	or	at	least	because	of	the	consequences	of	trying	to	circumvent	
these	difficulties.	
	
7.3	 There	are	noumena,	but	they	are	experiential	
By	maintaining	that	personal	perceptions	are	partially	grounded	in	something	
outside	 the	personal	 self—that	 is,	outside	alters	of	universal	consciousness—I	
am	 positing	 something	 at	 least	 analogous	 to	 what	 Barfield	 called	 the	
“unrepresented”	(2011)	and	Kant	the	“noumenal.”	Indeed,	I	am	maintaining	that	
there	 is	 a	 shared	 reality	 beyond	 the	 alters—namely,	 the	 experiential	 states	
beyond	 our	 respective	 dissociative	 boundaries—underlying	 our	 personal	
perceptions	of	the	world.	This	shared	reality	would	still	exist	even	if	we	and	all	
other	 living	beings	ceased	 to	be.	So	 the	noumenal	does	exist,	my	point	being	
simply	 that	 its	 essential	nature	 is	 experiential;	 the	noumenal	 itself	 consists	of	
experiences,	 even	 though	 these	 experiences	 are	 qualitatively	 different	 from	
personal	perceptions.	In	summary,	according	to	the	ontology	defended	in	this	
dissertation,	there	are	noumena	but	they	are	experiential.	1	
																																								 								
1 	Here	 I	 am	 deliberately	 avoiding	 the	 word	 ‘phenomenal’—using	 the	 qualifier	
‘experiential’	 instead—to	 avoid	 confusion:	 Kant	 uses	 the	 term	 ‘phenomenal’	
exclusively	in	connection	with	intentional	content,	whereas	I	use	it,	throughout	this	
dissertation,	 in	 its	 modern	 analytic	 sense.	 According	 to	 Ned	 Block,	 for	 instance,	
“Phenomenal	 consciousness	 is	 experience;	 the	 phenomenally	 conscious	 aspect	 of	 a	
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Indeed,	Kant	and	Barfield	expressly	did	not	specify	the	ontological	character	of	
the	 noumenal	 and	 the	 unrepresented,	 respectively,	 so	 neither	 is	 necessarily	
dichotomous	 with	 the	 experiential.	 The	 experiential	 states	 that	make	 up	 the	
noumena	 are	 not	 perceptual	 states	 of	 alters,	 but	 constitute	 a	 transpersonal	
qualitative	field	surrounding	the	alters.	
	
7.4	 The	conundrum	of	spacetime	
Space	and	time	are	built	into	language:	any	statement	about	what	nature	is	or	
how	it	works	presupposes	a	spacetime	scaffolding.	Without	extension	in	at	least	
one	 dimension,	 the	 various	 states	 of	 nature	 would	 overlap	 and	 become	
indistinguishable	 from	one	another.	 Information	about	nature—as	defined	by	
Shannon	(1948)—would	 thus	vanish	and	 there	would	 remain	 literally	nothing	
to	be	said	about	it.	
My	earlier	analogy	between	experiences	and	vibrations	of	consciousness	seems	
to	also	presuppose	a	spacetime	scaffolding	circumscribing	consciousness.	After	
all,	 vibrations	 entail	 some	 form	 of	 movement	 in	 space	 and	 time	 (think	 of	 a	
guitar	string	playing	a	musical	note:	it	moves	up	and	down	as	time	passes).	So	it	
could	 be	 argued	 that	 analytic	 idealism,	 in	 addition	 to	 consciousness	 itself,	
assumes	 a	 spacetime	 scaffolding	 as	 extra	 ontological	 primitive,	 wherein	
consciousness	can	then	‘move’	so	to	have	or	produce	particular	experiences.	But	
this	would	contradict	my	core	claim	that	universal	phenomenal	consciousness	
is	the	sole	ontological	primitive.	
For	 this	 core	 claim	 to	obtain,	 both	 space	 and	 time	must,	 instead,	 be	nothing	
more	than	qualities	of	experience.	Time	must	exist	only	insofar	as	what	we	call	
‘past’	 is	 an	 experiential	 quality	 characteristic	 of	 memory	 and	 ‘future’	 an	
experiential	 quality	 characteristic	 of	 imagined	 possibilities	 or	 expectations.	
Space,	 in	 turn,	 must	 exist	 only	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 the	 experiential	 quality	 of	 a	
certain	 relationship	 between	 perceived	 objects.	 This	 way,	 spacetime	must	 be	
only	an	amalgamation	of	qualities—amenable	to	mathematical	modeling—that	
themselves	 exist	 only	 in	 universal	 consciousness.	 This	 is	 only	 plausible	 if	 (a)	
physics	remains	viable	without	a	fundamental	spacetime	scaffolding	and	(b)	the	
felt	sense	of	temporal	flow	associated	with	experience	is	an	illusion.	
Starting	 with	 (a),	 Einstein’s	 relativity	 theory	 arguably	 implies	 a	 static	 ‘block	
universe’	wherein	the	passage	of	time	is	illusory.	This	realization	has	motivated	
attempts	by	physicists	to	recast	the	laws	of	physics	without	time	(Barbour	1999,	
Rovelli	 2018)	 or	 space	 (Smolin	 2013).	 Now,	modern	 quantum	 gravity	 theories	
posit	 that	 both	 space	 and	 time—spacetime—are	 emergent	 from	 more	
fundamental	 quantum	 processes	 (Crowther	 2014).	 Clearly,	 thus,	 physics	
remains	 viable	 without	 the	 postulate	 that	 the	 spacetime	 scaffolding	 is	
fundamental;	it	may	even	require	that	it	not	be	so.	
																																								 																																								 																																								 															
state	 is	what	 it	 is	 like	 to	 be	 in	that	state”	(1995:	227,	emphasis	added).	According	to	
this	 modern	 definition—and	 unlike	 Kant’s	 usage—even	 purely	 endogenous	
experiences,	with	no	intentional	content,	are	phenomenal	states.	
529173-L-bw-Kastrup
Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 97
Doctoral	Dissertation	 Radboud	University	Nijmegen	 dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup	
	
	 97	
However,	this	may	seem	to	pose	a	problem	for	analytic	idealism,	as	argued	by	
philosopher	Susan	Schneider:	
Suppose	 that	 our	 ordinary	 sense	 of	 duration	 is	 just	 an	 illusion,	 and	
reality	 is	 timeless.	 If	 this	 is	 the	 case,	 the	 point	 shouldn’t	 be	 that	 the	
fundamental	layer	of	reality	is	experiential.	The	point	should	be,	instead,	
that	fundamental	reality	is	nonexperiential.2	
The	conclusion	is	derived	from	Schneider’s	intuition	that,	
if	 there	 is	 no	 time	 …	 how	 could	 there	 be	 experience?	 Conscious	
experience	 has	 a	 felt	 quality	 that	 involves	 flow;	 thoughts	 seem	 to	 be	
present	 in	 the	 “now,”	 and	 they	 change	 from	 moment	 to	 moment.	
Timeless	experience	is	an	oxymoron.3	
So	 if	 time	 is	 not	 fundamental,	 then	 neither	 can	 experience	 be—or	 so	 her	
argument	goes.	
To	 secure	 the	 plausibility	 of	 analytic	 idealism	 I	 must,	 therefore,	 show	 that	
Schneider’s	 intuition	 here	 is	 flawed.	 Indeed,	 whereas	 demonstrating	 that	
spacetime	 is	 an	 illusion	 would	 likely	 require	 multiple	 doctoral	 dissertations	
across	 a	 variety	 of	 fields,	 I	 believe	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 show—rather	 easily—that,	
insofar	as	Schneider	is	appealing	to	phenomenal	introspection,	her	assertion	that	
“timeless	experience	is	an	oxymoron”	is	false.4	
To	see	it,	consider	these	questions:	Where's	the	past?	Is	it	anywhere	‘out	there’?	
Can	you	point	at	it?	Clearly	not.	What	makes	you	conceive	of	the	idea	of	a	past	
is	 the	 fact	 that	you	have	episodic	memories.	But	 these	memories	 can	only	be	
referenced	insofar	as	they	are	experienced	now,	as	memories.	There	has	never	
been	a	point	in	your	entire	life	in	which	the	past	has	been	anything	more	than	
memories	experienced	now.	
The	same	applies	to	the	future:	Where's	the	future?	Is	it	anywhere	‘out	there’?	
Can	 you	 point	 at	 it	 and	 say	 “there	 is	 the	 future”?	 Clearly	 not.	 Our	 idea	 of	 a	
future	arises	 from	expectations	and	 imaginings	experienced	now,	 always	now,	
as	 expectations	 and	 imaginings.	 There	 has	 never	 been	 a	 point	 in	 your	 life	 in	
which	 the	 future	 has	 been	 anything	more	 than	 expectations	 and	 imaginings	
experienced	now.	
Therefore,	 as	 far	 as	 careful	 phenomenal	 introspection	 can	 reveal,	 experience	
lacks	any	true	temporal	flow.	It	only	ever	happens	now.	Timelessness	seems	to	
be	precisely	an	intrinsic	property	of	experience.	Time,	on	the	other	hand,	seems	
																																								 								
2 See	 Schneider’s	 essay	 on	 Scientific	 American’s	 Observations	 blog	 at:	
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/spacetime-emergence-
panpsychism-and-the-nature-of-consciousness/.	
3	ibid.	
4	I	have	published	a	slightly	more	elaborate	version	of	the	argument	that	follows	also	
on	 Scientific	 American’s	 Observations	 blog,	 which	 is	 available	 at:	
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/do-we-actually-experience-the-
flow-of-time/.	
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to	be	merely	a	particular	phenomenal	state	experienced	timelessly;	a	cognitive	
construct	or	story	we	tell	ourselves	now,	always	now.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	there	
is	 compelling	 empirical	 evidence	 supporting	 the	notion	 that	 time	 is	 indeed	 a	
cognitive	construct	(e.g.	Buonomano	2018,	Eagleman	2009).	
To	avoid	confusion,	allow	me	to	explicitly	relate	these	ideas	to	the	ontological	
theses	of	presentism	(the	notion	that	only	present	things	exists,	not	the	past	or	
the	future)	and	eternalism	(the	notion	that	past,	present	and	future	things	all	
exist):	with	presentism,	my	claim	 is	 that	only	 the	now	 can	be	known	to	exist;	
there	 is	 nothing	 other	 than	 the	now	 insofar	 as	we	 can	 introspectively	 access;	
past	and	future,	as	ontological	 entities	 outside	 the	now,	are	merely	theoretical	
abstractions.	 However,	 with	 eternalism,	 I	 also	 claim	 that	 the	 experiential	
contents	 we	 label	 as	 ‘past’	 and	 ‘future’—and	 which	 motivate	 the	 theoretical	
abstractions	of	a	past	and	a	future	ontologically	distinct	from	the	now—are	as	
real	 as	 what	 we	 call	 the	 ‘present,’	 in	 that	all	 three	 exist	 solely	 as	 phenomenal	
states	 experienced	 in	 the	now.	In	this	latter	sense,	past,	present	and	future	are	
ontologically	 equivalent.	 Indeed,	 the	 partitioning	 of	 the	 salient	 conceptual	
space	between	presentism	and	eternalism	 is	not	 the	most	appropriate	 for	 the	
ideas	 I	 am	 attempting	 to	 convey	 here,	 and	 hence	 should	 be	 regarded	 with	
caution.	
To	 sum	 it	up,	 it	 seems	 to	be	 the	 case	 that	 (a)	physics	 remains	 entirely	 viable	
without	a	fundamental	spacetime	scaffolding	and	(b)	the	felt	sense	of	temporal	
flow	 associated	with	 experience	 is—at	 least	 insofar	 as	we	 can	 assess	 through	
careful	 introspection—an	 illusion,	 a	 story	 we	 tell	 ourselves	 timelessly.	 The	
plausibility	 of	 analytic	 idealism	 is	 thus	 preserved:	 there	 is	 currently	 no	
refutation	of	the	notion	that	spacetime	is	merely	an	amalgamation	of	qualities	
of	 experience.	 On	 the	 contrary:	 there	 are	 tantalizing	 signs	 that	 spacetime	
emerges	as	a	cognitive	construct	within	consciousness.	
But	in	this	case,	I	must	somehow	reconcile	the	hypothesis	that	spacetime	isn’t	
fundamental	 with	 the	 earlier	 analogy	 between	 experiences	 and	 vibrations	 of	
consciousness.	This	is	what	I	now	set	out	to	do.	
To	begin	with,	the	analogy	must	be	regarded	solely	as	such:	as	an	analogy.	This	
way,	experiences	are	like	vibrations	of	consciousness.	The	intent	of	the	analogy	
is	to	help	one	visualize	how	various	experiences	can	be	distinct	from	each	other	
without	requiring	that	there	be	anything	to	them	but	consciousness	itself.	As	a	
matter	 of	 fact,	 I	 defined	 experiences	 as	 excitations—as	 opposed	 to	 outright	
vibrations—of	 consciousness	 in	 the	 hope	 that	 the	 term	 ‘excitation’	 wouldn’t	
commit	me	as	much	to	dimensional	extension.	
The	problem	is	that,	if	one	wants	to	talk	about	the	nature	of	reality,	one	must	
presuppose	 a	 metaphorical	 spacetime	 scaffolding.	 This	 is	 an	 unavoidable	
concession	 to	 the	 limitations	 of	 language.	5	Nonetheless,	 acknowledging	 that	
																																								 								
5 	It	 could	 be	 argued	 here	 that	 Kant	 wrote	 about	 the	 noumena,	 the	 things-in-
themselves,	without	using	spatiotemporal	 terms.	Notice,	however,	 that	Kant	merely	
postulated	the	existence	of	the	noumena—merely	pointed	 to	 them—whilst	insisting,	
at	 the	 same	 time,	 that	 they	 are	 fundamentally	 unknowable	 and	 cannot	 be	
529173-L-bw-Kastrup
Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 99
Doctoral	Dissertation	 Radboud	University	Nijmegen	 dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup	
	
	 99	
this	dimensional	scaffolding	is	simply	a	kind	of	illusion	inherently	imposed	by	
the	 structure	 of	 our	 cognition	 doesn’t	 change	 the	 practical	 problem	 at	 hand:	
whatever	 reality	precedes	 spacetime	ontologically	 is	unreachable	by	 linguistic	
reasoning.	 At	 best,	 one	 can	 articulate	 projections	 of	 this	 otherwise	 ineffable	
reality	onto	the	cognitive	scaffolding	of	spacetime.	
Here	is	an	analogy	to	illustrate	what	I	mean:	one	cannot	read	a	letter	written	in	
a	piece	of	paper	 that	has	been	 folded	multiple	 times	over	 into	a	small,	nearly	
dimensionless	 crumple.	 The	 characters	 overlap	 and	 the	 information	 they	
contain	becomes	 indiscernible.	Only	by	unfolding	the	crumple—i.e.	extending	
the	piece	of	paper—can	one	make	sense	of	the	message	it	bears.	Reality	prior	to	
spacetime	 is,	 in	a	 sense,	 like	 the	paper	crumple:	one	needs	 to	unfold	 it	 along	
the	 dimensions	 of	 space	 and	 time	 to	 render	 it	 amenable	 to	 linguistic	
articulation.	
Does	this	mean	that	spacetime-bound	language	can	never	articulate	valid	and	
meaningful	conclusions?	No.	All	 it	means	is	that	the	conceptual	systems	built	
within	 the	 framework	 of	 spacetime	 cannot	 be	 ultimately	 true.	 After	 all,	 ex	
hypothesi,	 spacetime	 is	 merely	 a	 cognitive	 construction.	 However,	 those	
conceptual	 systems	 can	 still	 be	penultimately	 true	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 can	
accurately	correspond	to	something	ontologically	prior	to	dimensionality.	Valid	
spacetime-bound	 conclusions	 can	 thus	 be	 regarded	 as	 projected	 images	 of	
ultimate	 truths,	 adapted	 to	 the	 requirements	 and	 limitations	 of	 human	
reasoning	by	dimensional	extension.	
This	 way,	 to	 say	 that	 experiences	 are	 vibrations	 of	 universal	 phenomenal	
consciousness	admittedly	cannot	be	ultimately	true,	for	consciousness—as	sole	
ontological	primitive—does	not	occupy	a	spacetime	scaffolding	prior	 to	 itself.	
But	 it	 can	 still	be	 true	 in	 the	penultimate	 sense	 that	vibrations	correspond	 to	
something	 true—though	 ineffable—about	 consciousness	 prior	 to	dimensional	
extension;	 that	 vibrations	 are	 akin	 to	 an	 accurate	 projected	 image	 of	 what	
ultimately	happens	in	consciousness	when	it	experiences.	
That	one	cannot	directly	say	something	coherent	about	an	ultimate	truth	does	
not	 invalidate	 penultimate	 conceptual	 constructs.	 They	 can	 still	 tell	 one	
something	indirectly	true	about	what	reality	is	and	how	works.	
	
																																								 																																								 																																								 															
characterized.	He	also	did	not	 approach	 the	problem	of	 explaining	how	perception	
arises	from	the	noumena.	If	Kant	had	made	any	attempt	to	say	something	about	the	
noumena,	he	would	have	immediately	faced	the	linguistic	limitations	indicated	here,	
and	 would	 have	 had	 to	 adopt	 spatiotemporal	 terms.	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 in	 an	
incoherent	move	already	criticized	by	Arthur	Schopenhauer	in	The	World	as	Will	and	
Representation	 (1818),	Kant	talks	of	the	noumena	as	causes	of	perception.	Causality,	
of	 course,	 presupposes	 spacetime	 extension,	 so	 here	 we	 have	 Kant	 implicitly	
characterizing	the	noumena	in	spatiotemporal	terms,	even	though	they	are	supposed	
to	exist	outside	spacetime.	
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7.5	 Visualizing	the	ontological	primitive	
As	 a	matter	 of	 fact,	 space	 itself	 can	 be	 coherently	 regarded	 as	 the	 quality	 of	
human	 experience	 that	 corresponds	 most	 closely	 to	 universal	 phenomenal	
consciousness,	 different	 segments	 of	 the	 latter	 corresponding	 to	 different	
regions	of	space.	Indeed,	that	two	living	organisms—the	extrinsic	appearances	
of	 alters—never	 occupy	 the	 same	 volume	 of	 space	 reflects	 the	 notion	 that	
different	alters	are	located	in	different	segments	of	universal	consciousness,	as	
discussed	in	Chapter	3.	
Moreover,	that	we	think	of	empty	space	as	a	void,	a	nothing,	reflects	the	notion	
that	 unexcited	 universal	 consciousness	 cannot,	 by	 definition,	 be	 experienced.	
Even	 the	 idea	 that	unexcited	universal	 consciousness	must	 still	have	 intrinsic	
properties—otherwise	there	would	be	nothing	to	eventually	get	excited—finds	
a	correspondence	in	how	we	think	of	space	at	least	since	the	early	20th	century:	
empty	space,	too,	is	believed	to	be	a	void	with	intrinsic	properties.	
The	correspondences	here	are	clear:	there	is	a	strong	sense	in	which,	as	far	as	
human	 cognition	 is	 concerned,	 empty	 space	 is	 universal	 consciousness,	 the	
contents	of	space	being	excitations	of	universal	consciousness.	Moreover,	since	
space	 is	 simply	a	 facet	of	 spacetime,	 I	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	 closer	 to	 the	 truth	 to	
think	of	spacetime	as	universal	consciousness	than	as	a	scaffolding	occupied	by	
universal	consciousness.	
If	 one	 is	 to	make	 and	 talk	 about	philosophy,	 it	 is	unavoidable	 to	 frame	one’s	
thoughts	and	discourse	 in	 terms	of	spacetime	extension.	For	 the	true	analytic	
idealist,	 this	 is	 admittedly	 a	 concession,	 for	 spacetime	 is	 not	 in	 the	 idealist’s	
reduction	base.	The	assertions	made	should	thus	not	be	regarded	as	ultimate.	
But	they	are	still	true	and	meaningful	as	far	as	they	go.	
	
7.6	 Future	work	
This	 dissertation	 is	 perhaps	 a	 first	 step	 in	 reviving	 idealism	 in	 the	 context	 of	
contemporary	 analytic	 philosophy.	 As	 such,	 it	 opens	 up	 more	 avenues	 of	
inquiry	than	it	closes.	Here,	I	shall	mention	two	important	topics	that	I	believe	
deserve	more	thorough	analysis.	
The	 first	 is	 the	 philosophical	 understanding	 of	 dissociative	 processes	 in	 the	
human	psyche	and	the	application	of	Dissociative	Identity	Disorder	(DID)	as	an	
analogy	 for	 universal-level	 dissociation.	 An	 often-repeated	 criticism	 against	
analytic	idealism	is,	for	instance,	that	although	alters	of	universal	consciousness	
can	clearly	experience	one	another	from	a	second-person	perspective—the	way	
a	person	can	see	and	even	shake	hands	with	another—the	same	allegedly	isn’t	
the	 case	 for	 the	 alters	 of	 a	DID	 patient.	 In	 other	words,	 there	 allegedly	 isn’t	
anything	 a	 first	 dissociated	 personality	 of	 a	 DID	 patient	 looks	 like	 from	 the	
perspective	of	a	second	dissociated	personality	of	the	same	patient.	
The	 most	 straightforward	 answer	 to	 this	 criticism	 is,	 of	 course,	 that	 DID	 is	
merely	an	analogy:	the	claim	is	not	that	universal	consciousness	literally	suffers	
from	DID,	but	that	something	like	DID	happens	at	a	universal	level.	There	does	
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not	 need	 to	 be	 a	 complete	 correspondence	 between	 human-level	 DID	 and	
universal-level	dissociation	for	the	argument	to	be	valid.	
Having	 said	 that,	 there	 are	 tantalizing	 indications	 that	 the	 correspondence	 is	
more	 far-reaching	 than	 hitherto	 suggested	 in	 this	 dissertation.	 For	 instance,	
research	has	shown	that	different	alters	of	a	DID	patient	can—and	do—appear	
as	 characters	 in	 the	 dreams	 of	 the	 patient	 (Barrett	 1994:	 170-171).	 So	 there	
actually	is	something	other	dissociated	personalities	look	like	from	the	point	of	
view	of	the	host	personality	having	the	dream.	
More	significantly,	 the	same	research	has	also	shown	that	different	 alters	 of	 a	
DID	 patient	 can	 experience	 the	 same	 dream	 concurrently,	 each	 from	 its	 own	
subjective	 point	 of	 view	 within	 the	 dream.	 This	 is	 so	 significant	 that	 one	
illustrative	example	deserves	extensive	quoting:	
The	host	personality,	Sarah,	remembered	only	that	her	dream	from	the	
previous	night	 involved	hearing	 a	 girl	 screaming	 for	help.	Alter	Annie,	
age	four,	remembered	a	nightmare	of	being	tied	down	naked	and	unable	
to	cry	out	as	a	man	began	to	cut	her	vagina.	Ann,	age	nine,	dreamed	of	
watching	this	scene	and	screaming	desperately	for	help	(apparently	the	
voice	 in	 the	 host's	 dream).	 Teenage	 Jo	 dreamed	 of	 coming	 upon	 this	
scene	and	clubbing	the	little	girl's	attacker	over	the	head;	in	her	dream	
he	fell	to	the	ground	dead	and	she	left.	In	the	dreams	of	Ann	and	Annie,	
the	teenager	with	the	club	appeared,	struck	the	man	to	the	ground	but	
he	arose	and	 renewed	his	 attack	again.	Four	year	old	Sally	dreamed	of	
playing	 with	 her	 dolls	 happily	 and	 nothing	 else.	 Both	 Annie	 and	 Ann	
reported	a	little	girl	playing	obliviously	in	the	corner	of	the	room	in	their	
dreams.	 Although	 there	 was	 no	 definite	 abuser-identified	 alter	
manifesting	 at	 this	 time,	 the	 presence	 at	 times	 of	 a	 hallucinated	 voice	
similar	 to	 Sarah's	 uncle	 suggested	 there	 might	 be	 yet	 another	 alter	
experiencing	the	dream	from	the	attacker's	vantage.	(ibid.:	171)	
Taking	 this	 at	 face	 value	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 argument,	what	 it	 seems	 to	 show	 is	
that,	 while	 dreaming,	 a	 dissociated	 human	 psyche	 can	 manifest	 multiple,	
concurrently	conscious	alters	that	experience	each	other	from	a	second-person	
perspective,	just	as	a	person	sees	and	shakes	hands	with	another	in	waking	life.	
The	alters’	experiences	are	also	mutually	consistent,	in	the	sense	that	the	alters	
all	seem	to	experience	the	same	series	of	events,	each	from	its	own	subjective	
perspective.	The	correspondence	with	what	is	argued	to	happen	in	the	case	of	
universal-level	dissociation	is	uncanny.	
One	may	nonetheless	 object	 to	 this	 correspondence	 by	 pointing	 out	 that	 the	
alters	of	a	DID	patient	can	only	experience	one	another	from	a	second-person	
perspective	 if	 the	 host	 is	 in	 a	 particular	 state	 of	 consciousness—namely,	
dreaming.	 But	 notice	 that,	 since	 universal	 consciousness	 is,	 ex	 hypothesi,	 all	
there	 is,	 there	 is	 no	 ‘outside	 world’	 at	 its	 level.	 So	 the	 only	 state	 of	
consciousness	 conceivably	 available	 to	 it	 is	 one	 entailing	 self-generated	
experiences	 analogous	 to	 dreaming.	 Might	 we	 then	 be	 alters	 of	 universal	
consciousness	experiencing	one	another	within	a	universal	 ‘dream,’	 just	as	the	
alters	of	a	DID	patient	experience	one	another	during	the	patient’s	dream?	
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It	 is	 important	 to	 point	 out,	 however,	 that,	 despite	 decades	 of	 clinical	 work,	
research	on	DID	is	still	in	its	infancy.	Indeed,	only	in	the	past	few	years	has	the	
existence	 of	 DID	 been	 scientifically	 established.	 Our	 understanding	 of	 the	
psychic	 processes	 underlying	 dissociation	 is	 still	 fairly	 limited;	 particularly	
when	 it	comes	 to	 the	dream-life	of	DID	patients.	As	research	on	human-level	
dissociation	advances,	we	should	be	in	a	better	position	to	understand	the	true	
extent	to	which	DID	serves	as	an	analogy	for	universal-level	dissociation.	
The	second	topic	of	future	work	that	deserves	attention	is	our	understanding	of	
meta-consciousness	 and	 its	 modeling	 under	 the	 excitation	 metaphor	 of	
experience.	 I’ve	 described	 this	 metaphor	 in	 Chapter	 3:	 experiences	 can	 be	
regarded	 as	 self-excitations	 of	 universal	 phenomenal	 consciousness.	 I’ve	 also	
claimed	in	Chapter	5	that	meta-consciousness	reflects	a	particular	configuration	
of	consciousness.	Bringing	these	two	metaphors	together	is	certainly	feasible:	if	
we	 imagine	 universal	 phenomenal	 consciousness	 as	 a	membrane—just	 as	M-
theorists	 imagine	 their	 ‘branes’—experiences	 can	be	 regarded	as	 vibrations	of	
this	 membrane	 and	 meta-consciousness	 as	 a	 particular	 topological	
configuration	of	 the	membrane.	More	 specifically,	meta-consciousness	 can	be	
visualized	as	the	membrane	folding	in	on	itself,	so	that	the	patterns	of	vibration	
in	 a	 first	 segment	 of	 the	 membrane	 induce	 corresponding	 vibrations	 in	 a	
second	segment	folded	on	top	of	the	first.	The	patterns	of	vibration	in	the	first	
segment	constitute	a	 raw	experience,	whereas	 the	patterns	of	vibration	 in	 the	
second	 segment	 constitute	 the	meta-conscious	 realization	 that	 one	 is	 having	
the	raw	experience.	
However,	 since	 there	 are	 many	 nuances	 inherent	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 meta-
consciousness	 that	 were	 not	 explored	 in	 this	 dissertation,	 more	 work	 is	
required	 here.	 For	 instance,	 does	 meta-consciousness	 presuppose,	 entail	 or	
imply	a	Heideggerian	sense	of	a	separate	self	 inhabiting	the	world?	If	so,	how	
could	this	sense	be	accommodated	by	the	topological	analogy	discussed	above?	
What	are	 the	qualitative	differences	between	a	 raw	experience	and	 the	meta-
conscious	 realization	 that	 one	 is	 having	 the	 raw	 experience?	 How	 do	 these	
differences	arise	and	how	can	the	corresponding	mental	processes	be	modeled	
according	to	the	topological	metaphor?	And	so	forth.	
It	 remains	my	 hope	 that	 this	 dissertation	motivates	 analytic	 philosophers	 to	
reconsider	idealism	not	only	as	a	viable,	but	perhaps	even	the	most	promising,	
avenue	for	circumventing	the	fundamental	problems	faced	today	in	ontology.	I	
hope	 the	 ideas	 presented	 here	 are	 but	 the	 seeds	 for	 a	 wave	 of	 new	
developments	 in	 the	coming	years	and	decades,	which	will	pursue	with	more	
depth	and	detail	the	many	avenues	of	reasoning	opened	up	by	this	dissertation.	
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Appendix	A.	 Not	Its	Own	Meaning:	
A	Hermeneutic	of	the	World	
	
This	paper	first	appeared	in	Humanities,	ISSN:	2076-0787,	Vol.	6,	No.	3,	Article	
No.	55,	in	August	2017.	
	
A.1	 Abstract	
The	 contemporary	 cultural	 mindset	 posits	 that	 the	 world	 has	 no	 intrinsic	
semantic	 value.	 The	 meaning	 we	 see	 in	 it	 is	 supposedly	 projected	 onto	 the	
world	 by	 ourselves.	 Underpinning	 this	 view	 is	 the	 mainstream	 physicalist	
ontology,	according	to	which	mind	is	an	emergent	property	or	epiphenomenon	
of	brains.	As	such,	since	the	world	beyond	brains	isn’t	mental,	it	cannot	a	priori	
evoke	 anything	 beyond	 itself.	 But	 a	 consistent	 series	 of	 recent	 experimental	
results	 suggests	 strongly	 that	 the	 world	 may	 in	 fact	 be	 mental	 in	 nature,	 a	
hypothesis	openly	discussed	in	the	field	of	foundations	of	physics.	In	this	essay,	
these	 experimental	 results	 are	 reviewed	 and	 their	 hermeneutic	 implications	
discussed.	If	 the	world	 is	mental,	 it	points	to	something	beyond	its	 face-value	
appearances	and	is	amenable	to	interpretation,	just	as	ordinary	dreams.	In	this	
case,	the	project	of	a	Hermeneutic	of	Everything	is	metaphysically	justifiable.	
	
A.2	 Introduction	
To	be	amenable	 to	 interpretation,	 things	 and	phenomena	must	point	beyond	
themselves,	 thereby	 embodying	 semantic	 value	 or	 sense.	 For	 instance,	 these	
squiggles	of	ink	on	paper—which	we	call	written	words—mean	more	than	just	
squiggles	 of	 ink	 on	 paper:	 they	 point	 to	 something	 beyond	 themselves.	
Similarly,	 the	 inner	 imagery	 we	 experience	 in	 dreams	 points	 to	 something	
beyond	their	face-value	appearances,	which	has	motivated	depth	psychologists	
to	develop	extensive	hermeneutics	of	dreams	(e.g.	Ackroyd	1993,	von	Franz	and	
Boa	 1994,	 Jung	 2002,	 Fonagy	 et	 al.	 2012).	 Finally,	 the	 symbolisms	 of	 religious	
myths	 point	 to	 something	 that	 transcends	 the	 face-value	 appearances	 of	 the	
symbols	themselves	and	engages	people	at	an	emotional	level	(Kastrup	2016a).	
Influenced	 by	 twentieth	 century	 positivism	 and	 existentialism,	 the	
contemporary	 cultural	 mindset	 posits	 that	 things	 and	 phenomena	 only	 have	
semantic	 value	 insofar	 as	 we	 project	 this	 value	 onto	 them.	 Summarizing	 the	
essence	of	this	mindset,	Sartre	wrote:	“there	exist	concretely	alarm	clocks	…	But	
…	 then	 I	 discover	 myself	 suddenly	 as	 the	 one	 who	 gives	 its	 meaning	 to	 the	
alarm	 clock	 …	 the	 one	 who	 finally	 makes	 the	 values	 exist”	 (1992:	 77).	
Analogously,	squiggles	of	 ink	mean	more	than	squiggles	of	 ink	only	insofar	as	
we	stipulate	by	convention	that	they	do	so.	To	the	extent	that	alarm	clocks	and	
written	words	 are	 inventions	 of	 human	beings,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 assert	 that	
their	meaning	consists	in	what	we	project	onto	them.	
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However,	 the	contemporary	cultural	mindset	extends	 this	notion	of	projected	
meaning	to	nature	itself.	Fire	only	represents	“the	inseminating	fury	of	sex	and	
the	ardor	of	the	ascetic”	(Ronnenberg	and	Martin	2010:	84)	insofar	as	we	project	
passion	onto	it.	Stones	only	represent	eternity	(ibid.:	106)	insofar	as	we	project	
timelessness	onto	them.	Without	our	projections,	stones	mean	just	stones;	fire	
means	 just	 fire.	 In	 and	 of	 itself,	 the	world	 supposedly	 is	 its	 own	meaning.	 It	
does	not	inherently	point	to	anything	beyond	its	own	appearance	on	the	screen	
of	perception.	Whatever	sense	we	may	see	in	a	fact	of	the	world	is	supposedly	a	
confabulation	of	human	cognition,	not	intrinsic	to	the	fact	itself.	“In	this	case,”	
as	Zemach	put	 it,	 “one	may	say	either	 that	 this	 fact	has	no	 sense,	or	 that	 the	
only	sense	it	has	is	provided	by	its	form”	(2006:	363).	In	other	words,	“The	sense	
of	 the	world	 is	 identical	with	 its	 form”	 (ibid.:	 367).	Ortiz-Osés	 put	 it	 perhaps	
most	simply:	“When	taken	‘existentially,’	existence	seems	to	lack	sense,	whereas	
sense	taken	‘essentially’	would	appear	to	lack	existence”	(2008:	65).	
As	a	result,	our	culture	believes	that	the	semantic	value	of	the	world	is	simply	
an	artifact	of	human	minds.	The	world	doesn’t	have	a	story	to	tell,	a	suggestion	
to	 make	 or	 an	 insight	 to	 convey.	 It	 isn’t	 saying	 anything.	 There	 is	 nothing	
meaningful	 to	 be	 gleaned	 from	 the	 world,	 just	 utilitarian	 predictions	 to	 be	
made	 about	 its	 behavior.	 Under	 such	 ethos,	 projects	 such	 as	 Ortiz-Osés’—
meant	 to	 formulate	 a	 symbolic	 hermeneutic	 of	 the	 world	 premised	 on	 the	
notion	 that	 “the	whole	of	 existence	contains	an	almost	 secret	 essence”	 (2008:	
1)—become	metaphysically	precarious,	which	Ortiz-Osés	himself	seems	to	have	
acknowledged	(ibid.:	65).	
At	 the	 root	 of	 this	 state	 of	 affairs	 is	 the	 split	 between	mind	 and	 world	 that	
characterizes	 our	 present	 worldview.	 Indeed,	 according	 to	 the	 mainstream	
physicalist	 ontology,	 the	 fundamental	 building	 blocks	 of	 reality	 are	 physical	
elements	that	exist	independently	of	mind	(Stoljar	2016).	The	latter,	in	turn,	is	
supposedly	constituted	or	generated	by	particular	 local	arrangements	of	these	
physical	elements,	such	as	brains	inside	skulls.	Consequently,	mind	is	insulated	
from	the	external	world	surrounding	it	beyond	the	skull.	
The	problem,	of	course,	is	that	only	mind	can	host	intrinsic	semantic	value,	for	
the	 latter	 consists	 of	 cognitive	 associations:	 the	 intrinsic	 meaning	 of	 an	
experience	is	the	emotions,	insights	and	inner	imagery	it	evokes.	For	instance,	
the	feeling	of	hunger	may	evoke	inner	imagery	related	to	food	because	there	is	
a	 cognitive	 association	between	 the	 feeling	 and	 the	 imagery.	A	memory	 from	
childhood	may	 evoke	 the	 emotion	 of	 happiness	 because	 there	 is	 a	 cognitive	
association	between	the	memory	and	the	emotion.	These	associative	 links	are	
an	exclusive	feature	of	mentation.	
So	if	semantic	value	is	essentially	mental	and	mind	is	insulated	from	the	world	
beyond	the	skull,	then	semantic	value	cannot	exist	in	the	world.	A	non-mental	
world	can	be	evoked,	but	it	cannot	intrinsically	evoke	anything.	Such	separation	
between	meaning	 and	 world	 is	 what	 motivates	 our	 contemporary	 culture	 to	
consider	the	world	semantically	mute.	 “The	human	mind	has	abstracted	 from	
the	whole	all	…	meaning,	and	claimed	[it]	exclusively	 for	 itself,”	wrote	Tarnas	
(2010:	432).	
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Within	mind,	cognitive	associations	can	go	on	indefinitely,	as	endless	chains	of	
evocations:	a	daydream	may	 lead	to	a	 thought,	which	may	evoke	an	emotion,	
which	may	 trigger	 a	memory,	which	may	 lead	 to	 another	 thought,	 and	 so	on	
(Karunamuni	 2015:	 2-3).	 But	 once	 we	 leave	 the	 inner	 space	 of	 mentation	 by	
evoking	 an	 external	 fact	 in	 the	 world,	 the	 chain	must	 end.	 The	world	 is	 the	
chain’s	final	destination,	for	it	cannot	a	priori	evoke	anything	else	in	turn.	This	
semantic	end	point	is	what	we	call	a	‘literal	fact.’	Everything	prior	to	it	is	sign,	
simile	 or	 allegory—roundabout,	 indirect	 ways	 to	 arrive	 at	 the	 destination.	
According	 to	 our	 contemporary	 cultural	 mindset,	 the	 value	 of	 these	
indirections	 is	 entirely	 conditioned	 upon	 their	 ability	 to	 ultimately	 point	 at	
literal	facts.	Anything	short	of	it	is	considered	delusion,	for	it	allegedly	can’t	be	
anchored	in	truth.	
But	does	our	 current	 scientific	understanding	of	 reality	 truly	 corroborate	 this	
split	between	mind	and	world,	inside	and	outside?	Are	we	justified	in	taking	for	
granted	that	the	world	‘out	there’	is	fundamentally	distinct	or	separate	from	the	
mind	 ‘in	 here’?	 If	 not,	 could	 the	world	 carry	 intrinsic	 semantic	 value	 and	 be	
amenable	 to	 interpretation,	 just	 as	 dreams	 are?	 Could	 there	 be	 a	 valid	
hermeneutic	 of	 the	world,	 a	 vision	of	 it	 as	 symbolic,	 suggestive	of	 something	
beyond	 its	 own	 face-value	 appearances	 on	 the	 screen	 of	 perception?	 What	
would	the	implications	of	this	possibility	be	for	the	way	we	relate	to	the	world?	
These	are	the	questions	addressed	in	this	essay.	
In	 Section	 A.3,	 the	 latest	 experimental	 results	 emerging	 from	 the	 field	 of	
quantum	physics	will	be	briefly	reviewed.	They	empirically	indicate	that	mind	
and	world	aren’t,	after	all,	 fundamentally	distinct	or	separate.	Section	A.4	will	
show	how	this	continuity	between	mind	and	world	can	explain	why	the	axioms	
of	 rational	 thought	describe	and	model	 the	world	 so	uncannily	 accurately.	 In	
Section	A.5,	the	hermeneutic	implications	of	the	mental	world	hypothesis	will	
be	discussed.	Section	A.6	then	compares	the	analysis	in	Section	A.5	with	what	
some	of	the	world’s	philosophical	and	spiritual	traditions	have	to	say	about	the	
nature	and	meaning	of	the	world.	Finally,	Section	A.7	concludes	this	essay	with	
a	brief	discussion.	
	
A.3	 The	ontological	status	of	the	world	
The	mainstream	physicalist	notion	that	 the	world	 is	outside	and	 independent	
of	 mind	 is	 an	 abstract	 explanatory	 model	 constructed	 in	 thought,	 not	 an	
empirical	observation.	After	all,	what	we	call	‘the	world’	is	available	to	us	solely	
as	‘images’—defined	here	broadly,	so	to	include	any	sensory	modality—on	the	
screen	 of	 perception,	 which	 is	 itself	 mental.	 We	 interpret	 the	 contents	 of	
perception	as	coming	from	a	world	outside	mind	because	this	seems	to	explain	
the	fact	that	we	all	share	the	same	world	beyond	the	boundary	of	our	skin,	as	
well	 as	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 laws	 that	 govern	 this	 world	 do	 not	 depend	 on	 our	
personal	 volition.	 Stanford	 physicist	 Prof.	 Andrei	 Linde,	 well	 known	 for	 his	
theories	of	cosmological	inflation,	summarized	it	thus:	
529173-L-bw-Kastrup
Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 106
	 Analytic	Idealism	 	
	
	106	
Let	 us	 remember	 that	 our	 knowledge	 of	 the	 world	 begins	 not	 with	
matter	 but	 with	 perceptions.	 I	 know	 for	 sure	 that	my	 pain	 exists,	 my	
“green”	 exists,	 and	my	 “sweet”	 exists.	 I	 do	 not	 need	 any	 proof	 of	 their	
existence,	 because	 these	 events	 are	 a	 part	 of	 me;	 everything	 else	 is	 a	
theory.	 Later	we	 find	 out	 that	 our	 perceptions	 obey	 some	 laws,	which	
can	 be	most	 conveniently	 formulated	 if	 we	 assume	 that	 there	 is	 some	
underlying	reality	beyond	our	perceptions.	This	model	of	material	world	
obeying	 laws	 of	 physics	 is	 so	 successful	 that	 soon	we	 forget	 about	 our	
starting	point	and	say	that	matter	is	the	only	reality,	and	perceptions	are	
only	 helpful	 for	 its	 description.	 This	 assumption	 is	 almost	 as	 natural	
(and	maybe	 as	 false)	 as	 our	 previous	 assumption	 that	 space	 is	 only	 a	
mathematical	 tool	 for	 the	 description	 of	 matter.	 But	 in	 fact	 we	 are	
substituting	reality	of	our	feelings	by	a	successfully	working	theory	of	an	
independently	 existing	material	world.	And	 the	 theory	 is	 so	 successful	
that	we	almost	never	 think	about	 its	 limitations	until	we	must	address	
some	really	deep	issues,	which	do	not	fit	into	our	model	of	reality.	(1998:	
12)	
This	model	of	 reality	has	 intuitive	 implications	amenable	to	confirmation—or	
refutation—through	subtle	experimental	arrangements,	which	Linde	alluded	to	
when	 he	 spoke	 of	 “some	 really	 deep	 issues.”	 Indeed,	 the	 properties	 of	 a	
physicalist	world	should	exist	and	have	definite	values	even	when	this	world	is	
not	being	observed:	 the	moon	 should	exist	 and	have	whatever	weight,	 shape,	
size	 and	 color	 it	 has	 even	 if	 nobody	 is	 looking	 at	 it.	Moreover,	 a	mere	 act	 of	
observation	 should	 not	 change	 the	 values	 of	 these	 properties:	 the	 weight,	
shape,	size	and	color	of	the	moon	should	not	become	different	simply	because	
someone	happened	to	look	at	it.	
Operationally,	 these	 intuitive	 tenets	 of	 physicalism	 are	 translated	 into	 the	
notion	of	‘non-contextuality’:	the	outcome	of	an	observation	should	not	depend	
on	the	way	other,	separate	but	simultaneous	observations	are	performed.	After	
all,	 the	 properties	 being	 observed	 are	 supposed	 to	 be	 independent	 of	
observation.	What	I	perceive	when	I	look	at	the	night	sky	should	not	depend	on	
the	way	other	people	look	at	the	night	sky	along	with	me,	for	the	properties	of	
the	 night	 sky	 uncovered	 by	 my	 observation	 should	 not	 depend	 on	 theirs.	
Clearly—and	 in	 line	 with	 physicalism—non-contextuality	 implies	 that	 the	
world	 is	 independent	 of	 perception,	 insofar	 as	 perception	 constitutes	
observation.	My	 perceptions	 should	 simply	 reveal	 what	 the	 properties	 of	 the	
world	are	in	and	of	themselves.	
The	 problem	 is	 that,	 according	 to	 quantum	 theory,	 the	 outcome	 of	 an	
observation	 can	 depend	 on	 the	 way	 another,	 separate	 but	 simultaneous	
observation	is	performed.	For	instance,	if	two	particles	A	and	B	are	prepared	in	
a	 special	 way,	 the	 properties	 of	 particle	 A	 as	 seen	 by	 a	 first	 observer—say,	
Alice—are	 predicted	 to	 correlate	 with	 the	 way	 another	 observer—say,	 Bob—
simultaneously	 looks	 at	 particle	 B.	 This	 is	 so	 even	 when	 A	 and	 B—and,	
therefore,	 Alice	 and	 Bob—are	 separated	 by	 arbitrarily	 long	 distances.	 For	
instance,	what	Alice	sees	when	she	looks	at	particle	A	in,	say,	London,	depends	
on	the	way	Bob	concurrently	looks	at	particle	B	in,	say,	Sydney.	If	the	properties	
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of	the	world	were	outside	and	independent	of	Alice’s	and	Bob’s	minds—that	is,	
outside	 and	 independent	 of	 their	 perceptions—this	 clearly	 shouldn’t	 be	 the	
case;	 unless	 there	 is	 some	observation-independent	hidden	property,	 covertly	
shared	by	A	and	B	and	entirely	missed	by	quantum	theory,	which	could	account	
for	the	correlations.	This	was	Einstein’s	point	when	he	(in)famously	suggested	
that	 quantum	 theory	 was	 incomplete	 (Einstein,	 Podolsky	 and	 Rosen	 1935).	
However,	 as	 mathematically	 proven	 by	 John	 Bell	 (1964),	 the	 correlations	
predicted	 by	 quantum	 theory	 cannot	 be	 accounted	 for	 by	 these	 kinds	 of	
observation-independent	hidden	properties.	
Consequently,	 quantum	 theory	 appears	 to	 contradict	 non-contextuality	 and	
render	physicalism	untenable.	A	conceivable	way	to	avoid	this	conclusion	while	
accepting	quantum	theory	would	be	to	posit	that	particles	A	and	B,	or	Alice	and	
Bob	 themselves,	 somehow	 ‘tip	 each	 other	 off’	 during	 observation,	
instantaneously	 and	 at	 a	 distance,	 so	 to	coordinate	 their	actions	and	produce	
the	 predicted	 correlations.	 This,	 however,	 would	 require	 faster-than-light	
communication	and	fly	in	the	face	of	the	overwhelmingly	confirmed	theory	of	
special	relativity.	
Alternatively,	a	physicalist	could	attempt	to	salvage	non-contextuality	and	the	
notion	 of	 a	 world	 outside	 and	 independent	 of	 mind	 by	 rejecting	 quantum	
theory	 itself.	 Yet,	 as	 it	 turns	 out,	 since	 Alain	 Aspect’s	 seminal	 experiments	
(Aspect,	 Grangier	 and	 Roger	 1981,	 Aspect,	 Dalibard	 and	 Roger	 1982,	 Aspect,	
Grangier	and	Roger	1982)	the	predictions	of	quantum	theory	in	this	regard	have	
been	 repeatedly	 confirmed,	 with	 ever-increasing	 rigor.	 For	 instance,	 in	 an	
experiment	 performed	 in	 Geneva,	 Switzerland,	 in	 1998	 (Tittel	 et	 al.),	 the	
particles	A	 and	B	were	 separated	 by	more	 than	 10	 km—as	 opposed	 to	 the	 12	
meters	 of	 Aspect’s	 original	 experiment	 (1981)—reducing	 the	 already	 low	
likelihood	 that	 they	 could	be	 creating	 the	 correlations	predicted	by	quantum	
theory	through	some	kind	of	signal	exchange.	Despite	this	greater	separation,	
the	predictions	of	quantum	theory	were	again	confirmed.	
Then,	 still	 in	 1998	 but	 this	 time	 in	 Innsbruck,	 Austria,	 another	 experiment	
(Weihs	 et	 al.)	 was	 done	 to	 eliminate	 another	 far-fetched	 possibility:	 that,	 in	
advance	 of	 the	 preparation	 of	 particles	A	 and	B,	 ‘Alice,’	 ‘Bob’	 and	 the	 system	
responsible	 for	 the	preparation	could	 somehow	be	 ‘pre-agreeing’	on	a	hidden	
plan	of	action,	so	to	later	create	the	correlations	without	need	for	faster-than-
light	 communication	 (‘Alice’	 and	 ‘Bob,’	 in	 this	 case,	 were	 automated	
measurement	 apparatuses).	 To	 close	 this	 unlikely	 ‘conspiracy’	 loophole,	 the	
behaviors	 of	 ‘Alice’	 and	 ‘Bob’	 were	 programmed	 randomly	 and	 only	 after	
particles	 A	 and	 B	 had	 already	 been	 prepared.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 correlations	
predicted	by	quantum	theory	were	yet	again	confirmed.	
Critics	 continued	 to	 speculate	 about	 other	 far-fetched	 loopholes	 in	 these	
experiments.	In	an	effort	to	address	and	close	all	conceivable	loopholes,	Dutch	
researchers	 have	 recently	 performed	 an	 even	 more	 tightly	 controlled	 test,	
which—unsurprisingly	by	now—echoed	the	earlier	results	(Hensen	et	al.	2015).	
This	latter	effort	was	considered	by	the	periodical	Nature	the	“toughest	test	yet”	
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(Merali	 2015).	 Given	 all	 this,	 it	 seems	 now	 untenable	 to	 argue	 against	 the	
veracity	of	quantum	theory.	
The	 only	 alternative	 left	 for	 physicalists	 is	 to	 try	 to	 circumvent	 the	 need	 for	
faster-than-light	 signal	exchanges	by	 imagining	and	postulating	some	 form	of	
non-locality:	 nature	 must	 have—or	 so	 they	 speculate—observation-
independent	 hidden	 properties	 that	 are	not	 confined	 to	 particular	 regions	 of	
spacetime,	such	as	particles	A	and	B.	In	other	words,	the	argument	is	that	the	
observation-independent	 hidden	 properties	 allegedly	 missed	 by	 quantum	
theory	are	‘smeared	out’	across	space	and	time.	It	is	this	omnipresent,	invisible	
but	 objective	 background	 that	 supposedly	 orchestrates	 the	 correlations	
predicted	by	quantum	mechanics.	Non-contextuality	and	physicalism	can	thus	
be	salvaged;	or	can	they?	
The	problem,	of	course,	 is	that	non-local	hidden	properties	are	arbitrary:	they	
produce	 no	 predictions	 beyond	 those	 already	 made	 by	 standard	 quantum	
theory.	 As	 such,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 they	 represent	 an	 effort	 “to	modify	
quantum	mechanics	to	make	it	consistent	with	[one’s]	view	of	the	world,”	so	to	
avoid	the	need	“to	modify	[one’s]	view	of	the	world	to	make	it	consistent	with	
quantum	mechanics”	(Rovelli	2008:	16).	
Be	 it	 as	 it	 may,	 it	 turns	 out	 that	 certain	 specific	 correlations	 predicted	 by	
quantum	theory	are	incompatible	with	non-contextuality	even	for	 large	classes	
of	non-local	hidden	properties	(Leggett	2003).	Studies	have	now	experimentally	
confirmed	these	correlations	(Gröblacher	et	al.	2007,	Romero	et	al.	2010),	thus	
putting	 non-contextuality	 in	 even	 more	 serious	 jeopardy.	 To	 reconcile	 these	
results	 with	 physicalism	 would	 require	 a	 profoundly	 counterintuitive	
redefinition	of	what	we	call	 ‘objectivity.’	And	since	our	contemporary	cultural	
mindset	has	 come	 to	associate	objectivity	with	 reality	 itself,	 the	 science	press	
felt	 compelled	 to	 report	on	 some	of	 these	 results	by	pronouncing,	 “Quantum	
physics	says	goodbye	to	reality”	(Cartwright	2007).	
More	 recent	 experiments	 have	 again	 contradicted	 non-contextuality	 and	
confirmed	 that,	 unlike	 what	 one	 would	 expect	 if	 the	 world	 were	 separate	 or	
distinct	from	mind,	the	observed	properties	of	the	world	indeed	cannot	be	said	
to	exist	prior	to	being	observed	(Lapkiewicz	et	al.	2011,	Manning	et	al.	2015).	For	
all	 intents	 and	 purposes,	 the	 world	 we	 perceive	 is	 a	 product	 of	 observation.	
Commenting	on	this,	physicist	Anton	Zeilinger	has	been	quoted	as	saying	that	
“there	is	no	sense	in	assuming	that	what	we	do	not	measure	[that	is,	observe]	
about	a	system	has	[an	independent]	reality”	(Ananthaswamy	2011).	
So	 the	 question	 now	 is:	 Can	 some	 form	 of	 physicalism	 survive	 the	 failure	 of	
non-contextuality?	We	have	seen	earlier	that	the	intuitive	tenets	of	physicalism	
are:	 (a)	 there	 exists	 a	 world	 outside	mind;	 and	 (b)	mere	 observation	 doesn’t	
change	 this	 independently	 existing	 world.	 The	 failure	 of	 non-contextuality	
clearly	rules	out	(b).	Can	(a)	still	make	any	sense	in	the	absence	of	(b)?	If	it	can,	
then	the	world	outside	mind	must	somehow	physically	change,	instantaneously,	
every	time	it	 is	observed.	The	plausibility	of	this	notion	aside,	notice	that	one	
never	gets	to	see	the	observation-independent	world,	for	it	supposedly	changes	
instantly,	 in	 an	 observation-dependent	 manner,	 the	 moment	 one	 looks	 at	 it.	
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Clearly,	 the	only	motivation	 to	entertain	 this	notion	 is	 to	 try	 to	 salvage	 some	
rather	artificial	and	counterintuitive	 form	of	physicalism.	And	even	 if	such	an	
attempt	 were	 to	 succeed,	 the	 world	 we	 actually	 experience	 would	 still	 be	
conditioned	 by	 mind,	 insofar	 as	 it	 would	 be	 an	 outcome	 of	 conscious	
perception.	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 paper,	 therefore,	 the	 result	 would	 be	
indistinguishable	from	a	truly	mental	world.	
Already	 in	2005,	 Johns	Hopkins	physicist	 and	astronomer	Prof.	Richard	Conn	
Henry	had	 seen	 enough.	 In	 an	 essay	he	penned	 for	Nature,	 he	 claimed,	 “The	
universe	is	entirely	mental.	…	There	have	been	serious	[theoretical]	attempts	to	
preserve	a	material	world—but	they	produce	no	new	physics,	and	serve	only	to	
preserve	an	illusion”	(Henry	2005:	29).	The	illusion	he	was	referring	to	was,	of	
course,	that	of	a	world	outside	mind.	
Naturally,	 Conn	 Henry’s	 position	 is	 controversial	 and	 debate	 around	 it	
continues	 to	unfold.	Nonetheless,	 the	experiments	do	show	that	 the	 idea	of	a	
mental	world	must	be	taken	seriously,	if	nothing	else	for	the	sheer	power	of	the	
empirical	 evidence	 now	 accumulated.	 Moreover,	 philosophers	 have	 recently	
proposed	 coherent	 ontologies	 that	 can,	 at	 least	 in	 principle,	 make	 sense	 of	
reality	 without	 the	 need	 to	 postulate	 anything	 distinct	 from	 mind	 itself	
(Kastrup	 2017e,	 Nagasawa	 and	 Wager	 2016,	 Shani	 2015).	 These	 ontologies	
provide	coherent	frameworks	in	which	the	experimental	results	can	be	placed	
and	interpreted.	
Finally,	notice	 that,	 although	 the	argument	 in	 this	 section	has	been	based	on	
quantum	mechanical	 experiments	 carried	 out	 on	microscopic	 particles	 under	
laboratory	conditions,	we	know	that	the	implications	of	quantum	theory	apply	
to	our	macroscopic	world	of	tables	and	chairs	as	well.	Indeed,	quantum	effects	
have	 been	 experimentally	 demonstrated	 for	 macroscopic	 objects	 at	 room	
temperature	 (Lee	 et	 al.	 2011,	 Klimov	 et	 al.	 2015).	 As	 such,	 the	 failure	 of	 non-
contextuality	indicates	that	the	seemingly	objective	world	we	live	in	is	a	result	
of	 mental	 process	 at	 work	 and,	 as	 such,	 akin	 to	 a	 transpersonal	 dream:	 the	
tables,	chairs,	stars	and	galaxies	we	perceive	within	it	do	not	have	an	existence	
independent	of	our	minds.	
	
A.4	 The	continuity	of	mind	and	world	
In	a	famous	paper	titled	“The	Unreasonable	Effectiveness	of	Mathematics	in	the	
Natural	Sciences,”	physicist	Eugene	Wigner	(1960)	discussed	“the	miracle	of	the	
appropriateness	of	the	language	of	mathematics	for	the	formulation	of	the	laws	
of	physics.”	Indeed,	abstract	methods	and	results	developed	purely	in	thought	
have,	again	and	again,	succeeded	in	precisely	describing	concrete	phenomena.	
That	axiomatic	intuitions	turn	out	to	correctly	predict	and	model	the	structure	
and	 dynamics	 of	 the	 world	 at	 large	 is	 difficult	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 under	
physicalism,	this	probably	being	the	reason	why	Wigner	used	the	word	‘miracle’	
twelve	 times	 in	 his	 paper.	 After	 all,	 lest	 we	 incur	 the	 fallacy	 of	 circular	
reasoning,	under	physicalism	we	cannot	logically	argue	for	the	validity	of	logic	
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beyond	our	own	minds,	so	the	world	could	very	well	be	absurd	(Albert	 1985).	
That	it	is	not	is	Wigner’s	“miracle.”	
If	 the	 world	 is	 mental,	 however,	 the	 correspondence	 between	 the	 intuitive	
foundations	 of	 rational	 thought	 and	 the	 way	 the	 world	 works	 is	 perfectly	
natural.	 That	 we	 take	 the	 basic	 tenets	 of	 logic	 and	 mathematics	 to	 be	 self-
evident	truths	betrays	their	archetypal	nature	in	the	Jungian	sense:	they	reflect	
deeply	 ingrained	mental	 templates	 according	 to	which	 thought	unfolds	 (Jung	
1991).	As	a	matter	of	fact,	psychologist	Marie-Louise	von	Franz	went	as	far	as	to	
argue	 that	 the	 natural	 numbers	 themselves	 are	 archetypal	 (1974).	 Then—and	
here	 is	 the	 key	 point—the	 fact	 that	 these	 archetypes	 extend	 into	 the	 world	
clearly	indicates	that	the	world	itself	is	mental	and	continuous	with	our	minds.	If	
there	 is	 no	 intrinsic	 separation	 between	 our	 minds	 and	 the	 objects	 of	
perception,	 naturally	 these	 objects	 should	 comport	 themselves	 in	 a	 way	
consistent	with	mental	archetypes.	Perceptual	objects	should	be	an	expression	
of	 archetypal	 patterns	 in	 just	 the	 same	 way	 that	 thoughts	 are,	 so	 the	 world	
should	be	consistent—as	it	 is—with	our	logic	and	mathematics.	The	apparent	
eeriness	of	Wigner’s	“miracle”	melts	away.	
To	 visualize	 all	 this	 consider	 the	 following	 analogy:	 if	 mind	 is	 like	 a	 guitar	
string,	 then	 particular	 conscious	 experiences	 are	 like	 particular	 notes	 or	
patterns	of	vibration	of	the	string.	In	this	case,	the	mental	archetypes	discussed	
above	 are	 analogous	 to	 the	 elasticity,	 mass	 and	 length	 of	 the	 string,	 which	
determine	 its	 normal	modes	 of	 vibration.	 Some	 of	 the	 archetypically-defined	
normal	modes	of	mind	thus	correspond	to	the	laws	of	nature,	which	we	discern	
as	 regularities	on	 the	 screen	of	perception:	 they	 reflect	 some	of	 the	 ‘notes’	 in	
which	mind	naturally	‘plays’	in	the	world	at	large.	
Wigner’s	 “miracle”	 is	 not	 only	 explainable	 by,	 but	 also	 constitutes	 further	
evidence	 for,	 the	 mental	 world	 hypothesis.	 As	 such,	 it	 is	 high	 time	 we	
considered	the	implications	of	this	hypothesis	for	how	best	to	live	our	lives.	
	
A.5	 The	implications	of	a	mental	world	
Strong	 empirical	 evidence	 pointing	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 world	 we	
experience	is	a	result	of	transpersonal	mental	processes	at	work	has	now	been	
reviewed.	 There	 is	 no	 fundamental	 separation	 between	 mind	 ‘in	 here’	 and	
world	 ‘out	 there,’	 which	 explains	 why	 the	 archetypes	 of	 rational	 thought	
describe	 nature	 so	 well.	 Yet,	 the	 latter	 point	 is	 not	 the	 sole	 implication	 of	 a	
mental	world:	 if	 our	minds	 are	 continuous	with	 the	 environment	we	 inhabit,	
nothing	prevents	the	world	from	intrinsically	evoking	mental	contents	beyond	
perception,	such	as	insights	and	emotions.	
Indeed,	 according	 to	analytical	psychology,	our	nightly	dreams	carry	 intrinsic	
semantic	 value	 because	 they	 are	 manifestations	 of	 deeply	 ingrained	
psychological	 archetypes	 seeking	 to	 express	 themselves	 (Jung	 1991).	 By	
interpreting	the	archetypal	messages	our	dreams	present	to	us	in	symbolic	form	
we	can,	therefore,	achieve	meaningful	insights	that	escape	the	reach	of	ordinary	
waking	introspection	(Ackroyd	1993,	von	Franz	and	Boa	1994,	Jung	2002).	Now,	
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if	the	world	is	akin	to	a	collective	dream	also	produced	by	mental	archetypes,	as	
discussed	in	the	previous	section,	then	 the	 same	 rationale	 should	apply	 to	our	
waking	lives.	The	meanings	we	think	to	discern	in	the	world	may	not,	after	all,	
be	mere	personal	projections,	but	actual	properties	of	 the	world.	All	empirical	
facts	 may	 be	 archetypal	 symbols:	 extrinsic	 appearances	 of	 immanent	 mental	
dynamics.	 The	 entire	 cosmic	narrative	may	be	hinting	 at	 something	 prior	 to,	
and	beyond,	itself.	
In	a	mental	world,	 the	 images	we	perceive	on	 the	 screen	of	perception	aren’t	
essentially	 different	 from	our	 own	 imagination,	 except	 in	 that	 the	 former	 are	
shared	 across	 observers.	 This	 collective	 ‘world	 dream’	 symbolically	 points	 to	
underlying	transpersonal	mental	dynamics,	just	as	regular	dreams	symbolically	
point	to	underlying	personal	mental	dynamics.	As	such,	the	world	is	amenable	
to	hermeneutics:	 it	means	 something;	 it	points	 to	 something	beyond	 its	 face-
value	appearances;	it	evokes	something	a	priori;	it	is	not	its	own	meaning.	
	
A.6	 What	the	world’s	traditions	have	to	say	
Curiously,	despite	 empirical	 evidence	 for	 the	mental	world	hypothesis	having	
become	 available	 only	 in	 relatively	 recent	 times,	 philosophical	 and	 spiritual	
traditions	 have	 been	 hinting	 at	 the	 intrinsic	 semantic	 value	 of	 the	 world	 for	
millennia.	 For	 instance,	 based	 on	 his	 in-depth	 study	 of	 ancient	 Islamic	
mysticism,	Henry	Corbin	suggested	that	the	purpose	of	 life	 is	 to	 interpret	the	
world	as	a	metaphor	of	transcendent	meaning.	He	wrote:	
To	come	into	this	world	…	means	…	to	pass	 into	the	plane	of	existence	
which	in	relation	to	[Paradise]	is	merely	a	metaphoric	existence.	…	Thus	
coming	 into	 this	 world	 has	meaning	 only	 with	 a	 view	 to	 leading	 that	
which	is	metaphoric	back	to	true	being.	(As	quoted	in	Cheetham	2012:	59,	
emphasis	added.)	
That	 the	world	 isn’t	 literal	but	metaphorical	 implies	 that	 it	 isn’t	 the	 end	of	 a	
chain	of	cognitive	associations.	Instead,	its	very	purpose	is	to	evoke,	to	point	to	
cognition	beyond	its	face-value	appearances.	
Analogously,	in	a	clear	suggestion	that	the	things	and	phenomena	of	the	world	
are	 symbols	 of	 transpersonal	 mental	 patterns,	 Hong	 Zicheng	 wrote	 in	 the	
sixteenth	century:		
The	chirping	of	birds	and	twittering	of	insects	are	all	murmurings	of	the	
mind.	The	brilliance	of	flowers	and	colors	of	grasses	are	none	other	than	
the	patterns	of	the	Dao.	(2006:	105,	emphasis	added.)	
Still	 along	 similar	 lines,	 the	 Hermetic	 tradition	 suggests	 that	 the	 world	 is	 a	
mental	creation	in	a	transpersonal	mind:	
That	Light,	He	 said,	 am	 I,	 thy	God,	Mind	…	Mind	 is	 Father-God.	…	He	
[God]	thinketh	all	 things	manifest	…	[and]	manifests	through	all	 things	
and	in	all.	(Mead	2010:	3,	23,	emphasis	added.)	
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It	 then	 proceeds	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 world	 is	 the	 symbolic	 image	 of	 these	
immanent,	transpersonal	mental	processes:	
Holy	art	Thou,	O	God	…	of	whom	All-nature	hath	been	made	an	 image.	
(Mead	2010:	11,	emphasis	added.)	
In	the	West,	the	inception	of	these	notions	goes,	of	course,	all	the	way	back	to	
Plato	 and	his	 ‘Theory	of	 Ideas,’	 according	 to	which	 the	ontological	 ground	of	
reality	 is	 archetypal	 thoughts	 in	 a	 transpersonal	mind	 (Ross	 1951).	The	visible	
world	around	us	 is	 supposedly	modeled	after	 the	patterns	of	 these	archetypal	
thoughts,	which	it	thus	symbolically	points	to.	
Echoing	 all	 this,	 Nisargadatta	 Maharaj,	 a	 twentieth-century	 exponent	 of	 the	
Advaita	Vedanta	tradition	in	India,	said:	
When	you	see	the	world	you	see	God.	There	is	no	seeing	God	apart	from	
the	world.	Beyond	the	world	to	see	God	is	to	be	God.	(1973:	58)	
Thus,	our	only	access	to	God	is	through	the	images	on	the	screen	of	perception	
that	 we	 call	 the	 world.	 These	 images	 are	 the	 extrinsic	 appearance	 of	 God’s	
conscious	inner	life.	Beyond	them,	the	only	way	to	know	God	is	to	gain	direct	
access	to	God’s	inner	life—that	is,	to	be	God.	
I	will	mention	just	one	more	example,	since	an	exhaustive	review	of	how	these	
ideas	are	represented	in	the	world’s	traditions	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	brief	
essay.	Christian	mystic	and	scientist	Emanuel	Swedenborg	wrote	extensively	of	
the	 “correspondences”	 between	 the	 natural	 and	 spiritual	 worlds	 (2007:	 63).	
These	 correspondences	 imply	 that	 the	 things	 and	 phenomena	 of	 the	 natural	
world	 are	 symbolic	 images	 of	 deeper,	 transcendent	 truths.	 The	
“correspondences”	were	 Swedenborg’s	 attempt	 to	 formulate	 a	 hermeneutic	 of	
the	world.1	
	
A.7	 Discussion	
Physicalism	 has	 served	 important	 practical	 purposes	 over	 the	 past	 couple	 of	
centuries.	 It	 has	 provided	 scientists	 and	 engineers	 with	 an	 effective—if	
simplistic	 and	 ultimately	 wrong—picture	 of	 the	 world,	 conducive	 to	 the	
development	of	 technology.	By	thinking	of	objects	and	natural	phenomena	as	
having	standalone	reality	independent	of	their	own	minds,	practitioners	could	
achieve	the	degree	of	detachment	and	objectivity	necessary	 for	describing	the	
world	 without	 bias.	 The	 predictive	models	 of	 nature’s	 behavior	 that	 resulted	
from	this	effort	now	lie	at	the	foundation	of	our	technological	civilization.	
																																								 								
1	Here	 it	 would	 have	 been	 interesting	 to	 mention	 the	 vast	 literature	 of	 medieval	
scholasticism	 in	 Europe	 that	 resonates	 directly	 with	 the	 ideas	 presented	 in	 this	
dissertation.	For	instance,	in	his	analysis	of	the	thought	of	medieval	scholars,	Owen	
Barfield,	 based	mostly	on	 the	writings	of	Thomas	Aquinas,	 says	 that,	 to	 them,	 “the	
world	is	the	thought	of	God”	(2011:	95).	Allowing	for	some	leeway	regarding	the	use	of	
the	word	‘God,’	this	is	precisely	a	conclusion	of	Chapter	3.	
529173-L-bw-Kastrup
Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 113
Doctoral	Dissertation	 Radboud	University	Nijmegen	 dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup	
	
	 113	
But	whilst	 valuable	 in	 a	 utilitarian	 sense,	 this	 focus	 on	 nature’s	 behavior—as	
opposed	 to	nature’s	meaning—is	 extraordinarily	 limiting	 to	 the	human	 spirit.	
We	 are	 meaning-seeking	 animals	 (Frankl	 1991,	 Tillich	 1952).	 A	 long	 and	
productive	 life	 enabled	 by	 continuous	 advances	 in	 technology	 is	 ultimately	
vacuous	 and	 sterile	 if	 devoid	 of	 meaning.	 And	 the	 same	 worldview	 that	
facilitates	 the	 advancement	 of	 technology	 precludes	 us	 from	 finding	 and	
appreciating	 the	meaning	of	 life	 in	 the	world.	This,	 in	essence,	 is	perhaps	 the	
greatest	dilemma	of	the	contemporary	zeitgeist.	
In	 such	 a	 context,	 the	 alternative	 notion	 that	 the	world	 points	 to	 something	
beyond	 its	 face-value	appearances	offers	enriching	new	perspectives.	After	all,	
the	world	we	inhabit	now	carries	intrinsic	semantic	value;	a	message.	Like	the	
Voynich	manuscript	(Reddy	and	Knight	2011),	 it	 is	akin	to	a	book	written	in	a	
yet-undeciphered	 language,	clamoring	 for	a	 suitable	hermeneutic.	Ortiz-Osés’	
project	 (2008)	 turns	 out	 to	 rest	 on	 solid	 metaphysical	 foundations	 after	 all.	
Each	of	us,	 as	 individuals,	 can	now	give	ourselves	permission	 to	dedicate	our	
lives	 to	 finding	 meaning	 in	 the	 world,	 reassured	 by	 the	 knowledge	 that	 this	
meaning	is	really	there	even	if	we	can’t	immediately	apprehend	it.	And	whereas	
the	world’s	meaning	won’t	disappear	if	we	refuse	to	look	for	it,	the	point	is	that	
the	option	to	look	is	given	legitimacy.	
Because	 of	 its	 preoccupation	 with	 measurement	 and	 predictive	 modeling,	
contemporary	culture	is	forgetting	to	read	the	letter	for	the	sake	of	describing	
the	 envelope.	 The	 physical	 universe	 we	 can	measure	 is	merely	 the	 carrier	 of	
something	 implied.	 Exaggerated	 focus	 on	 the	 predictive	 models	 of	 science,	
crucial	 as	 they	 are	 for	 the	 development	 of	 technology,	 may	 distract	 us	 from	
fulfilling	what	may	be	our	natural	 and	 innate	 telos.	 In	 the	words	of	Ortega	y	
Gasset,	“Scientific	truth	is	an	exact	truth,	but	incomplete	and	penultimate,	that	
is	 forcedly	 integrated	 in	 another	 kind	 of	 truth,	 ultimate	 and	 complete	 yet	
inexact”	(as	quoted	in	Ortiz-Osés	2008:	30).	
Looking	 upon	 the	 world	 interpretatively,	 as	 a	 scholar	 looks	 upon	 an	 ancient	
text	 while	 trying	 to	 decipher	 its	 meaning,	 is	 not	 only	 metaphysically	 and	
teleologically	 sound,	 it	 can	 also	 make	 life	 more	 wholesome.	 Psychotherapist	
Thomas	Moore	offers	us	an	example:	by	 looking	upon	our	 family	members	as	
characters	 and	our	 family	 stories	 as	 episodes	of	 a	 great	 saga,	meant	 to	 subtly	
evoke	something	above	and	beyond	its	pedestrian	literal	appearances,	we	open	
ourselves	 up	 to	 the	 deeper	 archetypal	 sense	 they	 express	 (2012:	 32).	 By	
extrapolating	this	powerful	 idea	 further,	we	can	 look	upon	our	entire	 life	as	a	
small	 but	 crucial	 element	 of	 an	 unfathomable,	 symbolic	 cosmic	 drama.	 The	
experiences	 we	 go	 through	 are	 no	 longer	 literal	 and	 pedestrian,	 but	 carry	
deeper,	hidden	significance.	Indeed,	in	a	mental	world	it	is	as	unreasonable	to	
interpret	life	literally	as	it	is	to	interpret	dreams	literally.	Whoever	thinks	that	a	
dream	is	exactly	what	it	appears	to	be	at	face	value?	Most	people’s	instinct	upon	
having	an	intense	dream	is	to	immediately	ask	themselves:	What	does	it	mean?	
Looking	upon	life	in	the	same	way—and	asking	oneself	the	same	question—can	
bestow	on	it	a	much	more	spacious,	open	and	wholesome	outlook.	
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With	 its	 focus	 on	 closed,	 literal	 explanations,	 the	 physicalist	 ontology	 that	
informs	 the	 contemporary	 zeitgeist	 decrees	 that	 the	 world	 has	 no	 intrinsic	
meaning.	 Instead	of	 an	open	book	waiting	 to	be	deciphered	and	grasped,	 the	
world	 becomes	 just	 pixels	 to	 be	 measured;	 an	 endless	 string	 of	 quantifiable	
parameters	carrying	no	message.	Instead	of	the	starting	point	of	an	open,	epic	
journey	 along	 endless	 cognitive	 associations,	 wherein	 the	 meanings	 evoked	
constitute	and	ultimately	 reveal	 the	uncanny	 reflection	of	 the	observer	 in	 the	
observed,	the	world	becomes	the	end	point	of	a	botched	quest	that	never	even	
gets	 started.	 By	 doing	 this,	 the	 physicalist	 ontology	 gives	 us	 permission	 to	
procrastinate	in	semantic	nihilism	and	an	engineered	sense	of	closure.	It	stops	
us	from	pursuing	what	the	Islamic	mystics	studied	by	Corbin	thought	to	be	the	
purpose	of	life.	For	the	ultimate	meaning	of	it	all	may	not	be	discernible	in	any	
particular	end	point	or	conclusion,	but	only	in	the	cognitive	gestalt	entailed	by	
a	 circumambulation—to	 use	 a	 handy	 Jungian	 term—of	 associative	 threads.	 It	
may	 be	 discernible	 only	 in	 a	 “galaxy”	 of	 semantic	 fields	 that	 “are	 intimately	
connected,	 and	 their	 significations	 influence	 one	 another,	 so	 that	 the	 most	
important	 sense	 is	 found	diffuse	 in	 its	whole”	 (Ortega	 y	Gasset,	 as	 quoted	 in	
Ortiz-Osés	2008:	28).	
Historically	speaking,	the	denial	of	the	intrinsic	symbolic	meaning	of	the	world	
is	 a	 recent	 aberration	 (Tarnas	 2010).	 The	 antidote	 for	 this	 aberration	 is	 an	
extension	of	the	application	of	hermeneutics	beyond	all	discernible	boundaries.	
What	 we	 need	 is	 a	 hermeneutic	 of	 the	 entire	 cosmos;	 a	 Hermeneutic	 of	
Everything.	
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This	 paper	 first	 appeared	 in	 SAGE	 Open,	 ISSN:	 2158-2440,	 Vol.	 6,	No.	 4,	 doi:	
10.1177/2158244016674515,	in	October	2016.	
	
B.1	 Abstract	
The	physicalist	worldview	is	often	portrayed	as	a	dispassionate	interpretation	of	
reality	motivated	purely	by	observable	facts.	In	this	article,	ideas	of	both	depth	
and	social	psychology	are	used	to	show	that	this	portrayal	may	not	be	accurate.	
Physicalism—whether	 it	 ultimately	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 philosophically	 correct	 or	
not1—is	 hypothesized	 to	 be	 partly	 motivated	 by	 the	 neurotic	 endeavor	 to	
project	 onto	 the	 world	 attributes	 that	 help	 one	 avoid	 confronting	
unacknowledged	 aspects	 of	 one’s	 own	 inner	 life.	Moreover,	 contrary	 to	what	
most	 people	 assume,	 physicalism	 creates	 an	 opportunity	 for	 the	 intellectual	
elites	who	develop	and	promote	it	to	maintain	a	sense	of	meaning	in	their	own	
lives	 through	 fluid	 compensation.	 However,	 because	 this	 compensatory	
strategy	does	not	apply	to	a	large	segment	of	society,	it	creates	a	schism—with	
corresponding	 tensions—that	 may	 help	 explain	 the	 contemporary	 conflict	
between	neo-atheism	and	religious	belief.	
	
B.2	 Introduction	
A	worldview	is	a	narrative	in	terms	of	which	we	relate	to	ourselves	and	reality	
at	large.	It	is	a	kind	of	cultural	operating	system	that	gives	us	tentative	answers	
to	foundational	questions	such	as	‘What	are	we?’	‘What	is	the	nature	of	reality?’	
‘What	is	the	purpose	of	life?’	and	so	on	(Kastrup	2014).	Although	many	different	
worldviews	 vie	 for	 dominance	 today,	 the	 academically	 endorsed	 physicalist	
narrative	 defines	 the	mainstream,	 despite	 its	many	 difficulties	 (Kastrup	 2014,	
2015,	Nagel	2012).	This	reigning	worldview	posits	that	physical	entities	outside	
consciousness	 are	 the	 building	 blocks	 of	 reality.	 Consciousness,	 in	 turn,	 is	
supposedly	 an	 epiphenomenon	 or	 emergent	 property	 of	 certain	 complex	
arrangements	of	these	entities.	As	such,	under	physicalism,	consciousness	must	
be	reducible	 to	physical	arrangements	outside	and	 independent	of	experience	
(Stoljar	2016).	
Physicalism	is	often	portrayed	as	a	worldview	that,	in	contrast	to,	for	example,	
religion	 or	 spirituality,	 is	 based	 solely	 on	 objective	 facts.	 The	 present	 article,	
however,	 hypothesizes	 that	 the	 formative	 principles	 and	 motivations	
																																								 								
1	As	 I	 have	 extensively	 articulated	 earlier	 in	 this	 dissertation,	 my	 position	 is	 that	
physicalism	 is	 demonstrably	 inferior	 to	 idealism	 on	 both	 logical	 and	 empirical	
grounds.	Yet,	since	the	scope	of	this	particular	paper	is	restricted	to	psychology,	my	
tone	had	to	be	neutral	regarding	philosophical	matters.	
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underpinning	 the	physicalist	narrative—whether	 it	 ultimately	 turns	out	 to	be	
philosophically	 correct	 or	 not—are	 partly	 subjective,	 reflecting	 neurotic	 ego-
defense	maneuvers	meant,	as	described	by	Vaillant,	 to	 “protect	 the	 individual	
from	painful	 emotions,	 ideas,	 and	 drives”	 (1992:	 3).	 This	 becomes	 clear	when	
one	lifts	core	concepts	of	depth	psychology	to	the	social	and	cultural	spheres.	
However,	 as	 a	 mostly	 clinical	 approach,	 depth	 psychology	 requires	 some	
elaboration	before	being	applied	at	a	theoretical	level.	
The	modern	understanding	of	depth	psychology	can	be	traced	back	to	the	late	
19th	 and	 early	 20th	 centuries,	 in	 the	 works	 of	 Frederic	 Myers,	 Pierre	 Janet,	
William	 James,	 Sigmund	 Freud	 and	 Carl	 Jung	 (Kelly	 et	 al.	 2009).	 Its	
foundational	 inference	 is	 that	 the	 human	 psyche	 comprises	 two	 main	
subdivisions:	 a	 conscious	 and	 an	 ‘unconscious’	 segment.	 The	 conscious	
segment	of	the	psyche	comprises	experiences	a	person	has	introspective	access	
to	and	can	report.	According	to	the	analytical	school	of	depth	psychology,	the	
“ego”	is	defined	as	the	experiential	center	of	this	segment	(von	Franz	1964:	161),	
and	it	is	in	this	specific	sense	that	I	use	the	word	‘ego’	throughout	the	present	
article.	In	contrast,	the	so-called	‘unconscious’	segment	of	the	psyche	comprises	
mental	 contents	 the	person	has	no	 introspective	access	 to	and	cannot	 report.	
Nonetheless,	depth	psychologists	assert	that	‘unconscious’	mental	contents	can,	
and	do,	influence	the	person’s	manifest	thoughts,	feelings	and	behaviors.	
Because	the	ability	to	report	an	experience	is	a	metacognitive	capacity	on	top	of	
the	 experience	 itself	 (Schooler	 2002),	 a	 more	 rigorous	 articulation	 of	 the	
difference	between	the	conscious	and	 ‘unconscious’	segments	of	 the	psyche	 is	
this:	conscious	mental	contents	are	those	a	person	both	experiences	and	knows	
that	he	or	she	experiences	them.	 ‘Unconscious’	mental	contents,	on	the	other	
hand,	are	those	the	person	either	does	not	experience	or	does	not	know	that	he	
or	 she	 experiences	 them	 (Kastrup	 2014:	 104-110).	 In	 other	 words,	 conscious	
mental	contents	fall	within	the	field	of	egoic	self-reflection	and,	therefore,	can	
be	 reported,	 whereas	 ‘unconscious’	 mental	 contents	 escape	 this	 field	 and,	
therefore,	cannot	be	reported.	Indeed,	the	existence	of	mental	contents	that	are	
experienced	but	cannot	be	reported—even	to	oneself—is	now	well	established	
in	 neuroscience,	 which	 has	 prompted	 the	 emergence	 of	 so-called	 “no-report	
paradigms”	(Tsuchiya	et	al.	2015).	
However,	as	clinical	psychologists	can	only	gauge	consciousness	based	on	what	
their	 patients	 report,	 anything	 outside	 the	 field	 of	 self-reflection	 is	
indistinguishable	 from	 true	 unconsciousness.	 This	 explains	 the	 somewhat	
inaccurate	terminology	choice	of	the	founders	of	depth	psychology.2	
Some	critics	have	questioned	the	existence	of	an	‘unconscious’	segment	of	the	
psyche	 on	 philosophical	 grounds	 (Stannard	 1980:	 51-81).	 However,	 recent	
																																								 								
2 	See	 Chapter	 5	 for	 a	 much	 more	 extensive	 elaboration	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
‘unconscious,’	 including	 the	 role	of	dissociation,	which	 I	have	not	discussed	 in	 this	
particular	article.	In	a	nutshell,	my	position	is	that	there	is	no	actual	unconscious,	but	
simply	conscious	mental	 processes	 inaccessible	 to	 egoic	 introspection	because	 they	
(a)	escape	the	field	of	self-reflection	or	(b)	are	strongly	dissociated	from	the	ego.	
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empirical	results	in	neuroscience	show	the	presence	of	broad	cognitive	activity	
that	 individuals	 cannot	 report,	but	which	nonetheless	 causally	 conditions	 the	
individuals’	manifest	 thoughts,	 feelings	or	behaviors	 (Augusto	2010,	Eagleman	
2011,	Westen	1999).	Recent	neuroimaging	studies	of	the	psychedelic	state	have	
also	 corroborated	 the	 depth-psychological	 view	 that	 ego	 suppression—in	 the	
form	 of	 reduction	 of	 neural	 activity	 in	 the	 brain’s	 default	 mode	 network—
brings	otherwise	‘unconscious’	mental	contents	into	awareness	(Carhart-Harris	
et	al.	2012,	Carhart-Harris	et	al.	2016,	Palhano-Fontes	et	al.	2015).	
On	the	basis	of	these	empirical	results,	the	core	idea	of	depth	psychology—that	
is,	 that	 a	 segment	 of	 the	 psyche	 that	 escapes	 self-reflective	 introspection	 can	
causally	condition	our	thoughts,	feelings	and	behaviors—cannot	be	dismissed.	
And	because	cultural	narratives	are	the	compound	result	of	an	aggregation	of	
the	 thoughts,	 feelings	 and	 behaviors	 of	 individuals,	 depth-psychological	
insights	 are	 valid	 starting	 points	 for	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 psychological	
underpinnings	of	our	culture’s	mainstream	worldview.	
In	Sections	B.3	and	B.4,	I	review	ways	in	which	the	physicalist	narrative	can	give	
us	 permission	 to	 avoid	 confronting	 unwanted	 affects	 in	 the	 ‘unconscious’	
segment	 of	 our	 psyche.	 In	 Section	 B.5,	 I	 elaborate	 on	 how	 physicalism	 can	
conceivably	 even	nurture	 its	 proponents’	 sense	 of	meaning	 in	 life.	 This	 latter	
section	is	based	on	theories	of	social	psychology,	rather	than	depth	psychology,	
but	 it	 still	 leverages	 the	 notion	 of	 an	 ‘unconscious’:	 in	 hypothesizing	 that	
physicalism	 is	 an	 expression	 of	 fluid	 compensation,	 it	 presupposes	 that	
cognitive	 processes	 outside	 the	 field	 of	 self-reflection	 influence	 the	 feelings,	
thoughts	and	opinions	subjects	express.	Finally,	Section	B.6	briefly	sums	up	the	
key	ideas	defended	in	this	article.	
	
B.3	 Ego	protection	through	projection	
According	to	depth	psychology,	a	neurosis	is	the	expression	of	an	inner	psychic	
conflict	 caused	 by	 the	 ego’s	 refusal	 to	 acknowledge,	 confront	 and	 ultimately	
integrate	 unwanted	 affects	 rising	 from	 the	 ‘unconscious’	 (Jung	 2014:	 137).	 To	
keep	these	affects	at	bay,	the	ego	uses	a	variety	of	defense	mechanisms,	among	
which	denial,	 distortion,	 dissociation,	 repression	 and	 so	 on	 (Vaillant	 1992).	A	
particularly	 common	 defense	 mechanism	 is	 projection	 (ibid.),	 whereby	 one	
circumvents	 the	 need	 to	 confront	 ego-threatening	 forces	 within	 oneself	 by	
ascribing	 the	 corresponding	 attributes	 to	 the	 outer	 environment.	 As	 such,	
projections	can	be	said	to	partly	hijack	and	manipulate	one’s	worldview	in	an	
attempt	 to	 prevent	 short-term	 suffering.	 My	 hypothesis	 is	 that,	 through	
projection,	the	physicalist	worldview	gives	us	permission	to	avoid	confronting	
some	of	what	we	find	disagreeable	within	ourselves.	This	can	be	achieved	in	a	
variety	of	subtle	ways.	
For	 instance,	 we	 all	 have	 a	 sense	 of	 our	 own	 existence	 and	 identity.	 Lucid	
introspection	 reveals	 that	 the	 root	 of	 this	 sense	 is	 our	 consciousness—our	
capacity	to	be	subjects	of	experience.	After	all,	 if	we	were	not	conscious,	what	
could	 we	 know	 of	 ourselves?	 How	 could	 we	 even	 assert	 our	 own	 existence?	
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Being	conscious	is	what	it	means	to	be	us.	In	an	important	sense—perhaps	even	
the	only	 important	 sense—we	 are	 first	 and	 foremost	 consciousness	 itself,	 the	
rest	of	our	self-image	arising	afterward,	as	thoughts	and	images	constructed	in	
consciousness.	
From	 this	 perspective,	 the	 physicalist	 narrative’s	 attempt	 to	 reduce	
consciousness	to	physical	entities	outside	subjectivity	is	counterintuitive,	for	it	
divorces	the	alleged	nature	of	consciousness	from	our	felt	sense	of	identity.	We	
do	not	 feel	as	 though	we	were	a	bunch	of	physical	particles	bouncing	around	
inside	our	skull.	Instead,	we	feel	that	we	are	the	subjective	‘space’	wherein	our	
experiences	unfold,	including	our	ideas	about	physical	particles.	Hence,	there	is	
a	sense	in	which	the	physicalist	narrative	can	be	said	to	project	the	felt	essence	
of	ourselves	onto	something	distinctly	other.	According	to	it,	we	are	not	really	
‘here,’	grounded	in	our	subjective	sense	of	being,	but	somewhere	‘over	there,’	in	
an	abstract	world	fundamentally	beyond	the	felt	concreteness	of	our	inner	lives.	
As	such,	the	physicalist	narrative	entails	an	emptying	out	of	what	it	means	to	be	
us;	 a	 kind	 of	 secular	 kenosis.	 “I	 am	 no	 ghost,	 just	 a	 shell,”	 laments	 the	 art	
character	Annlee	(Huyghe	and	Parreno	2003:	35),	whose	predicament	is	that	of	
many	of	us	in	contemporary	society.	
The	kenosis	entailed	by	the	physicalist	narrative	can	exonerate	 its	proponents	
from	responsibility	for	their	choices	and	actions.	Consider	this	passage	by	Sam	
Harris:	“Did	I	consciously	choose	coffee	over	tea?	No.	The	choice	was	made	for	
me	 by	 events	 in	my	 brain	 that	 I	…	 could	 not	 inspect	 or	 influence”	 (2012:	 7-8,	
emphasis	 added).	 The	 projection	 of	 responsibility	 here	 is	 clear	 and	 the	
corresponding	release	described	by	Harris	himself:	“Losing	a	belief	 in	free	will	
has	not	made	me	fatalistic—in	fact,	it	has	increased	my	feelings	of	freedom.	My	
hopes,	 fears,	 and	 neuroses	 seem	 less	 personal”	 (2012:	 46,	 emphasis	 added).	
Indeed,	under	 the	 ethos	of	 such	 a	worldview,	 there	 is	no	 concrete	 reason	 for	
guilt	or	regret,	for	we	allegedly	are	not	what	we	experience	ourselves	to	be.	We	
are	not	responsible	for	what	happens	here	because	we	are	not—and	have	never	
been—really	here.	We	are	not	ghosts	in	the	machine	but	ghosts	conjured	up	by	
the	machine.	In	a	significant	sense,	we	do	not	really	exist.	
As	a	matter	of	fact,	some	proponents	of	the	physicalist	narrative	go	as	far	as	to	
deny	that	consciousness	exists.	“Consciousness	doesn’t	happen.	It’s	a	mistaken	
construct.”	These	words	of	neuroscientist	Michael	Graziano	(2016)	should	give	
anyone	 pause	 for	 thought.	 Here	 we	 have	 consciousness—whatever	 it	 may	
intrinsically	be—denying	that	consciousness	exists.	Philosopher	Daniel	Dennett	
(1991)	 also	 claimed	 that	 consciousness	 is	 an	 illusion,	 a	 claim	 that	 seems	 to	
immediately	 contradict	 itself.	 After	 all,	 where	 do	 illusions	 occur	 if	 not	 in	
consciousness? 3 	By	 appealing	 to	 metaphysical	 abstractions	 fundamentally	
																																								 								
3	In	the	words	of	David	Bentley	Hart,	“The	entire	notion	of	consciousness	as	an	illusion	
is,	 of	 course,	 rather	 silly.	 Dennett	 has	 been	 making	 the	 argument	 for	 most	 of	 his	
career,	and	it	is	just	abrasively	counterintuitive	enough	to	create	the	strong	suspicion	
in	many	that	it	must	be	more	philosophically	cogent	than	it	seems,	because	surely	no	
one	 would	 say	 such	 a	 thing	 if	 there	 were	 not	 some	 subtle	 and	 penetrating	 truth	
hidden	 behind	 its	 apparent	 absurdity.	 But	 there	 is	 none.	 The	 simple	 truth	 of	 the	
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beyond	experience,	such	denials	of	our	felt	selves	achieve	a	form	of	deliverance	
somewhat	analogous	to	religious	absolution.	Surprisingly,	as	we	will	 later	see,	
they	even	help	restore	a	sense	of	meaningfulness	 in	 life,	 following	what	 I	will	
call	‘ontological	trauma.’	
The	 structure	 of	 these	 denials	 is	 fairly	 clear:	 first,	 consciousness	 weaves	 the	
conceptual	 notion	 that	 certain	 aspects	 of	 its	 own	 dynamics	 somehow	 exist	
outside	 itself;	 then,	 it	 projects	 its	 own	 essence	 onto	 these	 aspects.	 The	
corresponding	 dislocation	 of	 identity	 is	 apparent—and	 its	 neurotic	 character	
easy	to	grasp—with	an	analogy:	 imagine	a	painter	who,	having	painted	a	self-
portrait,	points	at	it	and	declares	himself	to	be	the	portrait.	This,	in	essence,	is	
what	 physicalists	 do,	 whether	 it	 is	 philosophically	 justifiable	 or	 not.4	Their	
consciousness	conceptualizes	self-portraits	within	itself.	Sometimes	these	self-
portraits	take	the	form	of	electrical	 impulses	and	neurotransmitter	releases	 in	
the	brain	(Koch	2004).	Other	times,	they	take	the	shape	of	quantum	transitions	
or	 potentials	 (Tarlaci	 and	 Pregnolato	 2016).	 Whatever	 the	 case,	 their	
consciousness	always	points	 to	a	conceptual	entity	 it	 creates	within	 itself	and	
then	declares	 itself	 to	be	 this	entity.	 It	dismisses	 its	own	primary,	 first-person	
point	 of	 view	 in	 favor	 of	 an	 abstract	 third-person	 perspective.	 Consider	
Dennett’s	words:	“The	way	to	answer	these	‘first-person	point	of	view’	stumpers	
is	to	ignore	the	first-person	point	of	view	and	examine	what	can	be	learned	from	
the	third-person	point	of	view”	(1991:	336,	emphasis	added).	The	contempt	for	
the	subject	of	experience—the	primary	datum	of	existence	and	one’s	own	 felt	
identity—is	palpable	here;	the	kenosis	nearly	total.	
The	 physicalist	 narrative	 may	 also	 give	 us	 permission	 to	 carve	 out	 and	
dismiss—again	through	the	kenosis	of	projection—the	most	difficult	aspects	of	
our	inner	lives:	our	felt	emotions.	According	to	it,	the	feeling	of	an	emotion	is	
the	 internal	 perception	 of	 an	 “action	 program”	 triggered	 by	 certain	 stimuli	
(Damasio	 2011).	 Although	 the	 action	 program	 itself	 is	 important	 insofar	 as	 it	
helps	us	 survive	 and	 reproduce,	 the	 accompanying	 feeling	of	 emotion	 is,	 in	 a	
sense,	a	mere	side	effect	of	the	program’s	execution.	For	instance,	the	sight	of	
another	human	being	 facing	a	predicament	 is	a	 stimulus	 that	 triggers	actions	
meant	 to	help	 the	victim	and,	 consequently,	 increase	 the	 social	 cachet	of	 the	
action	taker.	The	feeling	of	compassion,	in	turn,	is	supposedly	nothing	but	the	
inner	 perception	 of	 this	 evolutionarily	 useful	 reactive	 schema	 (Immordino-
Yang	 et	 al.	 2009);	 it	 allegedly	 has	 no	 primary	 or	 fundamental	 significance.	
Under	such	a	narrative,	it	is	easier	to	go	into	denial	about	our	emotional	lives	
when	the	going	gets	tough.	We	feel	justified	to	dismiss	or	repress	our	traumas	
and	demons,	avoiding	the	often-painful	work	of	psychological	integration.	The	
																																								 																																								 																																								 															
matter	is	that	Dennett	is	a	fanatic:	He	believes	so	fiercely	in	the	unique	authority	and	
absolutely	comprehensive	competency	of	the	third-person	scientific	perspective	that	
he	is	willing	to	deny	not	only	the	analytic	authority,	but	also	the	actual	existence,	of	
the	first-person	vantage”	(2017).	
4	For	 clarity,	 and	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 repeating	 myself,	 my	 position	 is	 that	 this	 is	 not	
philosophically	justifiable,	as	I	have	extensively	argued	earlier	in	this	dissertation.	
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physicalist	narrative	provides	a	foundation	for	rationalizing	the	choice	of	living	
an	unexamined,	 superficial	 life.	To	a	person	desperate	 to	avoid	 the	 specter	of	
immediate	and	pungent	 suffering,	 the	benefits	of	 this	 stance	may	seem	to	 far	
outweigh	its	potential	long-term	implications.	
Surprisingly,	 the	 physicalist	 narrative	 can	 even	 offer	 us	 reassurance	 about	
death.	 According	 to	 it,	 there	 is	 literally	 nothing	 to	 fear	 about	 death	 itself,	
because	 it	 is	 allegedly	 the	 end	 of	 all	 experience,	 including	 the	 experiences	 of	
fear	and	pain.	All	of	our	problems	and	suffering	are	guaranteed	to	end	at	that	
point.	The	great	and	scary	unknown	of	the	experiential	realm	beyond	physical	
existence	 vanishes	 in	 one	 fell	 swoop;	 the	 greatest	 angst	 of	 humankind	 is	
conquered.	The	psychological	allure	of	this	idea	is	powerful,	yet	most	people	do	
not	 seem	 to	 ever	 stop	 to	 consider	 it.	We	 have	 come	 to	 take	 for	 granted	 the	
comforts	that	our	mainstream	worldview	grants	us.	
To	sum	it	up,	by	denying	our	felt	sense	of	existence	and	identity,	the	physicalist	
narrative	creates	an	opportunity	to	clear	the	ego	of	ultimate	responsibility.	By	
denying	 the	 fundamental	 reality	 of	 emotions,	 it	 creates	 an	 opportunity	 to	
protect	 the	 ego	 from	 a	 confrontation	 with	 far	more	 powerful	 forces.	 And	 by	
projecting	our	ontological	essence	onto	ephemeral	arrangements	of	matter,	 it	
creates	an	opportunity	 to	protect	 the	ego	 from	what	has	historically	been	the	
greatest	angst	of	humankind:	the	experiential	unknown	of	the	after-death	state.	
	
B.4	 Egoic	control	
It	has	been	 shown	 that	 religiosity	 can	 reflect	 a	 form	of	 compensatory	 control	
(Kay	 et	 al.	 2010):	 by	 believing	 that	 transcendent	 forces	 aligned	 with	 one’s	
convictions	 govern	 the	 world,	 the	 ego	 avoids	 the	 anxiety	 associated	 with	 its	
own	 inability	 to	 overcome	 uncertainty.	 This	 way,	 religiosity	 creates	 an	
opportunity	for	control	by	proxy:	although	the	ego	cannot	determine	the	course	
of	 nature,	 an	 external	 agency	 far	 superior	 to	 it	 is	 believed	 to	 do	 so	 in	 a	way	
consistent	 with	 the	 ego’s	 preferences.	 The	 ego’s	 need	 to	 avoid	 anxiety	 by	
exerting	control	is	thus	indirectly	fulfilled.	
Going	 beyond	 religiosity,	 the	 physicalist	 narrative	 enables	 a	 sense	 of	 direct	
egoic	 control	 over	 nature.	 Indeed,	 a	 recent	 empirical	 study	 has	 shown	 that	
“believing	that	science	is	or	will	prospectively	grant	…	mastery	of	nature	imbues	
individuals	 with	 the	 belief	 that	 they	 are	 in	 control	 of	 their	 lives”	 (Stavrova,	
Ehlebracht	 and	 Fetchenhauer	 2016:	 234).	Of	 course,	 by	 associating	 itself	with	
science—in	 a	 philosophically	 questionable	 move	 that	 is	 nonetheless	 widely	
accepted—the	 physicalist	 narrative	 has	 become	 the	 enabler	 and	 ontological	
foundation	of	this	belief.	And	because	direct	control—the	notion	that	one	can	
personally	steer	or	at	least	predict	what	is	going	to	happen—is	known	to	be	a	
key	contributor	to	mental	well-being	(Langer	and	Rodin	1976,	Luck	et	al.	1999),	
it	stands	to	reason	that	the	allure	of	physicalism	in	this	regard	could	potentially	
be	even	stronger	than	that	of	religious	control-by-proxy.	
The	opportunity	 for	direct	control	offered	by	 the	physicalist	narrative	goes	as	
far	 as	 conquering	 death	 itself:	 if	 consciousness	 is	 just	 an	 epiphenomenon	 or	
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emergent	 property	 of	 physical	 arrangements	 outside	 experience,	 it	 becomes	
conceivable	that,	through	smart	engineering,	we	could	create	means	to	upload	
our	 consciousness	 into	 more	 durable	 substrates	 such	 as	 silicon	 computers	
(Kurzweil	2005).	Some	physicalists	even	offer	detailed	roadmaps	for	achieving	
this	(Sandberg	and	Boström	2008).	The	possibility	of	eternal	life	thus	seems	to	
open	 up,	 provided	 that	 consciousness	 can	 be	 instantiated	 in	 a	 computer	 by	
programming	 the	 computer	with	 the	patterns	 of	 information	 flow	 found	 in	 a	
person’s	brain.	
This,	 however,	 is	 premised	 on	 the	 notion	 that	 a	 simulation	 of	 a	 mental	
phenomenon	 is	 equivalent,	 in	 essence,	 to	 the	 phenomenon	 itself.	 There	 are	
many	 compelling	 arguments	 against	 this	 notion	 in	 philosophy	 of	 mind,	 the	
most	 well	 known	 of	 which	 is	 perhaps	 John	 Searle’s	 (2004).	 To	 gain	 some	
intuition	 about	 what	 these	 arguments	 generally	 entail,	 consider	 this:	 Do	 we	
have	any	reason	to	believe	that,	by	performing	a	perfectly	accurate	simulation	
of	 kidney	 function	 in	 a	 computer,	 the	 computer	 will	 begin	 urinating	 on	 its	
desk?	 Clearly	 not.	 There	 is	 an	 essential	 difference	 between	 a	 computer	
simulation	and	the	phenomenon	it	simulates;	they	are	not	the	same	thing,	no	
matter	 how	 accurate	 the	 simulation.	 Yet,	 those	 hoping	 to	 ‘upload	
consciousness’	under	the	physicalist	narrative	seem	to	become	so	engrossed	in	
abstraction	 that	 they	 lose	 touch	 with	 basic	 intuitions	 of	 plausibility.	 Their	
neurosis	is,	in	this	sense,	comparable	with	religious	dogmatism.	
Although	both	the	religious	and	physicalist	narratives	create	an	opportunity	for	
conquering	death,	the	Promethean	door	to	immortality	opened	by	physicalism	
invests	the	ego—not	deities—with	the	power	to	control	transcendence	through	
technology.	 This	 is	 seductively	 more	 direct,	 its	 only	 weakness—from	 a	
psychological	 standpoint—being	 that	 it	 is	promissory:	 at	present,	nobody	has	
ever	managed	 to	upload	consciousness.	Yet,	 some	popular	physicalist	 authors	
argue	that	consciousness	uploading	may	be	achievable	still	 in	our	own	 lifetime	
(Kurzweil	 2005,	 Sandberg	 and	 Boström	 2008),	 which	 actualizes	 the	 potential	
allure	of	their	worldview.	
As	 seen	 in	 Section	 B.3	 and	 this	 section,	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 physicalist	
narrative	consistently	help	protect	and	invest	the	ego	with	authority.	This	is	not	
to	 say	 that	 physicalism	 is	 entirely	 motivated	 by	 neurotic	 ego-defense	
maneuvers,	 for	 there	 is	 a	 philosophical	 argument	 behind	 it	 that	 cannot	 be	
dismissed.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 question	 is	 whether	 it	 is	 plausible	 that	
physicalism’s	significant	ego-defense	potential	has	not	been,	to	some	degree,	an	
unexamined	motivation	for	its	development,	promotion	and	adoption.	
	
B.5	 The	question	of	meaning	
Meaning—in	 the	 sense	 of	 significance	 and	 purpose—is	 probably	 the	 greatest	
asset	any	human	being	can	possess.	Psychotherapist	Victor	Frankl	(1991),	who	
practiced	and	led	groups	while	detained	in	a	concentration	camp	during	World	
War	II,	asserted	that	the	will-to-meaning	is	the	most	dominant	human	drive,	in	
contrast	 to	Nietzsche’s	will-to-power	 and	Freud’s	will-to-pleasure.	Meaning	 is	
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so	powerful	that,	as	Jung	remarked,	it	“makes	a	great	many	things	endurable—
perhaps	everything”	(1995:	373).	Philip	K.	Dick’s	alter	ego	Horselover	Fat,	in	the	
novel	 Valis,	 embodies	 the	 essence	 of	 this	 drive:	 “Fat	 had	 no	 concept	 of	
enjoyment;	he	understood	only	meaning,”	wrote	Dick	(2001:	92).	Like	Fat,	many	
of	us	see	meaning	as	a	higher	value	than	power	or	pleasure.	Our	motivation	to	
live	 rests	 in	 there	being	meaning	 in	our	 lives.	Today,	we	need	meaning	more	
than	ever,	 for	 as	Paul	Tillich	 (1952)	 lucidly	observed,	 the	greatest	 anxieties	of	
our	culture	are	precisely	those	of	doubt	and	meaninglessness.	
And	 here	 is	 where	 an	 argument	 is	 often	 made	 for	 the	 impartiality	 of	
physicalism:	 as	 a	 worldview	 that,	 by	 turning	 the	 universe	 into	 a	 mechanical	
contraption	 fueled	 by	mere	 chance,	 drains	 the	meaning	 out	 of	 life,	 it	 cannot	
possibly	 be	 a	 neurotic	 ego-defense	 mechanism—or	 so	 the	 argument	 goes.	
Instead,	 the	 physicalist	 narrative	 must	 represent	 a	 courageous	 admission	 by	
“tough	people	who	 face	 the	bleak	 facts”	 (Watts	 1989:	65).	 It	must	embody	an	
objective	 assessment	 of	 reality,	 not	 an	 emotional,	 irrational	 wish-fulfillment	
maneuver	 akin	 to	 religion.	Compelling	 as	 it	may	 seem	at	 first,	 this	 argument	
fails	careful	scrutiny,	for	its	premise	is	false.	
Indeed,	 according	 to	 the	 Meaning	 Maintenance	 Model	 (MMM)	 of	 social	
psychology	(Heine,	Proulx	and	Vohs	2006)—which	is	perhaps	better	seen	in	the	
context	of	a	broader	theory	of	psychological	defense	(Hart	2013)—we	can	derive	
a	sense	of	meaning	from	four	different	sources:	self-esteem,	closure,	belonging,	
and	symbolic	immortality.	In	other	words,	we	can	find	meaning	in	life	through	
(a)	cultivating	a	feeling	of	personal	worth,	(b)	resolving	doubts	and	ambiguities,	
(c)	being	part	 of	 something	bigger	 and	 longer-lasting	 than	ourselves,	 and	 (d)	
leaving	something	of	significance	behind—such	as	professional	achievements—
in	 the	 form	 of	 which	 we	 can	 ‘live	 on’	 after	 physical	 death.	 A	 society’s	
mainstream	 cultural	 narrative	 conditions	 how	meaning	 can	 be	 derived	 from	
each	of	these	four	sources.	
The	key	idea	behind	the	MMM	is	that	of	fluid	compensation	as	an	ego-defense	
mechanism:	If	one	of	the	four	sources	of	meaning	is	threatened,	an	individual	
will	tend	to	automatically	compensate	by	seeking	extra	meaning	from	the	other	
three	sources.	For	instance,	threats	to	self-esteem	may	cause	the	individual	to	
reaffirm	his	or	her	model	of	reality,	thereby	bolstering	closure.	
As	 van	 Tongeren	 and	 Green	 (2010)	 have	 shown,	 a	 transcendent	 source	 of	
meaning,	 such	 as	 religion,	 plays	 the	 same	 role	 in	 fluid	 compensation	 as	 the	
other	 four	 sources.	 For	 instance,	 individuals	 tend	 to	 reaffirm	 their	 religious	
beliefs	following	disruption	to	their	meaning	system,	in	an	effort	to	protect	the	
latter.	 Van	 Tongeren’s	 and	 Green’s	 experiments	 have	 not	 only	 empirically	
substantiated	the	MMM,	they	have	also	shown	that	even	subliminal	 threats	to	
meaning	trigger	fluid	compensation,	strongly	indicating	that	the	‘unconscious’	
is	integral	to	the	process.	
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With	 this	 as	 background,	 my	 suggestion	 is	 that	 the	 physicalist	 narrative,	 in	
addition	to	being	a	rational	hypothesis	for	making	sense	of	the	world,5	may	be	
an	 expression	 of	 fluid	 compensation	 by	 intellectual	 elites.	 In	 other	 words,	
instead	of	a	threat	to	meaning,	the	physicalist	narrative	may	actually	reflect	an	
attempt	by	 these	elites	 to	protect	and	restore	 their	sense	of	meaning	through	
bolstering	 closure,	 self-esteem	and	 symbolic	 immortality.	The	disruption	 that	
may	have	originally	 led	to	this	compensatory	move	occurred	around	the	mid-	
to	late-19th	century.	
Indeed,	 it	was	at	 that	 time	 that	we	 lost	our	ability	 to	 spontaneously	 relate	 to	
religious	myths	without	linear	intellectual	scrutiny.	“With	Descartes	and	Kant,	
the	philosophical	relation	between	Christian	belief	and	human	rationality	had	
grown	 ever	 more	 attenuated.	 By	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century,	 with	 few	
exceptions,	 that	 relation	was	 effectively	 absent,”	wrote	Tarnas	 (2010:	 311).	The	
myths	 that	 had	 hitherto	 offered	 us	 meaning	 through	 the	 promise	 of	 literal	
immortality	and	metaphysical	 teleology	became	untenable.	Taylor,	who	richly	
chronicled	 this	 historical	 transition,	 characterized	 the	 corresponding	 loss	 of	
meaning	 rather	 broadly	 and	 generally	 as	 “a	 wide	 sense	 of	 malaise	 at	 the	
disenchanted	world,	a	sense	of	it	as	flat,	empty”	(2007:	302).	He	even	hinted	at	
fluid	 compensation	 when	 speaking	 of	 “a	 multiform	 search	 for	 something	
within,	 or	 beyond	 [the	world],	which	 could	 compensate	 for	 the	meaning	 lost	
with	transcendence”	(ibid.).	
While	 acknowledging	 that	 this	 generalized	 malaise	 was	 the	 matrix	 of	 what	
followed,	I	submit	that	a	more	specific,	forceful	and	personal	threat	to	meaning	
was	necessary	to	mobilize	the	extraordinary	level	of	academic	and	intellectual	
endorsement	 amassed	 by	 physicalism.	 After	 all—as	 Taylor	 himself	 described	
through	what	he	called	“the	nova	effect”—the	malaise,	in	and	by	itself,	fostered	
not	only	physicalism	but	also	an	explosion	of	myriad	other	worldviews.	
I	hypothesize	that	a	profound	and	disturbing	change	 in	the	 intellectual	elites’	
understanding	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 their	 own	 being—that	 is,	 an	 ontological	
trauma—was	the	specific,	forceful	and	personal	trigger	that	helped	congeal	the	
physicalist	narrative.	Having	lost	religion,	the	elites	were	left	with	the	prospect	
of	physical	deterioration	without	the	path	to	transcendence	previously	offered	
by	an	immortal	soul.	Hence,	they	were	forced	to	face	the	inexorability	of	their	
own	 approaching	 death.	 And	 as	 we	 know	 from	 Terror	 Management	 Theory,	
mortality	 salience	 is	 a	 formidable	 threat	 to	meaning	 (Pyszczynski,	Greenberg	
and	 Solomon	 1997)	 empirically	 shown	 to	 motivate	 investment	 in	 palliative	
worldviews	(Burke,	Martens	and	Faucher	2010).	Ontological	 trauma	may	have	
thus	triggered	 fluid	compensation	and	ultimately	 led	to	the	 intellectual	elites’	
championing	of	the	physicalist	narrative.	
Indeed,	many	studies	have	shown	that	mortality	salience	leads	to	a	heightened	
need	 for	 closure	 (Landau	 et	 al.	 2004).	 This	 is	 fluid	 compensation	 in	 action.	
																																								 								
5	Again,	here	I	am	making	a	charitable	concession	to	physicalism	because	the	limited	
scope	of	this	particular	article—focused,	as	it	is,	on	psychology—prevented	me	from	
arguing	against	it	philosophically.	
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Notice	also	that	the	physicalist	narrative	is	humanity’s	most	significant	attempt	
yet	to	achieve	closure	in	our	worldview.	As	multibillion-dollar	experiments	like	
the	Large	Hadron	Collider—whose	primary	purpose	 is	 to	 ‘close’	 the	 Standard	
Model	of	particle	physics,	with	no	immediate	practical	applications—illustrate,	
physicalism	embodies	an	unprecedented	effort	to	produce	a	causally	complete,	
unambiguous	model	of	 reality.	Nothing	else	 in	millennia	of	preceding	history	
has	 come	 anywhere	 near	 it.	 I	 suggest	 that	 this	 is	 not	 coincidental:	 the	
physicalist	 narrative	 may	 reflect	 the	 elites’	 ego’s	 attempt	 to	 regain,	 through	
heightened	 closure,	 the	meaning	 it	 lost	 along	 with	 religion.	Moreover,	 other	
modalities	of	fluid	compensation	may	be	at	play	here	as	well:	by	distinguishing	
themselves	as	a	segment	of	society	uniquely	capable	of	understanding	facts	and	
concepts	beyond	the	cognitive	capacity	of	others,	the	scientists	and	academics	
who	 promote	 the	 physicalist	 narrative	 stand	 to	 gain	 in	 self-esteem.	 The	
cosmological	scope	of	the	scientific	work	they	produce	and	leave	behind	upon	
their	deaths	can	also	be	seen	as	a	boost	to	symbolic	immortality.	Finally,	recall	
Tillich’s	observation:	doubt	and	meaninglessness	anxiety	dominate	our	culture’s	
mindset.	 Is	 it	 humanly	 plausible	 that	 our	 mainstream	 narrative	 would	 have	
evolved	to	tackle	only	doubt	and	leave	meaninglessness	anxiety	unaddressed?	
All	 in	all,	 the	physicalist	narrative	does	not	necessarily	 represent	a	net	 loss	of	
meaning	 for	 the	 intellectual	elites	who	produced	and	continue	 to	promote	 it.	
The	transcendent	meaning	lost	along	with	religion	may	be	compensated	for	by	
an	 increase	 in	 closure,	 self-esteem	 and	 symbolic	 immortality.	 Unfortunately,	
however,	this	compensatory	strategy	cannot	work	for	most	ordinary	people:	the	
men	 and	 women	 on	 the	 streets	 do	 not	 have	 enough	 grasp	 of	 contemporary	
scientific	theories	to	experience	an	increase	in	their	sense	of	closure.	Neither	do	
they	gain	 in	self-esteem,	because	they	are	not	part	of	 the	distinguished	elites.	
Finally,	insofar	as	ordinary	people	do	not	produce	scientific	work	of	their	own,	
no	particular	gain	in	symbolic	immortality	is	to	be	expected	either.	
In	conclusion,	 the	physicalist	narrative	may	serve	 the	egoic	meaning	needs	of	
the	intellectual	elites	who	develop	and	promote	it,	but	constitutes	a	significant	
threat	to	the	sense	of	meaning	of	the	average	person	on	the	streets.	Perhaps	for	
this	 reason,	 a	 large	 segment	 of	 society	 seeks	 meaning	 through	 alternative	
ontologies	considered	outdated	and	untenable	by	the	intellectual	elites,	such	as	
religious	 dualism	 (Heflick	 et	 al.	 2015).	 This	 creates	 a	 schism—with	
corresponding	 tensions—between	 different	 segments	 of	 society,	 which	 may	
help	 explain	 the	 contemporary	 conflict	 between	 neo-atheism	 and	 religious	
belief.	
	
B.6	 Conclusion	
The	physicalist	narrative,	 in	contrast	 to	the	way	 it	 is	normally	portrayed,	may	
not	 be	 dispassionate.	 It	 may	 be	 partly	 driven	 by	 the	 neurotic	 endeavor	 to	
project	 onto	 the	 world	 attributes	 that	 help	 us	 avoid	 confronting	
unacknowledged	 aspects	 of	 our	 own	 inner	 lives.	Moreover,	 contrary	 to	 what	
most	 people	 assume,	 physicalism	 creates	 an	 opportunity	 for	 the	 intellectual	
elites	who	develop	and	promote	it	to	maintain	a	sense	of	meaning	in	their	own	
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lives	 through	 fluid	 compensation.	 However,	 because	 this	 compensatory	
strategy	does	not	apply	to	a	large	segment	of	society,	it	creates	a	schism—with	
corresponding	 tensions—that	 may	 help	 explain	 the	 contemporary	 conflict	
between	neo-atheism	and	religious	belief.	
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Summary	
This	 dissertation	 elaborates	 on	 a	modern,	 analytic	 version	 of	 the	 ontology	 of	
idealism,	according	to	which	(a)	phenomenal	consciousness,	as	an	ontological	
category,	 is	 fundamental;	 and	 (b)	 everything	 else	 in	nature	 can	ultimately	 be	
reduced	 to,	 or	 grounded	 in,	 patterns	 of	 excitation	 of	 phenomenal	
consciousness.	 It	 posits	 a	 reduction	 base	 consisting	 of	 a	 single	 element:	
spatially	 unbound,	 universal	 phenomenal	 consciousness.	 Its	 key	 challenge	 is	
then	to	explain	how	the	seemingly	distinct	phenomenal	inner	lives	of	different	
subjects	of	experience	can	arise	within	this	fundamentally	unitary	phenomenal	
field.	 This	 is	 sometimes	 called	 the	 “decomposition	 problem”	 in	 the	 literature	
and	it	is	the	core	problem	this	dissertation	attempts	to	tackle.	Along	the	way,	a	
variety	 of	 other	 challenges	 are	 addressed,	 such	 as:	 how	 we	 can	 reconcile	
idealism	with	 the	 fact	 that	we	all	 inhabit	 a	 common	external	world;	why	 this	
world	unfolds	independently	of	our	personal	volition	or	imagination;	why	there	
are	 such	 tight	 correlations	 between	 measured	 patterns	 of	 brain	 activity	 and	
reports	of	experience;	etc.	
The	 core	 of	 this	 dissertation	 consists	 of	 five	 papers	 published	 in	 academic	
journals.	 They	 are	 reproduced	 here,	 in	 chapters	 2	 through	 6,	 without	 any	
change	of	substance.	
Chapter	 2	 discusses	 what	 is	 perhaps	 the	 root	 of	 key	 unresolved	 problems	 in	
contemporary	analytic	philosophy:	the	tendency	to	try	to	make	sense	of	nature	
by	replacing	concrete	observations	with	theoretical	abstractions.	Such	attempts	
often	consist	of	mere	word	games,	played	 in	 thought	with	a	 rich	and	shifting	
phantasmagoria	 of	 concepts.	 Chapter	 2	 attempts	 to	 make	 these	 word	 games	
explicit.	 It	 also	 suggests	 more	 epistemically	 reliable	 lines	 of	 reasoning	 that	
avoid	unnecessary	conceptual	abstractions.	
By	pursuing	these	more	reliable	lines	of	reasoning,	Chapter	3—the	core	of	this	
dissertation—elaborates	 on	 an	 analytic	 formulation	 of	 idealism.	 It	 can	 be	
summarized	 thus:	 there	 is	 only	 universal	 phenomenal	 consciousness.	We,	 as	
well	 as	 all	 other	 living	 organisms,	 are	 dissociated	 alters	 of	 this	 universal	
consciousness,	analogously	to	how	a	person	with	Dissociative	Identity	Disorder	
(DID)	manifests	multiple	disjoint	centers	of	subjectivity	also	called	‘alters.’	We,	
and	 all	 other	 living	 organisms,	 are	 surrounded	 by	 the	 transpersonal	
phenomenal	 activity	 of	 universal	 consciousness,	 which	 unfolds	 beyond	 the	
dissociative	boundary	of	our	respective	alter.	The	inanimate	world	we	perceive	
around	us	 is	 the	 ‘extrinsic	appearance’—i.e.	 the	phenomenal	 image	 imprinted	
from	across	 our	 dissociative	 boundary—of	 this	 activity.	 The	 living	 organisms	
we	share	the	world	with	are	the	extrinsic	appearances	of	other	alters.	
Chapter	4	 lists	possible	objections	against	such	a	consciousness-only	ontology	
and	tackles	them	one	by	one.	It	attempts	to	show	that	they	are	often	based	on	
logical	 fallacies	 such	 as	 question-begging,	 unexamined	 assumptions,	
misunderstandings	of	the	implications	of	analytic	idealism,	etc.	
One	 objection	 is	 exceptional	 because	 it	 poses	 some	 legitimate	 difficulties:	 a	
necessary	 implication	 of	 the	 ontology	 proposed	 in	 Chapter	 3	 is	 that	 an	
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organism’s	metabolism—all	of	it—is	the	extrinsic	appearance	of	the	organism’s	
conscious	 inner	 life.	 This	 is	 reasonable	 enough	 for	 certain	 patterns	 of	 brain	
activity	known	to	correlate	with	experiences	accessible	 through	 introspection,	
but	 what	 about	 so-called	 ‘unconscious’	 mental	 processes	 and	 metabolism	
beyond	the	brain,	such	as	e.g.	liver	and	kidney	function?	
Chapter	 5	 argues	 that,	 despite	 appearances	 to	 the	 contrary,	 there	 is	 no	 clear	
reason	 to	 believe	 that	 any	 mental	 process	 is	 truly	 unconscious.	 Instead,	 it	
attempts	to	show	that	there	are,	 in	fact,	very	good	reasons	to	think	that	what	
we	regard	as	unconscious	mental	processes	correspond	merely	to	an	illusion	of	
unconsciousness,	 which	 results	 from	 dissociative	 states	 or	 lack	 of	
metacognition.	And	once	 these	 two	mechanisms—dissociative	 states	and	 lack	
of	 metacognition—are	 identified,	 they	 can	 explain	 why	 experiences	
corresponding	to	areas	of	 the	 living	body	beyond	the	nervous	system	can’t	be	
accessed	through	introspection.	
Finally,	 Chapter	 6	 compiles	 and	 discusses	 a	 broad	 list	 of	 instances	 of	 brain	
function	 impairment	 that	 are	 accompanied	 by	 enrichment	 of	 conscious	 inner	
life	and	an	expansion	of	one’s	sense	of	identity.	The	list	includes	cases	as	varied	
as	asphyxiation,	physical	trauma	to	the	head,	the	consumption	of	psychoactive	
substances	that	dampen	brain	activity,	etc.	Such	correlations	between	impaired	
brain	 function	 and	 enriched	 conscious	 inner	 life	 are	 at	 least	 counterintuitive	
under	the	mainstream	physicalist	notion	that	conscious	inner	life	is	constituted	
or	generated	by	brain	activity.	Under	analytic	idealism,	on	the	other	hand,	they	
are	to	be	expected:	if	normal	brain	function	is	part	of	the	extrinsic	appearance	
of	a	dissociated	alter	of	universal	consciousness,	then	some	forms	of	reduction	
or	impairment	of	normal	brain	function	should	be	the	extrinsic	appearance	of	a	
reduction	or	impairment	of	the	dissociation.	And,	of	course,	from	a	first-person	
perspective	a	reduction	of	dissociation	must	be	experienced	as	an	enrichment	
of	conscious	inner	life:	reintegrated	memories,	the	recovery	of	a	broader	sense	
identity,	 renewed	 access	 to	 previously	 dissociated	 insights	 and	 emotions,	
reintegration	 of	 previously	 dissociated	 skills,	 etc.	 Contrary	 to	 physicalism,	
analytic	idealism	can	thus	not	only	accommodate,	but	also	make	sense	of,	the	
evidence	discussed	in	Chapter	6.	
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Samenvatting	
Dit	proefschrift	stelt	voor	een	moderne,	analytische	versie	van	de	ontologie	van	
idealisme.	 Volgens	 deze	 zo	 genoemde	 ‘analytische	 idealisme,’	 (a)	 fenomenaal	
bewustzijn,	 als	 een	 ontologische	 categorie,	 is	 fundamenteel;	 en	 (b)	 elk	
waarneembaar	aspect	van	de	natuur	kan	uiteindelijk	worden	gereduceerd	 tot,	
of	geaard	in,	patronen	van	opwinding	van	fenomenaal	bewustzijn.	Het	poneert	
een	 reductiebasis	 bestaande	 uit	 een	 enkel	 element:	 ruimtelijk	 ongebonden,	
universeel	fenomenaal	bewustzijn.	De	belangrijkste	uitdaging	is	dan	om	uit	te	
leggen	 hoe	 de	 schijnbare	 gescheiden	 fenomenale	 innerlijke	 levens	 van	
verschillende	 subjecten	 zich	 kunnen	 voordoen	 binnen	 dit	 fundamenteel	
eenvormige	 fenomenale	 veld.	 Dit	 wordt	 in	 de	 literatuur	 soms	 het	
‘decompositieprobleem’	 genoemd	 en	 het	 is	 het	 kernprobleem	 dat	 dit	
proefschrift	 probeert	 aan	 te	 pakken.	 Onderweg	 komen	 er	 een	 aantal	 andere	
uitdagingen	aan	de	orde,	zoals:	hoe	we	analytische	idealisme	kunnen	verzoenen	
met	het	feit	dat	we	allemaal	een	gemeenschappelijke	externe	wereld	bewonen;	
waarom	deze	wereld	zich	ontvouwt	onafhankelijk	van	onze	persoonlijke	wil	of	
verbeeldingskracht;	 waarom	 er	 zulke	 strakke	 correlaties	 zijn	 tussen	 gemeten	
patronen	van	hersenactiviteit	en	ervaringsrapporten;	enz.	
De	kern	van	dit	proefschrift	bestaat	uit	vijf	papers	gepubliceerd	in	academische	
tijdschriften.	 Ze	 worden	 hier	 weergegeven,	 in	 hoofdstukken	 2	 tot	 en	 met	 6,	
zonder	enige	verandering	van	inhoud.	
Hoofdstuk	 2	 bespreekt	 wat	 misschien	 de	 oorzaak	 is	 van	 de	 belangrijkste	
onopgeloste	problemen	in	de	hedendaagse	analytische	filosofie:	de	neiging	om	
te	proberen	de	natuur	toe	te	lichten	door	concrete	waarnemingen	te	vervangen	
door	 theoretische	 abstracties.	 Zulke	 pogingen	 bestaan	 vaak	 uit	 louter	
woordspelletjes,	 gespeeld	 in	 gedachten	 met	 een	 rijke	 en	 veranderende	
fantasmagorie	 van	 concepten.	 Hoofdstuk	 2	 probeert	 deze	 woordspelletjes	
expliciet	 te	maken.	Het	 suggereert	ook	meer	epistemische	betrouwbare	 lijnen	
van	redenatie	die	onnodige	conceptuele	abstracties	vermijden.	
Door	 deze	meer	 betrouwbare	 redenaties	 na	 te	 streven,	 gaat	Hoofdstuk	 3—de	
kern	van	dit	proefschrift—in	op	een	analytische	formulering	van	idealisme.	Het	
kan	 als	 volgt	 worden	 samengevat:	 er	 is	 alleen	 universeel	 fenomenaal	
bewustzijn.	Wij,	 evenals	 alle	 andere	 levende	 organismen,	 zijn	 gedissocieerde	
‘alters’	 van	 dit	 universeel	 bewustzijn,	 analoog	 aan	 hoe	 een	 persoon	 met	
Dissociatieve	 Identiteitsstoornis	 meerdere	 disjuncte	 centra	 van	 subjectiviteit	
manifesteert,	ook	wel	‘alters’	genoemd.	Wij,	en	alle	andere	levende	organismen,	
worden	omringd	door	de	transpersoonlijke	fenomenale	activiteit	van	universeel	
bewustzijn,	 die	 zich	 ontvouwt	 voorbij	 de	 dissociatieve	 grens	 van	 ons	
respectieve	 alter.	 De	 levenloze	wereld	 die	we	 om	 ons	 heen	waarnemen	 is	 de	
‘extrinsieke	verschijning’—d.w.z.	het	fenomenale	beeld	dat	is	afgedrukt	vanuit	
onze	dissociatieve	grens—van	deze	activiteit.	De	 levende	wezens	waarmee	we	
de	wereld	delen	zijn	de	extrinsieke	verschijningen	van	andere	alters.	
Hoofdstuk	 4	 somt	mogelijke	 bezwaren	 op	 tegen	 zo	 een	 ontologie	met	 alleen	
bewustzijn	 en	 pakt	 ze	 een	 voor	 een	 aan.	 Het	 probeert	 te	 laten	 zien	 dat	 de	
bezwaren	vaak	gebaseerd	zijn	op	logische	drogredenen	zoals	cirkelredenering,	
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foutieve	 impliciete	 veronderstellingen,	misverstanden	 over	 de	 implicaties	 van	
analytische	idealisme,	enz.	
Eén	 bezwaar	 is	 uitzonderlijk	 omdat	 het	 enkele	 legitieme	 moeilijkheden	
oplevert:	 een	 noodzakelijke	 implicatie	 van	 de	 in	 Hoofdstuk	 3	 voorgestelde	
ontologie	 is	 dat	 de	 hele	 metabolisme	 van	 een	 organisme	 de	 extrinsieke	
verschijning	 is	 van	 de	 bewuste	 innerlijke	 leven	 van	 het	 organisme.	 Dit	 is	
redelijk	voor	bepaalde	patronen	van	hersenactiviteit	waarvan	bekend	is	dat	ze	
correleren	met	 ervaringen	 die	 toegankelijk	 zijn	 via	 introspectie,	maar	 hoe	 zit	
het	 met	 de	 zogenaamde	 ‘onbewuste’	 mentale	 processen	 en	 het	 metabolisme	
buiten	de	hersenen,	zoals	b.v.	lever-	en	nierfunctie?	
Hoofdstuk	5	stelt	dat	er,	ondanks	het	schijn	van	het	tegendeel,	geen	duidelijke	
reden	is	om	te	geloven	dat	een	mentaal	proces	ooit	echt	onbewust	is.	In	plaats	
daarvan	probeert	het	te	laten	zien	dat	er	in	feite	zeer	goede	redenen	zijn	om	te	
denken	dat	wat	we	beschouwen	als	onbewuste	mentale	processen	alleen	maar	
overeenkomen	 met	 een	 illusie	 van	 onbewustzijn,	 die	 het	 gevolg	 is	 van	
dissociatieve	 toestanden	 of	 gebrek	 aan	 metacognitie.	 En	 zodra	 deze	 twee	
mechanismen—dissociatieve	toestanden	en	gebrek	aan	metacognitie—worden	
geïdentificeerd,	 kunnen	 ze	 verklaren	 waarom	 ervaringen	 die	 corresponderen	
met	 gebieden	 van	 het	 levende	 lichaam	 voorbij	 het	 zenuwstelsel	 niet	
toegankelijk	zijn	via	introspectie.	
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